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ABSTRACT 
 
This thesis consists of four self-contained papers in the areas of disaster risk and economic 
development. Chapter One provides a qualitative survey of the empirical literature on the nexus 
among poverty, inequality and natural disasters. The last few years have seen an explosion of 
economic research on the consequences of natural disasters. This new interest is attributable first 
and foremost to a growing awareness of the potentially catastrophic nature of these events, but 
also a result of the increasing awareness that natural disasters are social and economic events. 
Here, we survey the literature that examines the direct and indirect impact of natural disaster 
events specifically on the poor and their impact on the distribution of income within affected 
communities and societies.  
 
With a meta-regression analysis of the existing literature on the impacts of disasters on households 
in Chapter Two, we observe several general patterns. Incomes are clearly impacted adversely, with 
the impact observed specifically in per-capita measures. Consumption is also reduced, but to a 
lesser extent than incomes. Poor households appear to smooth their food consumption by 
reducing the consumption of non-food items; in particular health and education, and this suggests 
potentially long-term adverse consequences. Given the limits of our methodology and the paucity 
of research, we find no consistent patterns in long-term outcomes. We place disaster risk to the 
poor within the context of sustainable development and future climatic change. 
 
Our objective In Chapter Three is to identify all of the directly observable determinants’ of publicly 
allocated and realized spending for disaster risk reduction (DRR) at the local government (sub-
district) level in Bangladesh. We employ the Heckman two-stage selection model with detailed 
public finance and other data from 483 sub-districts (Upazilas) across the country. While some of 
our results conform with our priors, our estimations surprisingly find that government does not 
respond to the sub-district’s risk exposure as a factor affecting the DRR financing mechanism. This 
variable is consistently counter-intuitively statistically insignificant. The DRR regional allocations 
do not seem to be determined by risk and exposure, only weakly by vulnerability, nor even by 
more transparent political economy motivations.  
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In Chapter Four, we examine the short-run economic impacts of recurrent flooding on Bangladeshi 
households surveyed in 2000, 2005 and 2010. In 2010 Household Income and Expenditure Survey 
(HIES), households answered a set of questions’ on whether they were affected by flood  and its 
likely impacts. We identify two treatment (affected) groups by using the self-reported data and 
historical rainfall data based flood risk index. We estimate a difference-in-difference (DID) model 
to quantify the impacts on income, expenditure, asset and labour market outcomes and further 
extend our analysis to different income and expenditure brackets. Overall, we find robust evidence 
of negative impacts on agricultural income and expenditure. Intriguingly, the extreme poor (i.e. 
the bottom 15th quintile) experience significant positive impacts on agricultural income in the self-
reported treatment case.  
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INTRODUCTION OF THE THESIS: 
Natural disasters - earthquakes, typhoons, hurricanes, floods, cold and heat waves, 
droughts and volcanic eruptions - are a constant presence in all our lives and there had been an 
explosion of economic research on their consequences in the last few years. In addition to a 
growing awareness of the potentially catastrophic nature of these events, this is also a result of 
the increasing awareness that natural disasters are social and economic events. Hence, their 
impact is shaped as much by the structure and characteristics of the countries they hit as by their 
physical attributes. This research had also been flourished on the potential changes that will occur 
in the pattern and intensity of future natural events that is associated with anthropogenic climate 
change. Despite the fact that disasters occur everywhere with increasing direct financial costs for 
the past several decades, they are especially prevalent in the most populous region of the world 
(e.g. Asia) and most catastrophic in the destruction they wreak in the poorest countries (e.g., Haiti 
in 2010). The need to understand the role of disasters and their impacts on the poor, in creating 
and sustaining poverty, and in generating poverty traps, is even more acute as the changes due to 
human-induced climate change are predicted to be more extreme in poorer countries and will thus 
place additional barriers to poverty alleviation. 
These intersecting themes of disasters, climate change, and poverty are gaining even more 
prominence now with the ongoing negotiations of three new comprehensive international treaties 
under the aegis of the United Nations: on disaster risk reduction (a successor to the Hyogo 
Framework for Action), on climate change mitigation and adaptation (a successor to the Kyoto 
Protocol), and on sustainable development (a successor to the Millennium Development Goals). 
All of these are scheduled to conclude in 2015.  
Therefore, in Chapter One, we aim to contribute to these international discussions by first 
surveying the existing literature on the impact of natural disasters on poverty and the poor, their 
impact on income distribution within affected communities and societies, discuss some of the 
limitations associated with this literature, and outline a future agenda of investigation that can 
contribute to better-informed policymaking. We argue that perhaps it is even more important to 
determine the long-term effects of catastrophic disasters on various income groups, rather than 
only their direct and indirect short-term impacts as despite the limited empirical evidence 
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available, data suggest that large natural shocks can have important regional consequences that 
may persist for decades. 
The poor, both in low- and higher-income countries are especially vulnerable to the impact 
of disasters, so that disasters are not only of interest to social scientists because of society-wide 
economic impact, their impact on the public sector which bears the costs of reconstruction, or 
because of their environmental impact, but also because of their importance in the processes of 
development, income growth, and income distribution. The research on the impact of disaster 
shocks specifically on the poor is one branch of this wider ‘disaster’ literature that has not yet been 
adequately summarized, nor has there appeared to be any attempt to reach any general 
conclusions from the numerous case studies (country-specific, disaster-type-specific, or disaster-
event-specific) that constitute the bulk of this research stream. This lacuna is at least in part 
attributable to the complex nature of the inter-relationship between disaster impacts and poverty 
and welfare outcomes, and the consequent diversity of impacts across the investigated case 
studies. An additional difficulty, given this diversity of outcomes, is in identifying the precise 
channels - both direct and indirect - that describe the causal mechanisms. We aim to fill this lacuna 
using meta-regression analysis in Chapter Two. Our contribution here is the synthesis of the 
microeconomic literature examining the heterogeneity of impact of disasters on the poor 
complementing the macroeconomic insights derived from previous work.  
A burgeoning literature has emerged investigating the efficacy of public spending in lower 
income countries. This literature assumes that public spending is indeed geared towards achieving 
the relevant favourable outcomes—productivity growth for infrastructure spending, better health 
service utilization for health spending, or improved literacy for education spending. More 
importantly, this literature implicitly assumes that funding is allocated optimally given these 
desired outcomes and the perceived community needs. It is this last assumption that we examine 
in Chapter Three. Our focus here amounts to answering a basic question: ‘what determines public 
spending in disaster risk reduction and mitigation in Bangladesh?’ We focus on Bangladesh as it is 
widely perceived as a poster-child for successful spending on DRR by a developing country. In 
particular, Bangladesh is often mentioned for its successful early warning programmes for 
cyclones, which is frequently favourably contrasted with neighbouring Burma after its catastrophic 
experience with cyclone Nargis in 2008. We believe that this particular question has important 
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implications not only for DRR spending in Bangladesh but also to DRR spending elsewhere, and 
more generally for government spending in low income countries and its challenges. 
The ‘disaster-development’ literature has made considerably less progress on the use of 
self-reported data to empirically estimate the impacts of natural disasters on development 
outcomes in least developed countries with high climatic risks. In Chapter Four, we examine the 
short-run economic impacts of recurrent flooding on Bangladeshi households surveyed in 2000, 
2005 and 2010. In 2010 Household Income and Expenditure Survey (HIES), households answered 
a set of questions’ on whether they were affected by flood and its likely impacts. In this paper, we 
ask: ‘what are the impacts on household income, expenditure, asset and labour market outcomes 
of recurrent flooding in Bangladesh?’ This paper makes two key contributions: First, we develop a 
difference-in-difference (DID) model and estimate the impacts of recurrent flooding through 
identification of two different treatment (affected) groups using self-reported information and 
historical rainfall data based flood risk index for Bangladesh. We further extend our analysis using 
a quantile regression and quantify the impacts on the ‘ultra’ (extreme) poor. The development 
responses of the climatic disasters may therefore depend on the novel approach i.e. accuracy in 
identifying the treatment groups using self- and non-self-reported data. Second, we show that 
there is inconsistency between self- and non-self-reported information based estimates with 
literature outcomes questioning the designation of survey questions (related to natural shocks) 
and their usefulness to capture development impacts. 
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A QUALITATIVE SURVEY OF THE EMPIRICAL LITERATURE 
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1.1         ECONOMIC RESEARCH ON DISASTER IMPACT 
 The last few years have seen an explosion of economic research on the consequences of 
natural disasters. This is probably attributable first and foremost to a growing awareness of the 
potentially catastrophic nature of these events as evident, for example, in the earthquake and 
tsunami in South-East Asia in 2004, the 2010 Port-au-Prince earthquake, and the 2011 triple 
earthquake/tsunami/nuclear disaster in Japan. It is also a result of the increasing awareness that 
natural disasters are social and economic events: their impact is shaped as much by the structure 
and characteristics of the countries they hit as by their physical attributes such as wind speed and 
rainfall for tropical storms, or the energy unleashed in an earthquake.  
In addition to this growing interest in the social and economic aspects of the risk that 
natural hazards pose, the increasing awareness of climatic change is also playing an important role. 
Much discussion in the past few years had focused on the potential changes that will occur in the 
pattern and intensity of future events that is associated with human-induced climate change. A 
summary of these intersecting literatures was recently undertaken by the Intergovernmental Panel 
on Climate Change (IPCC, 2012).  
 Recent research projects have evaluated the growth impact of natural disasters in the 
short- and medium-long terms, the fiscal impact of disasters (again for various time horizons), the 
impact on international trade and financial flows, the impact on populations through migration 
and fertility choices, the impact on human capital, the importance of political economy questions 
in shaping the disasters’ aftermath, and on other related topics. Intriguingly, there is less research 
on the impact of natural disaster events specifically on the poor and on income distribution (on 
inequality).  
These intersecting themes of disasters, climate change, and poverty are gaining even more 
prominence now with the ongoing negotiations of three new comprehensive international treaties 
under the aegis of the United Nations: on disaster risk reduction (a successor to the Hyogo 
Framework for Action), on climate change mitigation and adaptation (a successor to the Kyoto 
Protocol), and on sustainable development (a successor to the Millennium Development Goals). 
All of these are scheduled to conclude in 2015.  
Here, we aim to contribute to these international discussions by first surveying the existing 
literature on the impact of natural disasters on poverty and the poor, discussing some of the 
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limitations associated with this literature, and outlining a future agenda of investigation that can 
contribute to better-informed policymaking. A companion paper, Karim and Noy (2014), 
generalizes some insights from a subset of the empirical research papers described here using a 
meta-regression technique. 
 
1.2 A TYPOLOGY OF IMPACTS 
Before we discuss this literature, we need to clarify what we mean by disaster impacts, and 
what are some of the methodological decisions that are inherent in this choice. ECLAC (2003) 
distinguish between the direct impact of sudden-onset disasters (the immediate mortality, 
morbidity, and physical damage) and the indirect impact that affects the economy in the aftermath 
of the actual damage caused (including secondary mortality and morbidity, and an impact on 
economic activity). The World Bank in their survey Natural Hazards Unnatural Disasters (2010) 
employs a different terminology that makes essentially the same distinction: first-order and higher-
order effects. 
The terminology of n-order effects might be preferable in theory since it enables one to 
potentially distinguish between second-order effects (e.g., the immediate decline in production as 
a result of the destruction of productive capital), and third-order (or even higher) effects (e.g., the 
decline in production that results from the decline in imported inputs that resulted from exchange 
rate and terms-of-trade changes following a disaster). 
These distinctions between second-order and higher-order effects is however difficult to 
operationalize into a precise typology. We, therefore, refrain from using this terminology and 
persist in using the more coarse distinction between direct and indirect effects (Cavallo and Noy, 
2011). Here, our interest is understanding both the immediate (direct or first-order) effect of 
disasters on poverty and income distribution and also the consequent indirect (higher-order) 
effects that have an impact on the lives of the poor and on distribution of incomes and resources 
within societies. 
Another potentially important distinction lies between natural disasters that are frequent 
and occur regularly and those disasters whose nature or magnitude is unusual (and therefore 
probably unexpected). The distribution of disaster damages is highly skewed, with presence of very 
extreme - “fat tail” - disasters, whose costs (in terms of mortality, morbidity, and/or physical 
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destruction) are significantly higher than the average disaster costs. The Haiti earthquake of 
January 2010, for example, led to a mortality that was at least 10 standard deviations higher than 
in earthquakes of similar or higher strength (Noy, 2013). The 2004 earthquake/tsunami in the 
Indian Ocean and cyclone Nargis in Myanmar in 2008 are also examples of these fat-tail events. 
Fat-tail events would be typically associated with extremely small probabilities in common 
risk assessments, but are nevertheless quite common occurrences worldwide. Importantly, since 
the probability that these catastrophic events will occur is thought to be so small, policymakers 
will tend to ignore them and societies will generally be underprepared for them. 
Our interest in this survey paper is to discuss the impact of natural disasters - both direct 
and indirect - on poverty and income distribution. In this description, we will distinguish between 
the impact of sudden-onset catastrophic events and more regular natural hazards that occur in 
many countries (e.g., typhoons in the Philippines or the annual monsoon floods in Bangladesh). 
 
1.3 THE DIRECT IMPACTS OF DISASTERS ON THE POOR: SUDDEN-ONSET EVENTS 
 The direct damages from a disaster are not evenly distributed. Comparison between 
countries clearly shows that richer countries can prevent or mitigate disasters’ impact more 
effectively and therefore the cost they bear (as a fraction of their economic size) is significantly 
smaller (Kahn, 2005). The reasoning that appears to explain why these cross-country differences 
depend on average incomes has, firstly, to do with the most obvious channel: preventive measures 
are normal (or luxury) investment goods, so countries with higher permanent incomes or wealth 
will be able to devote more resources to prevention or mitigation.  
 Escaleras et al. (2007), however, argue that corruption explains a lot of the cross-country 
differences in initial impacts of similar events, and it is well documented that corruption is inversely 
related to average per capita income. Kellenberg and Mobarak (2008) find evidence for a non-
linear cross-country relationship between average incomes and direct impacts, where (for some 
types of disasters) the costs initially increase with incomes, and above a certain threshold (which 
they typically identify as per capita income level of a lower middle-income country) it starts to 
decrease. 
 Most of these papers that identify the cross-country pattern of correlation between income 
levels and direct disaster impact conclude that this evidence also represent the time-series 
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relationship; i.e., a country whose incomes will grow over time, will, according to Kellenberg and 
Mobarak (2008) initially experience higher disaster costs (measured by mortality) and then 
eventually, as average incomes increase further, lower disaster costs. The evidence regarding this 
question however is rather less clear. Hallegatte (2012), for example, points out that when these 
figures are aggregated worldwide, the World’s GDP has been growing at about 4 percent a year in 
the past several decades, while disaster losses (as measured by EM-DAT1) have been growing, on 
average, at about 6 percent. This implies that as the world continues to grow, the cost of disasters 
is going to increase (relative to the World’s economy). 
 Ultimately, however, identifying the direct impact of disasters on the poor (in magnitude, 
and relative to the rich) cannot be answered by examining the cross-country distribution of costs 
and economic activity, since this evidence may be more related to country-wide differences in 
institutional capacity and policy that are correlated with incomes rather than dependent on 
incomes directly. In any case, most of our conceptions and measurements of poverty are based on 
national identification.  
 The evidence on the distribution of the direct impact of a disaster within a country on 
households in various income levels is less well understood; the evidence that does exist generally 
suggests that poorer households are more vulnerable and will bear the direct damages 
disproportionately at higher levels and as higher shares of their households’ income. 
A salient feature of disaster risk exposure is the choice of millions of people to live in 
disaster-prone areas, and these are in many cases predominantly the poor (e.g., Boustan et al., 
2012). Examining geographical distribution to test for the poor’s exposure to natural disasters, Kim 
(2012) argues that, on average, the poor are at least two times more exposed relative to the non-
poor globally.  
A more detailed effort by Baez and Mason (2008) to identify the regional hot spots of 
increased weather variability reveals that central and southern Peru and western Bolivia proves to 
be most vulnerable to heavy rains and flood among Latin America and Caribbean (LAC) regions; 
these are regions that are associated with high poverty and population density. Supporting 
evidence on other Latin American countries as well as relevant social protection solutions have 
                                                             
1 EM-DAT is an international disaster database compiled and managed by CRED (Centre for Research on the 
Epidemiology of Disasters), Université catholique de Louvain (UCL), Belgium. 
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been documented by De la Fuente (2010). Tesliuc and Lindert (2002) present evidence from 
Guatemala, where the poor seems to be more exposed to natural shocks than the non-poor 
(though the reverse is true in the case of man-made shocks).2 Tesliuc and Lindert (2002) report 
that in Guatemala 35.4 percent of the poorest quintile is affected by natural shocks compared to 
21.2 percent of the richest quintile. 
A study by UNISDR (2012) in Syria, Jordan and Yemen shows that poverty is most severe in 
rural non-diversified economies where agriculture is severely limited by low rainfall, degraded 
lands, erosion and desertification. The study concludes that low productivity and water shortage 
leads to stagnating rural incomes increasing poverty in Syria and Yemen. In Jordan, these dynamics 
are more severe in urban areas. Rains, flash floods and snowstorms affect the densely populated 
areas possessing the largest share of the country’s poor, particularly women. In short, while 
poverty is clearly associated with increased exposure to hazards, the exact causality is often 
country-specific, and probably quite complex. 
Neumayer and Plumper (2007) investigate gender differences in disaster-related mortality, 
and conclude that generally women are more likely to die than men, or at a much younger age, 
especially when they come from a disadvantaged socioeconomic background.3 By one estimate, 
women represented 70 percent of casualties after the 2004 Indian Ocean in Aceh, Indonesia 
(World Bank, 2011). 
Only a few attempts to analyze the direct impacts of specific natural disasters by examining 
various indices of poverty, income inequality and human development have been concluded (e.g., 
Datt and Hoogeveen, 2003; Reardon and Taylor, 1996; Lal, Singh and Holland, 2009 and Rodriguez-
Oreggia et al., 2013). A full picture of these impacts is not yet within reach, and whether these are 
due to direct or indirect channels is not easy to determine. 
 
 
                                                             
2 As coping with natural disasters is related to prior economic conditions, the average impacts of a fairly regular natural 
shock (e.g. periodic drought) is found to have a lesser impact compared to a sudden economic shock (e.g. financial 
crisis). 
3 A higher level of women’s socio-economic rights appears to offset the negative effect of natural disasters on women 
(Neumayer and Plumper, 2007). 
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1.4 DROUGHTS AND RAINFALL FLUCTUATIONS 
Droughts and extreme fluctuations in rainfall are also frequently disastrous, with very 
noticeable adverse consequences on human populations. In this case, unlike the sudden-onset 
case, the distinction between direct and indirect effects is less clear-cut. In this section, we 
therefore focus on the overall effects of these events rather than separating their immediate 
(direct) impacts and the longer-term indirect effects. 
Despite evidence of the adverse changes in overall income in the aftermath of slow-onset 
natural catastrophes such as droughts, some projects conclude that these disasters do not have 
much impact on poverty and income distribution (and should be seen as across-the-board adverse 
shocks). Little et al. (2006), for example, find that droughts did not increase overall rates of poverty 
in the medium-term in Ethiopia. They suggest this is mainly due to increasing income 
diversification and less emphasis on rain-fed agriculture. However, if anything, the balance of the 
limited available evidence seems to suggest that droughts and extreme rainfall volatility do 
increase poverty even if poverty is also influenced by numerous other factors (see also Karim and 
Noy, 2014). 
Several projects have analyzed the impacts of rainfall shocks and local rainfall variability on 
various household socio-economic indicators, including consumption growth, human capital 
accumulation, life expectancy, and adult and children’s anthropometrics as a proxy for 
health/wellbeing outcomes (e.g., Jensen, 2000; Shah and Steinberg, 2012; Asiimwe and Mpuga, 
2007; Hoddinott et al., 2011; Dercon, 2004; Hoddinott, 2006; Maccini and Yang, 2009; Tiwari et al., 
2013, Neumayer and Plumper, 2007 and Bandyopadhyay and Skoufias, 2015).  
An examination of children’s educational investments in Côte d’Ivoire revealed, for 
example, that school enrolment rates declined by 20 percentage points (more than one-third of 
the original rate) in regions affected by adverse weather conditions (Jensen, 2000). Maccini and 
Yang (2009) report that a 20 percent increase in rainfall in Indonesia during early childhood led to 
0.57cm greater height, 0.22 additional completed grades of schooling and to households’ 
prosperity that is 0.12 standard deviation higher on an asset index scale. Another similar research 
project, in Nepal, found a 0.15 standard deviation increase in weight-for-age for children aged 0–
36 months due to 10 percent higher rainfall (Tiwari et al., 2013). This has also been evident in 
Zimbabwe, where Hoddinott et al. (2006, 2011) showed lower annual growth in height of 1.5-2cm 
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among children aged 12-24 months after drought with the most severe impacts on poor 
households. However, this finding did not seem uniform across regions within countries. In the 
Mexican case, Skoufias and Vinha (2012) pointed out that positive temperature shocks negatively 
impacted certain sub populations– namely boys, children between 12 and 23 months at the time 
of measurement, and children of less educated mothers in some regions. 
Moreover, in the long run, children from relatively wealthier households recovered this lost 
physical growth while children from poorer homes did not (Hoddinott, 2006). The same study also 
found a decrease in women’s body-mass index by about 3 percent in the aftermath of a 1994-95 
drought. Similarly, in Ethiopia, Yamano et al. (2005) found that children of 6-24 months old 
experienced about 0.9cm less growth in communities with substantial crop damage after severe 
droughts while food aid acted as an effective insurance mechanism in reducing child malnutrition. 
Estimating the long-term impacts of 1984 Ethiopian famine, Porter (2008) reveals that children 
who were under the age of 36 months are years later shorter by almost 3 cm. An interesting article 
on the impacts of early childhood nutritional intervention in Guatemala by Hoddinott et al. (2008) 
demonstrates that improving nutritional status before age 3 could substantially increase wage 
rates for men compare to women justifying early childhood nutritional investments as long-term 
drivers of economic growth. However, positive rainfall shocks can also contribute to early 
childhood adverse nutritional changes with increasing risk of termination of breastfeeding in the 
Indian case (Mendiratta, 2012). 
Evidence from India suggests that parents and children work less and have lower wages 
during drought years and the reverse case happens when households experience positive rainfall 
shocks (Shah and Steinberg, 2012). The same study further identified deleterious effects on health, 
schooling and more interestingly, on later-life wages due to early life exposure to droughts. An 
almost similar argument had also been posed by Banerjee (2007) in an earlier study on agricultural 
wages in Bangladesh. The author argues that floods have positive implications on wages in the 
long-run in flood months with declining wages in inundated areas. The study further identified 
productivity in line with labour demand along with land distribution and bargaining power of 
workers as impact factors. In a study on different types of workers’ income; Mueller and 
Quisumbing (2011) pointed out that the real wage of casual and salaried agricultural workers 
declined only in the short-term with significant but temporary reduction in salaried income 
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between 34.3 percent and 45.6 percent. Dercon (2004) found out that a 10 percent lower rainfall 
about 4–5 years earlier had an impact of one percentage point on current consumption growth 
rates. After controlling for heterogeneity, the paper identified a substantial impact of about 16 
percent lower growth when comparing groups that suffered significantly with those being 
moderately affected. Also in Ethiopia, Foltz et al. (2013) concluded that both food and non-food 
consumption is directly related to rainfall. Similar evidence has also been identified by Skoufias 
and Vinha (2013) in the Mexican case where temperature shocks along with rainfall affect both 
food and non-food consumption. This effect is more nuanced, as Hou (2010) finds that after a 
drought-related negative income shock occurs, households tend to buy cheaper calories resulting 
in a net increase in total calories consumed.  
Asiimwe and Mpuga (2007) point out that the timing of the rainfall shock appears to matter. 
In their examination of Uganda, positive rainfall shocks experienced during planting or harvest 
times actually result in lower household consumption expenditure. Analyzing data on Indonesian 
rice farmers, Skoufias et al. (2012) argue that although a delayed monsoon does not have a 
significant impact on average, farmers located in low rainfall exposure areas following the 
monsoon are negatively affected. Agricultural year and regional climate are also found influential 
in effecting households’ ability to protect consumption as shown by Skoufias and Vinha (2013) in 
the Mexican case. A study on Indian agricultural labour markets by Mahajan (2012) reported that 
low rainfall years affect male-female wage gap adversely in rain-fed rice growing regions. Rainfall, 
of course, matters much more in rural/agricultural communities, than in the urban ones (at least 
directly). 
Variations in rainfall influence households in rural Bangladesh in making crucial 
occupational choices. In flood-prone areas, less productive employment diversification choices, at 
the cost of skill-swap and reduced consumption, has been identified by Bandyopadhyay and 
Skoufias (2015). Employment diversification has also been identified, in the same paper, as an ex-
ante adaptation strategy in the presence of stable local rainfall variability. The authors further 
highlighted that with comparison to credit and safety nets, access to markets provides better 
coping opportunities in protection against costly occupational diversification within households. 
Even more nuanced observations about the way different conditions lead to different 
outcomes in the face of similar shocks were proposed by Reardon and Taylor (1996). They 
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compared the impact of similarly adverse drought shocks over two regions in Burkina Faso (the 
semi-arid Sahel, and the wetter Guinean region); they find the impacts of drought appear to be 
very different, in some cases leading to increases in poverty, and in others the opposite. 
 
1.5 THE INDIRECT IMPACTS OF SUDDEN-ONSET EVENTS 
 The direct impacts are only a part of the economic significance of natural disasters. In 
general, we do not understand the indirect impacts as well, though they are potentially more 
severe. These impacts may result from direct damage to the inputs used in production, to 
infrastructure, or from the fact that reconstruction and rehabilitation pull resources away from 
other sectors. Further on, the indirect impacts can manifest themselves in a new equilibrium 
steady-state in which the economy/society are in a different position to what they were pre-
disaster. Anttila-Hughes and Hsiang (2013), for example, find that for Philippine households, the 
indirect impacts are almost an order of magnitude larger than the direct damages wreaked by 
typhoons. 
 While it is clear that the poor are more exposed, more vulnerable and less resilient to the 
direct impact of natural hazards, Baez and Mason (2008) find low levels of income to be the prime 
limiting factor towards damage mitigation response of households. In a range of studies, the 
impact of disasters on income and consumption levels of the poorest households is found to be 
disproportionately strong (Rentschler, 2013). 
 In contrast to these adverse consequences, reconstruction spending can provide a boost to 
the domestic economy and specifically employees and employers in that sector. Both government 
funding and privately funded reconstruction from insurance payments, accumulated saving, or 
from other sources, is bound to provide some temporary stimulus to the local economy (Cavallo 
and Noy, 2011). In the longer-run, there is a potential to ‘build-back-better;’ reconstruction can, at 
least in theory, be a reconstruction to better standards, newer, more advanced and more 
innovative infrastructure including better housing for the poor.  
 Post-disaster realignment of interest groups may even facilitate a new political equilibrium 
that enables better policies (whatever ‘better’ means in practice).4 Equally plausible is the scenario 
                                                             
4 One can already observe this possibility in the aftermath of what is sometime considered the first international 
modern natural disaster, the Lisbon earthquake of 1755. Sebastião José de Carvalho e Melo, the prime minister of 
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that the new political equilibrium will actually be less beneficial to the poor, if the external shock 
removed what John Kenneth Galbraith called the ‘countervailing forces’ that prevented elites from 
capturing specific assets.5 
 Most recent research suggests that aggregate adverse short-run effects, at the national 
level can be observed in middle- and low-income countries experiencing catastrophic disasters. 
These countries have difficulty financing reconstruction; as they generally face difficulties 
conducting counter-cyclical fiscal policy and their insurance and re-insurance markets are 
significantly shallower (see Noy, 2009; von Peter et al., 2012 and Strobl, 2012).6 The same financing 
constraints that seem to prevent middle- and low-income countries from adequately paying for 
and implementing successful reconstruction are also the ones that typically inhibit lower-income 
households. 
Analyzing the impacts of several types of natural disasters at the municipal level in Mexico, 
Rodriguez-Oreggia et al. (2013) argue that natural disasters reduce human development and 
increase measures of poverty (food, capacity and asset). They further conclude that floods and 
droughts are associated with more significant adverse effects when compared to frost, extreme 
rainfalls and other types of natural hazards. Similarly, Lal, Singh and Holland (2009) identify 
evidence indicating a negative relationship between HDI and disasters, and leading to higher 
poverty levels in Fiji. 
Two UNDP projects explored the relationship between natural hazards and poverty in Latin 
American countries (Baez and Santos, 2008 and Glave et al., 2008). Baez and Santos (2008), on El 
Salvador, reported that the combined effects of two earthquakes in 2001 led to reduction of 
household income by one-third of the pre shock average. Evidence from Peru, in Glave et al. (2008), 
suggests that the effect of disasters on poverty rates ranges between 0.16 and 0.23 percentage 
point increase in poverty. From a distributional point of view, the authors concluded that an 
                                                             
Portugal, appointed to run the relief operations after the earthquake, wrote: “Politics is not always the cause of 
revolutions of State. Dreadful phenomena frequently change the face of Empires...We could say that it is necessary 
that across the land provinces are wasted and cities ruined in order to dispel the blindness of certain nations.” (quoted 
in Shrady, 2008). 
5 Some realizations of this possibility are described in Naomi Klein’s book-length investigation in The Shock Doctrine. 
6 Most of the research on high-income countries fails to find much aggregate impact of even large disasters (e.g., 
Doyle and Noy, 2015). 
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increase in average shocks reduce the median of monthly per capita consumption in the bottom 
25th and 50th of the distribution by 3.85 percent and 2.68 percent respectively.7 
Baez and Santos (2007) investigated the impact of hurricane Mitch in Nicaragua, and found 
a range of distinct adverse medium-term effects; in particular, they focus on topics that are more 
relevant for the poor and identified increased probability of undernourishment and a significant 
increase in labour force participation among children (though this increase did not correspond 
with a decline in school enrolments). As in Baez and Santos (2007), most research has not 
attempted to isolate separately the impact of these sudden shocks on the poor versus other 
income groups. However, most of the mechanisms and impact they identified are more likely to 
be specifically relevant to low-income households. Evidence from Vietnam, for example, revealed 
that riverine floods and hurricanes caused welfare losses up to 23 percent and 52 percent 
respectively inside cities with a population over 500,000 (Thomas et al., 2010); flood-prone urban 
areas are typically associated with lower-income households.  
The importance of credit in facilitating recovery is well documented. Sawada and 
Shimizutani (2008) report that in the aftermath of the 1995 Kobe earthquake in Japan, households 
that were credit constrained did not manage to regain their consumption levels while households 
that had better access to credit restrictions were more successful in recovering. In an attempt to 
identify a causal relationship between credit access and welfare, Morse (2011) finds that the 
presence of payday lenders reduce about the frequency of foreclosures by about 1 unit (out of 4.5 
units) per 1000 homes in the US in regions hit by a natural disaster. Credit constraints may also 
lead households to sub-optimally sell productive assets in order to smooth consumption after a 
major but temporary income shock (Mueller and Osgood, 2009a). Anttila-Hughes and Hsiang 
(2013) also find similar dynamics for Philippine households. In their case, while both low- and high-
income households experience similar level of damages in the initial impact following an 
exceptionally strong typhoon, it is only the lower-income households whose consumption does 
not recover in the years that follow. 
                                                             
7 Comparing impacts of El-Niño shocks to the financial crisis in 1998, Datt and Hoogeveen (2003) show that the largest 
share of the overall impact on poverty is attributable to the El-Niño shock, ranging between 47% and 57% of the total 
impact on measures of incidence, depth and severity of poverty relative to the 1998 shock that only accounts for 10–
17% of the total poverty impact. 
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Impacts on the poor in the aftermath of a natural disaster are also being observed through 
migration and remittances pattern (see Gray and Mueller, 2012; Boustan et al., 2012; Attzs, 2008; 
Clarke and Wallsten, 2003; Dillon et al., 2011 and Halliday, 2012). A household panel dataset for 
Jamaica after hurricane Gilbert reveals that remittances increased by only about 25 cents for every 
dollar of damage (Clarke and Wallsten, 2003). However, Attzs (2008) observes an increase in 
migration after a hurricane and an increased inflow of remittances (which constitutes 87 percent 
of income for the poorest deciles in Jamaica). Intriguingly, in El Salvador, Halliday (2012) identified 
that the 2001 catastrophic earthquake resulted in a large negative effect on female migration with 
absolutely no effect on male migration.8 As we have seen with the direct impact, these studies 
further emphasized that women and the poor are more exposed and dealt with the aftermath of 
a disaster more directly.9  
Using unique long time-series data on internal migration in Nigeria, Dillon et al. (2011) 
distinguish along genders when examining the impact of weather variation on migration. They find 
that male migration appear to be a coping mechanism for households facing temperature 
variation; in particular to ex post variation but with some evidence also suggesting households are 
responding to ex ante risk as well. Women, they argue, are more exposed to ex post covariate risks. 
They highlight differences in expected male and female labour market returns from migration as 
the rationale for explaining households’ preference for male migration. On the issue of migratory 
income, Mueller and Osgood (2009b) find that, in Brazil, precipitation shocks have long-term 
adverse impacts on rural out-migrants’ income once they arrive in urban areas. Their finding that 
urban poverty may be associated with rural climatic pressures to migrate is indicating that the 
absence of worthy alternatives may be a likely reason for migration, a reason that is more powerful 
than the damage from migration itself. 
Another group of projects had examined the evidence on the impacts of natural shocks on 
household assets and on consequent income distribution (see Carter et al., 2007; Mogues, 2011; 
Anttila-Hughes and Hsiang, 2013; Morris et al., 2002; Jakobsen, 2012 and Masozera et al., 2007). 
Most of these studies point out that, conditional on the severity of the shock, most households 
                                                             
8 In El Salvador, over 90% of all households do not allocate any males to domestic activities, so the need for domestic 
labour in the disaster’s aftermath may explain this pattern (Halliday, 2012). 
9 Boustan et al. (2012) adds another layer of complexity by identifying ways in which disaster mitigation efforts may 
interact with individual migration decisions. 
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suffer a depletion of assets (wealth) beyond the previously documented reduction in current 
income. Morris et al. (2002) reveals that, after hurricane Mitch, assets of households in the lowest 
wealth quintile were reduced by 18 percent compared to 3 percent for the upper wealth quintile. 
Lopez-Calva and Ortiz-Juarez (2009) examine distributional impacts in Peru, and find that a one 
unit increase of the occurrence of shocks leads to a reduction of 2 percent in household per capita 
consumption in the lowest quartile compared to only 1.2 percent in the richest quartile. 
Another important and policy-relevant question is whether disasters can push households 
down into poverty trap. Carter et al. (2007) examined two different outcomes in two different case 
studies. In Honduras, in the medium-term, relatively wealthy households were able to partially 
rebuild their lost assets unlike the lowest wealth quintiles. However, in Ethiopia, the poorest 
households (in wealth) try to hold on to their few assets despite consumption possibilities 
shrinking during drought periods and severe losses in agricultural production/income. Van den 
Berg (2010) adds more nuance about the ability of households at various income levels to pursue 
possible strategies that allow them to maintain their capital. She concludes that, in the case of 
Hurricane Mitch, there is little evidence of changes in the transitions between various income 
levels, suggesting permanent poverty traps. 
Several studies analyzed the impacts of natural disasters on population dynamics and 
fertility response (e.g. Martine and Guzman, 2002; Lin, 2004 and Finlay, 2009). Martine and 
Guzman (2002) identified a reduction in population growth in some Honduran provinces by 92 
percent-40 percent, depending on the province, due to the effects of Hurricane Mitch. Lin (2004) 
also reaches similar conclusions. However, Finlay (2009) argues that a large scale natural disaster 
may have a positive effect on fertility under the assumption that a child could be used as an 
insurance mechanism to compensate for income and asset loss. We can speculate that these 
dynamic incentives may affect poorer households differently than richer ones; for example that 
increasing fertility will only be observed for poorer households that do not have access to other 
ways of financing retirement. The evidence on these possible differences, however, does not yet 
exist. 
 
 
 
  
 
27 
 
1.6         COPING RESPONSES OF THE POOR 
A significant body of research has attempted to shed some light on possible coping 
mechanisms of dealing with natural disasters, typically focusing on the rural poor in low-income 
countries. Baez and Mason (2008) argue, for example, that rural households possess limited 
capacity to fully and efficiently adjust to weather related shocks. This limited capacity is associated 
with a lack of access to formal financing and other tools that can facilitate optimal coping strategies 
(such as re-training). In line with this argument, Bandyopadhyay and Skoufias (2015) also provided 
evidence on effects of occupational choice as ex ante adaptation strategy.  
Sawada (2007) provides an earlier survey of some of the potential coping mechanisms in 
the local, regional, and global contexts, while Ghorpade (2012) provides a more recent version. 
Helgeson et al. (2012) provides a recent example of a careful study identifying the possible coping 
mechanisms and evaluating their prevalence with a large survey of Ugandan farmers. Patnaik and 
Narayanan (2010) examine similar questions with data from two districts in rural India. Yet, an 
evaluation of the differences among income groups in their coping mechanisms is less common. 
Khandker (2007) finds that sixty percent of sampled households adopted some form of 
what appears to be sub-optimal coping mechanism during a sudden shock. These involved 
borrowing (often at high interest), skipping meals, selling productive assets or migrating away from 
affected areas.  
The use of livestock as a buffer stock in terms of reducing the probability of being ‘always 
poor’ in the aftermath of a natural disaster has also been examined. Fafchamps et al. (1998) argue 
that livestock sales offset at most 30 percent and probably closer to 15 percent of income loss 
resulting from village level rainfall shocks in West Africa. In Uganda and India, in contrast, livestock 
are held as a form of liquid savings and selling livestock had been used as the most frequent form 
of coping strategy after a weather disaster (Helgeson et al., 2012, and Patnaik and Narayanan, 
2010).  
Formal insurance policies are typically unaffordable or unsuited to conditions in rural low-
income regions/countries. Thus other insurance products to deal with weather risks have been 
developed, with a recent enthusiasm for index insurance. Equally important, are other recent 
methods and ideas for disaster coping strategies such as disaster micro-insurance or contingent-
repayment in microfinance loans (see Jensen, 2000; Barnett and Mahul, 2007; Mechler et al., 2006; 
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Shoji, 2010 and Janzen and Carter, 2013). Yet, the introduction of insurance tools for the poor is 
still in its infancy; and the poor often rely on accumulated savings, mortgaging available assets, 
donations, remittances, emergency loans from microcredit institutions or traditional 
moneylenders, and if these fail, direct support from family, neighbours, and friends (Mechler et 
al., 2006). 
Estimating an acceptable and affordable premium for disaster insurance specifically for the 
poor seems to be extremely difficult not only due to multiple risks on life, health and property but 
also due to the ‘fat-tailed’ nature of catastrophic natural hazards. However, index- or micro- 
insurance products could potentially be effective mechanisms in transferring covariate weather 
risks for the rural poor as has been (provisionally) observed in Mexico and India (Barnett and 
Mahul, 2007).  
Shoji (2010) employed a unique dataset and examined the impact of rescheduling of 
savings and repayment installments in microfinance (i.e., contingent repayment) for affected 
members during a natural disaster. The paper pointed out that rescheduling decreased the 
probability of avoiding meals by 5.1 percent during negative shocks with larger impact on the poor 
and particularly more on females. Another study on drought impacts in Kenya by Janzen and Carter 
(2013) reveals that insured households are 8-41 percentage points less likely to reduce meals and 
18-50 percentage points less likely to sell productive assets during the recovery process. Yet, 
identifying whether targeted programs in microfinance and micro insurance are able to 
compensate the losses adequately and prevent households from resorting to sub-optimal 
strategies remains to be seen. 
The evidence suggests that insurance substantially reduces the probability of selling 
livestock during a drought improving the chances of advancement in the recovery process (Janzen 
and Carter, 2013). Drawing a gender distinction on this issue, Hoddinott and Kinsey (2000) suggests 
that women in poor households are heavily affected by drought shock and ex ante private coping 
strategies. In the region they examine, the accumulation of livestock proves to be more effective 
in comparison to ex post public responses to protect women against adverse consequences. 
Silbert and Pilar Useche (2012) find that although male-headed households are less 
vulnerable and therefore reduce their total consumption to a lesser extent, education can still lead 
female-headed households to better coping decisions. As already noted, ex ante income 
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diversification has also been demonstrated to be an important coping mechanism for consumption 
smoothing (Wong and Brown, 2011). 
Several projects have looked at vulnerability and coping strategies in selected South and 
South east Asian countries (see Hallegatte et al.,2010; Zoleta-Nantes, 2002; Few, 2003; Patnaik and 
Narayanan,2010; Takashi et al., 2012 and Israel and Briones, 2013). Zoleta-Nantes (2002) showed 
the differential impacts of flood hazards on three vulnerable groups - street children, the urban 
poor and residents of wealthy neighborhoods - in metro Manila, the Philippines. She concluded 
that spatial isolation and lack of participation in decision-making intensified present and future 
vulnerability at the household and community levels.10 A study on the Indian State of Mumbai by 
Hallegatte et al. (2010) assess the risk and benefits of adaptation due to flood exposure and 
provides evidence of potential sensitivity and vulnerability to heavy precipitation signifying that 
improving drainage as part of disaster risk management and extended insurance could reduce the 
indirect effects of flooding on marginalized groups. Another study by Takashi et al. (2012) on 
household level recovery after floods in North Pakistan concluded that although households with 
fewer assets did struggle in the recovery process, the speed of recovery was slower for the richer 
households later on; leaving an income distribution that was characterized by a mass of 
households around the income poverty line.  
Most researches have focused on first moment impacts of disasters, on the impact of 
disasters on average levels (of income, of wealth, of health, etc.), but it is also important to point 
out that disasters can also be an important source of damaging fluctuations (second moments). 
This generated fluctuations might trigger responses as these may lead to chronic or 
intergenerational poverty (Sinha et al., 2002). 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                             
10 Another study in Metro Manila, on the impacts of typhoon-related floods by Israel and Briones (2013), found that 
the occurrence and intensity of aforementioned disasters have a significant negative effect on household income. 
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1.7         LONG-TERM SCENARIOS IN DISASTERS’ AFTERMATH 
It is perhaps of even greater importance to determine the long-term effects of catastrophic 
disasters on various income groups, rather than only their direct and indirect short-term impacts. 
The limited empirical evidence suggests that large natural shocks can have important regional 
consequences that may persist for decades. The population of New Orleans, for example, is 
unlikely to recover from the dramatic exodus of people from the region after Hurricane Katrina - 
in July 2012, seven years after the hurricane; the population of the city was still 20 percent lower 
than the week before the storm hit. Emigration, as in Katrina’s case, is one possible long-term 
consequence, and at least in Katrina’s case, it seems that the poor and the disenfranchised were 
disproportionally more likely to emigrate in the storm’s aftermath.11 This evidence, however, is 
only anecdotal; we have no direct evidence that disasters’ long-term impact affect the poor any 
differently than other segments of society, nor do we have substantial evidence on the 
distributional consequences, in the long-term, of disaster events. 
Analyzing the case of Indonesia, Silbert and Pilar Useche (2012) pointed out that larger 
households are 16 percent more vulnerable to future poverty in the presence of shocks, and 
holding all else equal, larger households are likely to be poorer. Similarly, evidence from Brazil 
suggests that exposure to drought can reduce rural wages by 9 percent in the longer term (defined 
as 5-10 years; Mueller and Osgood, 2009a). To shed light on distributional impacts, a recent study 
by Yamamura (2013) concluded that although natural disasters have increased income inequality 
in the short-term, this effect however, decays over time and disappears in the medium term.12  
From the macroeconomic/aggregate literature, we know that certain economic conditions 
and policies may lead to increased resilience in the aftermath of disaster, but on the other hand, 
its negative impact may be exacerbated significantly by others. Relevant factors include the 
existence or absence of ex-ante disaster management plans, the flexibility to re-allocate resources 
                                                             
11 Coffman and Noy (2012) describe the impact of a hurricane on a small Hawaiian island, and conclude that the long-
term impact of the disaster was a 15% population decline enduring at least two decades after the event. Lynham et 
al. (2012) provide similar evidence for a tsunami in another Hawaiian island. Hornbeck (2012) examines the long-term 
impact, at the county level, of the American Dust-Bowl during the 1930s. Hornbeck finds that while there was some 
adjustment in agricultural activities, there were still substantial declines in productivity and land prices that lasted for 
many decades. The main adjustment mechanism he describes is emigration. 
12 Narayanan and Sahu (2011) investigate climate related disaster in the Indian state of Orissa, and find deteriorating 
health conditions due to these events that reduce the ability of the poor to participate in income generating economic 
activities. 
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efficiently for disaster relief and reconstruction, the expected access to extra-regional funds from 
the central government or from other sources (foreign aid, re-insurance payments, etc.), and the 
ability of the region’s dominant economic sectors to rebound. Institutional, cultural and social 
factors may also play an important constructive role.13 Whether these differences also matter, in 
the long-run, at the household level, and differentiate between the poor and others, or have any 
distributional impacts are all still open questions. 
One issue that may turn out to be the most important in determining post-disaster 
outcomes is not the degree and level of destruction, or the degree of preparedness, but the 
adjustment in expectations with regard to future events that catastrophes often prompt. Kobe, for 
example, was not perceived to be a high-risk area for earthquakes before 1995, an assessment 
which unsurprisingly changed in the disaster’s aftermath. In contrast, the devastation wrought by 
war, even a very destructive one, may be perceived as a one-off event and therefore not lead to 
long-term shifts in economic activity (see Davis and Weinstein, 2002). The perceived increased risk 
of future catastrophic events, however, may inhibit human and capital saving and investment in an 
affected region for decades (see Aizenman and Noy, 2013).  
This may be especially important as these changes in the subjective probabilities assigned 
to plausible hazards may well matter differently for people from different socio-economic 
backgrounds, given the additional exposure of the poor to risk and given the possibility of 
decreased investment leading into poverty traps. Once again, however, this is still an open 
empirical question, like so many of the other issues highlighted in this paper. 
 
                                                             
13 For evidence on the importance of social capital, see Aldrich (2012). 
 
  
 
32 
 
REFERENCES 
Aizenman, J., & Noy, I. (2013). Public and private saving and the long shadow of macroeconomic 
shocks .National Bureau of Economic Research working paper, no. 19067. 
 
Aldrich, Daniel (2012). Building Resilience: Social Capital in Post-Disaster Recovery. University of 
Chicago Press. 
 
Anttila-Hughes, Jesse Keith and Hsiang, Solomon M. (2013). Destruction, Disinvestment, and 
Death: Economic and Human Losses Following Environmental Disaster. Available at SSRN: 
http://ssrn.com/abstract=2220501 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2220501. 
 
Asiimwe, J. B., & Mpuga, P. (2007). Implications of rainfall shocks for household income and 
consumption in Uganda. AERC Research Paper 168, African Economic Research Consortium. 
 
Attzs, M. (2008). Natural disasters and remittances: Exploring the linkages between poverty, 
gender and disaster vulnerability in Caribbean. SIDS No. 2008.61, Research paper/UNU-WIDER. 
 
Auffret, P. (2003). High Consumption Volatility: The Impact of Natural Disasters?. World Bank Policy 
Research Working Paper 2962, The World Bank. 
 
Baez, J., & Mason, A. (2008). Dealing with Climate Change: Household Risk Management and 
Adaptation in Latin America. Available at SSRN 1320666. 
 
Baez, Javier E., and Indhira V. Santos (2008). On Shaky Ground: The Effects of Earthquakes on 
Household Income and Poverty. Background paper of the ISDR/RBLAC-UNDP Project on Disaster 
Risk and Poverty in Latin America. 
 
Baez, J. E., & Santos, I. V. (2007). Children’s vulnerability to weather shocks: A natural disaster as a 
natural experiment. Social Science Research Network, New York. 
 
Bandyopadhyay, S., & Skoufias, E. (2015). Rainfall variability, occupational choice, and welfare in 
rural Bangladesh. Review of Economics of the Household, 13(3), 1-46. 
 
Banerjee, L. (2007). Effect of flood on agricultural wages in Bangladesh: An empirical analysis. 
World Development, 35(11), 1989-2009. 
 
Barnett, B. J., & Mahul, O. (2007). Weather index insurance for agriculture and rural areas in lower-
income countries. American Journal of Agricultural Economics, 89(5), 1241-1247. 
 
Boustan, L. P., Kahn, M. E., & Rhode, P. W. (2012). Moving to higher ground: migration response to 
natural disasters in the early twentieth century. The American Economic Review, 102(3), 238-244. 
 
Carter, M. R., Little, P. D., Mogues, T., & Negatu, W. (2007). Poverty traps and natural disasters in 
Ethiopia and Honduras. World Development, 35(5), 835-856. 
  
 
33 
 
Cavallo, E., and I. Noy (2011). The economics of natural disasters - a survey. International Review 
of Environmental and Resource Economics, 5(1): 1-40. 
 
Clarke, G., & Wallsten, S. (2003). Do remittances act like insurance? Evidence from a natural 
disaster in Jamaica. Development Research Group, The World Bank. 
 
Coffman, M. and I. Noy (2012). Hurricane Iniki: Measuring the Long-Term Economic Impact of a 
Natural Disaster Using Synthetic Control. Environment and Development Economics, 17, 187-205. 
 
Cunguara, B., Langyintuo, A., & Darnhofer, I. (2011). The role of nonfarm income in coping with the 
effects of drought in southern Mozambique. Agricultural Economics, 42(6), 701-713. 
 
Datt, G., & Hoogeveen, H. (2003). El Niño or El Peso? Crisis, poverty and income distribution in the 
Philippines. World Development, 31(7), 1103-1124. 
 
Davis, D., and D. Weinstein (2002). Bones, Bombs, and Break Points: The Geography of Economic 
Activity. American Economic Review, 92(5), 1269-1289. 
 
De la Fuente, A. (2010). Natural disaster and poverty in Latin America: Welfare impacts and social 
protection solutions. Well-Being and Social Policy, 6(1), 1-15. 
 
Dercon, S. (2004). Growth and Shocks: Evidence from Rural Ethiopia. Journal of Development 
Economics, 74(2): 309–329. 
 
Dillon, A., Mueller, V., & Salau, S. (2011). Migratory responses to agricultural risk in northern 
Nigeria. American Journal of Agricultural Economics, 93(4), 1048-1061. 
 
Doyle, L. and Noy, I. (2015). The short-run nationwide macroeconomic effects of the Canterbury 
earthquakes. New Zealand Economic Papers, 49:2, 134-156, DOI: 
10.1080/00779954.2014.885379. 
 
Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean, ECLAC (2003). Handbook for 
Estimating the Socio-economic and Environmental Effects of Disasters. The United Nations. 
 
Escaleras, Monica, Nejat Anbarci, Charles A. Register (2007). Public Sector Corruption and Major 
Earthquakes: A Potentially Deadly Interaction. Public Choice, Vol. 132, No. 1/2:pp. 209-230. 
 
Fafchamps, M., Udry, C., & Czukas, K. (1998). Drought and saving in West Africa: are livestock a 
buffer stock?. Journal of Development economics, 55(2), 273-305. 
 
Few, R. (2003). Flooding, vulnerability and coping strategies: local responses to a global threat. 
Progress in Development Studies, 3(1), 43-58. 
 
Finlay, J. (2009). Fertility response to natural disasters: the case of three high mortality 
earthquakes. World Bank Policy Research Working Paper Series 4883, The World Bank. 
  
 
34 
 
Foltz, J., Gars, J., Özdoğan, M., Simane, B., & Zaitchik, B. (2013). Weather and Welfare in Ethiopia. 
In 2013 Annual Meeting, August 4-6, 2013, Washington DC, No. 150298, Agricultural and Applied 
Economics Association. 
 
Giesbert, L., & Schindler, K. (2012). Assets, shocks, and poverty traps in rural Mozambique. World 
Development, 40(8), 1594-1609. 
 
Ghorpade, Y. (2012). Coping Strategies in Natural Disasters and under Conflict: A Review of 
Household Responses and Notes for Public Policy. Households in Conflict Network, no. 136. 
 
Glave, M., Fort, R., & Rosemberg, C. (2008). Disaster Risk and Poverty in Latin America: The 
Peruvian Case Study. Background paper of the ISDR/RBLAC-UNDP Project on Disaster Risk and 
Poverty in Latin America. 
 
Gray, C. L., & Mueller, V. (2012). Natural disasters and population mobility in Bangladesh. PNAS, 
109(16), 6000-6005. 
 
Hallegatte, Stephane (2012). An Exploration of the link between development, economic growth 
and natural risk. Policy Research Working Paper Series 6216, The World Bank. 
 
Hallegatte, S., Henriet, F., Patwardhan, A., Narayanan, K., Ghosh, S., Karmakar, S., ... & Naville, N. 
(2010). Flood risks, climate change impacts and adaptation benefits in Mumbai: an initial 
assessment of socio-economic consequences of present and climate change induced flood risks and 
of possible adaptation options. OECD Publishing no. 27. 
 
Halliday, T. J. (2012). Intra-household labor supply, migration, and subsistence constraints in a risky 
environment: Evidence from rural El Salvador. European Economic Review, 56(6), 1001-1019. 
 
Helgeson, J., Dietz, S., & Hochrainer, S. (2012). Vulnerability to weather disasters: the choice of 
coping strategies in rural Uganda. Centre for Climate Change Economics and Policy Working Paper, 
no.107. 
 
Hoddinott, J., Maluccio, J., Behrman, J. R., Martorell, R., Melgar, P., Quisumbing, A. R., & Yount, K. 
M. (2011). The consequences of early childhood growth failure over the life course. International 
Food Policy Research Institute Paper, no. 1073. 
 
Hoddinott, J., Maluccio, J. A., Behrman, J. R., Flores, R., & Martorell, R. (2008). Effect of a nutrition 
intervention during early childhood on economic productivity in Guatemalan adults. The Lancet, 
371(9610), 411-416. 
 
Hoddinott, John (2006). Shocks and their consequences across and within households in Rural 
Zimbabwe. Journal of Development Studies, 42:2, 301-321. 
 
Hoddinott, J., & Kinsey, B. (2001). Child growth in the time of drought. Oxford Bulletin of Economics 
and Statistics, 63(4), 409-436. 
  
 
35 
 
Hoddinott, J., & Kinsey, B. (2000). Adult health in the time of drought. Food Consumption and 
Nutrition Division (FCND) Discussion Paper, no.79. 
 
Hou, X. (2010). Can Drought Increase Total Calorie Availability? The Impact of Drought on Food 
Consumption and the Mitigating Effects of a Conditional Cash Transfer Program. Economic 
Development and Cultural Change, 58(4), 713-737. 
 
Hornbeck, R. (2012). The Enduring Impact of the American Dust Bowl: Short- and Long-Run 
Adjustments to Environmental Catastrophe. American Economic Review, 102(4): 1477–1507. 
 
Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (2012). Managing the Risks of Extreme Events and 
Disasters to Advance Climate Change Adaptation. Available at http://www.ipcc.ch/pdf/special-
reports/srex/SREX_Full_Report.pdf 
 
Israel, Danilo C. and Briones, Roehlano R. (2013). Disasters, Poverty and Coping Strategies: The 
Framework and Empirical Evidence from Micro/Household Data - Philippine Case. Presented at 
2013 ERIA workshop, Singapore. 
 
Jakobsen, K. T. (2012). In the Eye of the Storm - The Welfare Impacts of a Hurricane. World 
Development, 40(12), 2578-2589. 
 
Janzen, S. A., & Carter, M. R. (2013). The Impact of Microinsurance on Consumption Smoothing 
and Asset Protection: Evidence from a Drought in Kenya. In 2013 Annual Meeting, August 4-6, 
2013, Washington DC, no. 151141, Agricultural and Applied Economics Association. 
 
Jensen, Robert (2000). Agricultural volatility and investments in children. The American Economic 
Review, 90.2: 399-404. 
 
Jha, Raghbendra (2006). Vulnerability and Natural Disasters in Fiji, Papua New Guinea, Vanuatu 
and the Kyrgyz Republic. Available at http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.882203. 
 
Kahn, M E. (2005). The Death Toll from Natural Disasters: The Role of Income, Geography, and 
Institutions. Review of Economics and Statistics, 87(2): 271–284. 
 
Karim, A., and I.Noy (2014). Poverty and Natural Disasters – A Meta-Regression Analysis. 
Manuscript. 
 
Kellenberg, D. K., and A. M. Mobarak (2008). Does Rising Income Increase or Decrease Damage 
Risk from Natural Disasters?. Journal of Urban Economics, 63(3): 788–802. 
Khandker, S. R. (2007). Coping with flood: role of institutions in Bangladesh. Agricultural 
Economics, 36(2), 169-180. 
 
Kim, Namsuk (2012). How much more exposed are the poor to natural disasters? Global and 
regional measurement. Disasters, 36(2): 195-211. 
Klein, N. (2007). The shock doctrine: The rise of disaster capitalism. Macmillan. 
  
 
36 
 
Lal, P. N., Rita, R., & Khatri, N. (2009). Economic costs of the 2009 floods in the Fiji sugar belt and 
policy implications. IUCN. 
 
Lal, P.N., R. Singh and P. Holland (2009). Relationship between natural disasters and poverty: a Fiji 
case study. SOPAC Miscellaneous Report 678, Global Assessment Report on Disaster Reduction, 
UNISDR. 
 
Lin, C. Y. C. (2004). The Effects of Natural Disasters and Economic Volatility on Fertility. Available at 
SSRN 590421. 
 
Little, P. D., Stone, M. P., Mogues, T., Castro, A. P., & Negatu, W. (2006). ‘Moving in place’: Drought 
and poverty dynamics in South Wollo, Ethiopia. Journal of Development Studies, 42(2), 200-225. 
 
López-Calva, L. F. and E. Ortiz-Juárez (2009). Evidence and Policy Lessons on the Links between 
Disaster Risk and Poverty in Latin America: Methodology and Summary of Country Studies. 
Research for Public Policy, MDGs and Poverty, MDG-01-2009, RBLAC-UNDP, 
New York  
 
Lynham, J; Noy, I; Page, J (2012). The 1960 Tsunami in Hawaii: Long Term Consequences of a Coastal 
Disaster. School of Economics and Finance working paper, no.13, Victoria University of Wellington. 
 
Maccini, S.L. and D. Yang (2009). Under the Weather: Health, Schooling, and Economic 
Consequences of Early-Life Rainfall. American Economic Review, 99:3, 1006–1026. 
 
Mahajan, K. (2012). Rainfall shocks and gender wage gap: Agricultural labor in India. Presented in 
8th Annual Conference on Economic Growth and Development, Dec 17-19, 2012, Indian Statistical 
Institute, New Delhi. 
 
Martine, G., & Guzman, J. M. (2002). Population, poverty, and vulnerability: Mitigating the effects 
of natural disasters. Environmental Change and Security Project Report, 8, 45-64. 
 
Masozera, M., Bailey, M., & Kerchner, C. (2007). Distribution of impacts of natural disasters across 
income groups: A case study of New Orleans. Ecological Economics, 63(2), 299-306. 
 
Mechler, R., Linnerooth-Bayer, J., & Peppiatt, D. (2006). Microinsurance for Natural Disaster Risks 
in Developing Countries. ProVention Consortium. http://www.climate-
insurance.org/upload/pdf/Mechler2006_MI_for_NatDis.pdf.  
Mendiratta, V. (2012).The Impact of Climatic shocks on children’s health in India. Available at 
http://www.isid.ac.in/~pu/conference/dec_12_conf/Papers/VibhutiMendiratta.pdf. 
 
Mogues, T. (2011). Shocks and asset dynamics in Ethiopia. Economic Development and Cultural 
Change, 60(1), 91-120. 
 
  
 
37 
 
Morris, S. S., Neidecker-Gonzales, O., Carletto, C., Munguıá, M., Medina, J. M., & Wodon, Q. (2002). 
Hurricane Mitch and the livelihoods of the rural poor in Honduras. World Development, 30(1), 49-
60. 
 
Morse, A. (2011). Payday lenders: Heroes or villains?. Journal of Financial Economics, 102(1), 28-
44. 
 
Mueller, V., & Quisumbing, A. (2011). How resilient are labour markets to natural disasters? The 
case of the 1998 Bangladesh Flood. Journal of Development Studies, 47(12), 1954-1971. 
 
Mueller, V. A., & Osgood, D. E. (2009a). Long-term impacts of droughts on labour markets in 
developing countries: evidence from Brazil. The Journal of Development Studies, 45(10), 1651-
1662. 
 
Mueller, V. A., & Osgood, D. E. (2009b). Long-term consequences of short-term precipitation 
shocks: evidence from Brazilian migrant households. Agricultural Economics, 40(5), 573-586. 
 
Narayanan, K., & Sahu, S. K. (2011). Health, income inequality and climate related disasters at 
household level: reflections from an Orissa District. Munich Personal RePEc Archive. 
https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/35028/1/MPRA_paper_35028.pdf.  
Neumayer, E., & Plumper, T. (2007). The gendered nature of natural disasters: The impact of 
catastrophic events on the gender gap in life expectancy, 1981–2002. Annals of the Association of 
American Geographers, 97(3), 551-566. 
 
Noy, I (2013). Investing in Disaster Risk Reduction: A Global Fund. In: Bjorn Lomborg (ed.) Global 
Problems, Smart Solutions: Costs and Benefits, Cambridge University Press, pp. 500-509. 
 
Noy, I. (2009). The Macroeconomic Consequences of Disasters. Journal of Development Economics, 
88(2), 221-231. 
 
Patnaik, U., & Narayanan, K. (2010). Vulnerability and Coping to Disasters: A Study of Household 
Behaviour in Flood Prone Region of India. Munich Personal RePEc Archive. 
 
Porter, C. (2008). The long run impact of severe shocks in childhood: Evidence from the Ethiopian 
famine of 1984. Department of Economics, The University of Oxford. 
Rabassa, M., Skoufias, E., & Jacoby, H. G. (2012). Weather and child health in rural Nigeria. Policy 
Research Working Paper No. 6214, The World Bank. 
 
Reardon, T., & Taylor, J. E. (1996). Agroclimatic shock, income inequality, and poverty: Evidence 
from Burkina Faso. World Development, 24(5), 901-914. 
 
Rentschler, J. E. (2013). Why resilience matters-the poverty impacts of disasters. Policy Research 
Working Paper No. 6699, The World Bank. 
 
  
 
38 
 
Rodriguez-Oreggia, E., de la Fuente, A., de la Torre, R., Moreno, H., & Rodriguez, C. (2013). The 
impact of natural disasters on human development and poverty at the municipal level in Mexico. 
Journal of Development Studies, 49(3), 442-455. 
 
Sawada, Y. (2007). The impact of natural and manmade disasters on household welfare. 
Agricultural Economics, 37(s1), 59-73. 
 
Sawada, Y., & Shimizutani, S. (2008). How Do People Cope with Natural Disasters? Evidence from 
the Great Hanshin-Awaji (Kobe) Earthquake in 1995. Journal of Money, Credit and Banking, 40(2-
3), 463-488. 
 
Shah, M., & Steinberg, B. M. (2012). Could Droughts Improve Human Capital? Evidence from India. 
Unpublished manuscript, University of California, Davis. 
 
Shoji, Masahiro (2010). Does Contingent Repayment in Microfinance Help the Poor During Natural 
Disasters?. Journal of Development Studies, 46:2,191-210. 
 
Shrady, N. (2008). The Last Day: Wrath, Ruin, and Reason in the Great Lisbon Earthquake of 1755. 
Viking Press. 
 
Silbert, Megan, and Maria del Pilar Useche (2012). Repeated Natural Disasters and Poverty in Island 
Nations: A Decade of Evidence from Indonesia. University of Florida, Department of Economics, 
PURC Working Paper. 
 
Sinha, S., Lipton, M., & Yaqub, S. (2002). Poverty and damaging fluctuations: how do they relate?. 
Journal of Asian and African Studies, 37(2), 186-243. 
 
Skoufias, E., Katayama, R. S., & Essama-Nssah, B. (2012). Too little too late: welfare impacts of 
rainfall shocks in rural Indonesia. Bulletin of Indonesian Economic Studies, 48(3), 351-368. 
 
Skoufias, E., & Vinha, K. (2012). Climate variability and child height in rural Mexico. Economics & 
Human Biology, 10(1), 54-73. 
 
Skoufias, E., & Vinha, K. (2013). The impacts of climate variability on household welfare in rural 
Mexico. Population and Environment, 34(3), 370-399. 
 
Strobl, Eric (2012). The economic growth impact of natural disasters in developing countries: 
Evidence from hurricane strikes in the Central American and Caribbean regions. Journal of 
Development Economics, 97(1), 131-140. 
 
Takashi, K., Humayun, K., Mir Kalan, S., & Muhammad, T. (2012). Household-level Recovery after 
Floods in a Developing Country: Further Evidence from Khyber Pakhtunkhwa, Pakistan. Institute of 
Economic Research, no. 27, Hitotsubashi University. 
 
  
 
39 
 
Tesliuc, Emil D., and Kathy Lindert (2002). Vulnerability: A quantitative and qualitative assessment. 
Guatemala Poverty Assessment Program. 
 
Thomas, T., Christiaensen, L., Do, Q. T., & Trung, L. D. (2010). Natural disasters and household 
welfare: evidence from Vietnam. World Bank Policy Research Working Paper Series 5491, The 
World Bank. 
 
Tiwari, S., Jacoby, H. G., & Skoufias, E. (2013). Monsoon Babies Rainfall Shocks and Child Nutrition 
in Nepal. Policy Research Working Paper 6395, The World Bank. 
 
United Nations International Strategy for Disaster Reduction (2012). Disaster Risk - Poverty Trends 
in Jordan, Syria, Yemen: Key Findings and Policy Recommendations. UNISDR Regional Office for the 
Arab States, Cairo. 
 
Van den Berg, M. (2010). Household income strategies and natural disasters: Dynamic livelihoods 
in rural Nicaragua. Ecological Economics, 69(3), 592-602. 
 
Von Peter, Goetz, Sebastian von Dahlen & Sweta Saxena (2012). Unmitigated disasters? New 
evidence on the macroeconomic cost of natural catastrophes. BIS Working Paper No. 394. 
 
Wong, Po Yin, and Philip H. Brown (2011). Natural Disasters and Vulnerability: Evidence from the 
1997 Forest Fires in Indonesia. The BE Journal of Economic Analysis & Policy, 11.1., pp 1935-1682. 
 
World Bank (2011). Indonesia - Gender equality in disaster management and climate adaptation. 
Indonesia gender policy brief, no. 6, World Bank, Washington DC. Available at 
http://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/2011/06/17559638/indonesia-gender-equality-
disaster-management-climate-adaptation. 
World Bank (2010). Natural Hazards, UnNatural Disasters. World Bank Publications, Washington, 
DC.  
 
Yamamura, E. (2013). Impact of natural disasters on income inequality: Analysis using panel data 
during the period 1965 to 2004. Munich Personal RePEc Archive. 
 
Yamano, Takashi, Harold Alderman, and Luc Christiaensen (2005). Child growth, shocks, and food 
aid in rural Ethiopia. American Journal of Agricultural Economics, 87.2: 273-288. 
 
Zoleta-Nantes, D. B. (2002). Differential impacts of flood hazards among the street children, the 
urban poor and residents of wealthy neighborhoods in Metro Manila, Philippines. Mitigation and 
Adaptation Strategies for Global Change, 7(3), 239-266. 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
40 
 
   APPENDIX: EMPIRICAL STUDIES ON THE IMPACTS OF NATURAL DISASTERS ON POVERTY  
NO
. 
STUDY DESCRIPTION DATA/TIME PERIOD SAMPLE/METHODS RESULTS/OUTCOMES 
 
  1 
Author: Carter et al. 
(2007) 
Publication: World 
Dev. 
Study area: Ethiopia, 
Hondurus 
Natural Disaster: 
Hurricane Mitch, 
Drought 
Database used: 
Naturally occurring 
experiments 
Time period: 7 year: 
Pre-drought (1996-
97), drought (1998-
2000), recovery 
(2001-03) 
 
Sample size: 416 
rural Ethiopian HH, 
850 rural Honduran 
HH 
Modeling 
technique: Linear  
regression  
 
Honduras: medium-term 
effects of the shock differ 
by initial wealth; the 
relatively wealthy were able 
to partially rebuild their lost 
assets. For the poorer 
households, asset losses 
lasted longer and were 
more acute. Ethiopia: 
poorest households try to 
hold on to their few assets 
despite decreases in 
income and consumption 
possibilities during the 
period of severe losses in 
agricultural production. 
 
2 
Author: Hoddinott 
and Kinsey (2001) 
Publication: Oxford 
Bulletin of Econ. and 
Stat. 
Study area: rural 
Zimbabwe 
Natural Disaster: 
Drought 
Database used: 
Random panel data 
set 
Time period: 1983 
(Jul-Sep), 1984 (Jan-
Mar), re-interview in 
1997 
 
Sample size: 243 
children aged 12-
24 months 
Modeling 
technique: Linear  
regression  
 
This shock lowered annual 
growth rates for children 
between 1.5-2cm, and 
these children remained 
shorter after four years. 
This impact has been 
greater among children 
living in poor households. 
 
3 
Author: Glave et al. 
(2008) 
Publication: UNDP 
Research paper 
Study area: Peru 
Natural Disaster: 
Combined Natural 
Shocks 
Database used: 
INDECI-SINPAD 
database, National 
Household Survey 
(ENAHO) 
Time period: 2002-
2006  
Sample size: 2000 
rural HH 
Modeling 
technique: 
Multinomial 
regression 
 
The effect of disasters on 
poverty rates ranges 
between 0.16 and 0.23pp; 
an increase in the average 
number of disasters by one 
s.d. from the mean would 
increase poverty rates by at 
least one percentage point. 
 
4 
Author: Mogues 
(2011) 
Publication: Econ. 
Dev. and Cultural 
Change 
Study area: North-
eastern Ethiopia 
Natural Disaster: 
Rainfall shocks 
Database used: 
Panel survey  data 
Time period: Jun 
2000-Jul 2003 HH 
survey, livestock 
holdings data 1996-
99 
 
Sample size: 448 
HH  
Modeling 
technique: Linear  
regression; model 
controls for HH 
heterogeneity 
 
Analyzed community-level 
coping mechanisms; found 
that covariant shocks 
impacted more on grain 
stocks than livestock and 
the impact is greater on 
total livestock compared to 
cattle only.  
 
         
5 
Author: Dercon 
(2004) 
Publication: J of Dev. 
Econ. 
Database used: 
panel data 
Time period: 1989 - 
1997 
Sample size: 350 
HH 
Modeling 
technique: log 
A 10 percent lower rainfall 
4–5 years earlier had an 
impact of one percentage 
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Study area: rural 
Ethiopia 
Natural Disaster: 
Rainfall shocks 
 linear model, ML 
estimation 
 
point on current 
consumption growth rates.  
 
6 
Author: Tesliuc and 
Lindert (2002) 
Publication: World 
Bank 
Study area: 
Guatemala 
Natural Disaster: 
Bunched shocks (D, 
Fl, H, Q) 
Database used: Pilot 
LSMS survey module, 
QPES, ENCOVI Data 
Time period: 2000 
 
Sample size:  
N = urban-2609, 
rural-3706, 
Guatemala city-921 
Modeling 
technique: log 
linear multivariate 
regression model 
 
The poor are 
disproportionately more 
exposed to natural disasters 
and agriculture related 
shocks and less to financial 
shocks. Moreover, as a 
result of shocks; income 
inequality increased by 16 
percent, consumption 
inequality by 11 percent 
and total poverty by 20 
percent. 
 
7 
Author: Datt and 
Hoogeveen (2003) 
Publication: World 
Dev. 
Study area: 
Philippines 
Natural Disaster: 
Drought / El Nino 
Database used: 
House Hold survey 
APIS data 
Time period: Year 
1998 
 
Sample size: 
38,710 
Modeling 
technique: log-
linear regression 
 
El Nino shock, ranging 
between 47 percent and 57 
percent of the total impact 
of economic and weather 
shocks on measures of 
incidence, depth and 
severity of poverty.  
 
8 
Author: Jakobsen 
(2012) 
Publication: World 
Dev. 
Study area:  
rural Nicaragua 
Natural Disaster: 
Hurricane Mitch 
Database used: 
Three Nicaraguan 
Living Standard 
Measurement 
Survey (LSMS) panel 
data 
Time period: 1998, 
1999 and 2001 
 
Sample size: 
3000HH (50 
percent rural)  
Modeling 
technique: Multi-
step methodology 
including difference 
in difference, single 
equilibrium model, 
asset index and OLS 
The hurricane did not have 
an adverse impact on the 
ownership of productive 
assets among the affected 
households on average. 
Non-productive asset 
holdings seem to have 
significantly reduced 
affecting the poorest 
households 
disproportionately. 
 
9 
Author: Anttila-
Hughes and Hsiang 
(2013) 
Publication: SSRN 
Study area: 
Philippines 
Natural Disaster: 
Typhoons / Tropical 
cyclones 
Database used: 
Combine Storm data 
with FIES and DHS 
panel data; EM-DAT 
Time period:  
1993, 1998, 2003, 
2008  
 
Sample size: 
142,789 
Modeling 
technique: Time 
series non-linear 
regression 
 
Typhoons causes’ large 
losses to households’ 
economic well-being, 
destroy durable assets and 
depress income. Female 
infant mortality increases 
substantially in the years 
following storm exposure. 
The delayed deaths among 
female infants outnumber 
typhoon deaths by a factor 
of 15. 
 
10 
Author: Rodriguez-
Oreggia et al. (2013) 
Database used: 
Poverty panel 
Sample size: 2,454 
municipalities 
Natural disasters reduce 
human development and 
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Publication: J of Dev. 
Studies 
Study area: Mexico 
(municipal level) 
Natural Disaster: ND 
(Fl, Fr, R,L,Os) 
dataset 
(municipalities); 
DESINVENTAR; HDI 
Time period: 2000, 
2005 
 
Modeling 
technique: 
Difference-in-
Difference 
regression 
 
increases poverty. Floods 
and droughts have more 
significant adverse effects 
compared to frost, rains, 
and other natural disasters. 
 
11 
Author: Lopez-Calva 
and Ortiz-Juarez 
(2009) 
Publication: UNDP 
Research for Public 
Policy papers 
Study area: Mexico, 
El Salvador, Peru, 
Bolivia, Ecuador 
Natural Disaster: 
Bunched natural 
shocks  
Database used: 
DESINVENTAR, 
Household and 
Municipality level 
data (longitudinal), 
Census 
Time period: 
Mexico: 2000-
2005,El-Salvador: 
2001,Peru: 2002-
2006,Bolivia: 1992-
2001  
 
Sample size: El-
Salvador: 700 HH, 
Peru: 2091HH 
Modeling 
technique: Fixed 
Effect and 
Difference-in 
Difference  
 
In Bolivia, poverty 
increased by 12 pp after the 
flood in 2007. In Peru, given 
that households have 
experienced a natural 
event, they are 2.3-4.8 
times more likely to be 
always poor rather than to 
be never poor. All cases 
suggest that sufficiently 
large or persistent natural 
events are likely to have 
both a short term and a 
potential long term and 
inter-generational adverse 
impact on poverty.  
 
12 
Author: Baez and 
Santos (2007) 
Publication: J of Dev. 
Econ. 
Study area: 
Nicaragua 
Natural Disaster: 
Hurricane Mitch 
Database used: 
Nicaraguan Living 
Standards 
Measurement 
Studies (LSMS), 
Nicaraguan 
Demographic Health 
Surveys (DHS) 
Time period: 1998, 
1999, 2001 
 
Sample size: 2,764 
HH 
Modeling 
technique: 
Difference-in 
Difference 
approach 
 
 
Children were 8.7 
percentage points more 
likely to be undernourished 
due to hurricane Mitch; no 
significant effect on school 
enrolment. Child labour 
force participation 
increased by 58 percent 
and the proportion of 
children simultaneously in 
school and working 
increased from 7.5 percent 
to 15.6 percent. 
 
13 
Author: Auffret 
(2003) 
Publication: World 
Bank  
Study area: 16 
countries 
Natural Disaster: 
Catastrophic shocks 
Database used: 
Dynamic Panel Data  
Time period: 1963-
1997 
Sample size: Total 
Panel Observation: 
540 
Modeling 
technique: GMM  
Catastrophic events lead to 
a substantial decline in 
output and investment 
growth and a moderate 
decline in consumption 
growth. 
 
14 
Author: Giesbert and 
Schindler (2010) 
Publication: German 
Institute of Global 
and Area Studies 
Paper 
Database used: 
Panel survey data of 
Trabalho de 
Inquérito Agrícola 
(TIA) in Mozambique 
Sample size: 4,104 
HH 
Modeling 
technique: Probit 
regression  
Drought has a significant 
impact on asset 
accumulation in the short 
term with preliminary 
evidences of households at 
various wealth 
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Study area: Rural 
Mozambique  
Natural Disaster: 
Agricultural shocks 
and earthquakes 
Time period: 2002, 
2005 
 
distributional levels found 
applying different shock 
coping strategies. 
 
 
15 
Author: Morris et al. 
(2002) 
Publication: World 
Dev. 
Study area: 
Hondurus 
Natural Disaster: 
Hurricane Mitch 
Database used: 
Integrated House 
Hold Survey data 
Time period: 
Interview: 1999, 
municipalities up to 
March 1997  
 
Sample size: 2398 
rural HH 
Modeling 
technique: 
Alternate Logistic 
Regression 
The rural extreme poor 
were seriously damaged by 
the hurricane; experienced 
a reduction in income, 
depletion of assets and a 
number of other costs. 
Assets of households in the 
lowest wealth quintile 
reduced by 18 percent 
compared to 3 percent in 
upper wealth quintile. 
 
16 
Author: Asiimwe and 
Mpuga (2007) 
Publication: AERC 
Research Paper 168 
Study area: Uganda 
Natural Disaster: 
Rainfall Shocks 
Database used: HH 
survey data 
Time period: 1992-
93, 1999-2000, 2002-
2003 
 
Sample size: 1992-
93 (9900 HH), 
1999-2000 (10,696 
HH), 2002-2003 
(9711 HH) 
Modeling 
technique: 
Regression  
 
The impact of rainfall 
shocks is significant in the 
first and second planting 
seasons (March–May, 
September–November), 
where positive rainfall 
shocks result in lower 
household income and 
consumption expenditure.  
 
17 
Author: Maccini and 
Yang (2009) 
Publication: 
American Econ. Rev. 
Study area: 
Indonesia  
Natural Disaster: 
Early life Rainfall 
Database used: IFLS 
(Indonesian Family 
Life Surveys), GHCN 
(precipitation and 
temperature  
data) 
Time period: 2000 
 
Sample size: Men - 
4277, Women - 
4615 
Modeling 
technique: 
Reduced-form 
Linear Relationship 
 
Women experiencing 20 
percent more rainfall are 
3.8pp less likely to self-
report poor or very poor 
health. They attain 0.57cm 
greater height, 0.22 more 
grades of schooling, and 
live in HH that score 0.12SD 
higher on an asset index.  
 
18 
Author: Narayanan 
and Sahu (2011) 
Publication: RePEc  
Study area: Orissa, 
India 
Natural Disaster: 
Flood 
Database used: 
Primary data 
collection at the 
household level 
(CARICOM) 
Time period: 2009 
Sample size: 150 
rural HH 
Modeling 
technique: Linear 
regression  
Smaller family size, 
migration income share, 
caste structure are the 
major contributors of 
household health post-
disaster.  
 
19 
Author: Khandker 
(2007) 
Publication: 
Agricultural 
Economics 
Study area: 
Bangladesh 
Database used: 
Panel households 
survey in 1998/99 
Time period: 1998 
 
Sample size: 2,600 
HH 
Modeling 
technique: 
Regression 
 
Half of rural households 
were able to mitigate the 
impact of the 1998 Flood. 
The flood had no lasting 
impact on consumption and 
assets. This is mostly due to 
a subsequent bumper crop, 
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Natural Disaster: 
Flood 
flood relief, or borrowing 
from micro-credit. 
 
20 
Author: Tiwari et al. 
(2013) 
Publication: World 
Bank 
Study area: rural 
Nepal 
Natural Disaster: 
Rainfall shocks 
Database used: 
Demographic and 
Health Survey (DHS), 
DHM (171 rainfall 
stations) 
Time period: 2001, 
2006, 2011 
 
Sample size: 2001 
(8602 HH), 2006 
(9036 HH) and 
2011 (10,826 HH) 
Modeling 
technique: OLS 
 
A 10 percent increase in 
rainfall leads to a 0.15 SD 
increase in weight-for-age 
for children (0–36 months). 
Excess monsoon rainfall 
also enhances child stature 
iff in the second year of life. 
This transitory child height 
effect completely dissipates 
by age 5. 
 
21 
Author: Silbert and 
Pilar Useche (2012) 
Publication: Working 
Paper, Univ. of 
Florida 
Study area: 
Indonesia  
Natural Disaster: ND 
(Fl, Q, MMw) 
Database used: IFLS 
(Indonesian Family 
Life Surveys); EM-
DAT 
Time period: 1997, 
2000, 2007 
 
Sample size: 3269 
HH 
Modeling 
technique:  
Estimation of Ligon 
and Schechter (LS) 
measure, Housing 
Quality Index 
(income) 
 
Disasters between 1992-
1997 significantly increase 
vulnerability to future 
poverty (by nearly 68 
percent) whereas 
households experiencing a 
disaster between1995-2000 
are 36 percent less 
vulnerable to poverty.  
 
22 
Author: Wong and 
Brown (2011) 
Publication: B.E. J of 
Economic Analysis & 
Policy 
Study area: 
Indonesia  
Natural Disaster: 
Forest Fire 
Database used: EM-
DAT; IFLS (1993, 
1997) 
Time period:  
1997 fire, HH - 1993, 
1997 
 
Sample size: 7224 
HH 
Modeling 
technique: Ligon 
and  
Schechter(LS) 
measure, 
Estimation of OLS 
Model 
 
Farm households face a 
32.4 percent increase in 
vulnerability in food 
consumption relative to 
non-farm. HH who own 
farm businesses face 49.2 
percent more vulnerability 
than non-farm. Male-
headed households are less 
vulnerable.  
 
 
23 
Author: Mahajan 
(2012) 
Publication: Indian 
Statistical Institute 
Study area: 14 
States, India 
Natural Disaster: 
Rainfall shocks 
Database used: 
1993/94, 1999/00, 
2004/05, and 
2007/08 of National 
Sample Surveys 
(NSS). Rainfall Data: 
Univ. of Delaware 
Time period: 1993-
2007 
Sample size: 416 
HH, random 
selection 
Modeling 
technique: Log-
linear regression 
and Difference 
analysis 
 
Rainfall shocks do not affect 
gender wage gap. In rain-
fed rice growing regions, 
females suffer greater loss 
in terms of wages 
compared to men due to 
lower rainfall. Greater 
demand for women in crop 
cultivation makes them 
more vulnerable to labour 
market losses during low 
rainfall. 
 
24 
Author: Lal , Singh 
and Holland (2009) 
Publication: SOPAC 
Report 678, UNISDR 
Study area: Fiji  
Database used: 
NDMO, EM-DAT, 
GLIDE, FMS and 
Pacific Disaster Net; 
Sample size: 
835,869 
Modeling 
technique: 
Regression 
A negative relationship 
between HDI and disasters 
implying higher poverty 
levels with decrease in HDI. 
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Natural Disaster: 
Cyclones and floods 
HIES, HDI, HPI and 
IFS database 
Time period: 1990 – 
2002 
 
 
 
25 
Author: Reardon and 
Taylor (1996) 
Publication: World 
Dev. 
Study area: Burkina 
Faso 
Natural Disaster: 
Severe drought 
Database used: HH 
Farm survey 
(ICRISAT) 
Time period: 1983-
84, 1984-85 
 
Sample size: 150 
HH, 25 per vill.   
Modeling 
technique: Income 
source 
decomposition, 
Foster-Greer-
Thorbecke poverty  
index  
In the Sahelian zone, 
inequality decreases but 
poverty increases after 
drought. In the Guinean 
zone (superior agro 
climate), poverty and 
inequality are positively 
related.  
 
 
26 
Author: Jha (2006) 
Publication: South 
Asia Research 
Centre, ANU 
Study area: Fiji, 
Kyrgyz Rep., PNG and 
Vanuatu 
Natural Disaster: 
Earthquakes, Slides, 
Floods and 
Windstorms 
Database used: WDI, 
EM-DAT 
Time period: Fiji 
(1960-85,1997-99), 
Kyrgyz Rep.(1990-
2003), PNG (1961-
1999), Vanuatu 
(1983-1995) 
 
Sample size: Fiji 
(.84 mill.), Kyrgyz 
Rep. (5.1 mill.), 
PNG (5.5 mill.) and 
Vanuatu (.21 mill.) 
Modeling 
technique: 
Certainty-
Equivalent  
Consumption 
Growth, 
macroeconomic 
aggregates 
 
If consumption continued 
at an average pace, Fiji 
would experience a net 
drop in per capita 
consumption of 22.74 
percent. In Kyrgyz Rep. the 
drop would be 17.14 
percent. In PNG, there 
would be a rise in per 
capita consumption of 
33.03 percent; in Vanuatu, 
per capita consumption 
would grow by 2.67 percent 
for the period 1995–2015.  
 
27 
Author: Hou (2010) 
Publication: Econ. 
Dev. and Cultural 
Change 
Study area: Mexico 
Natural Disaster: 
Drought 
Database used: 
Panel data from 
PROGRESA 
Time period: 1998-
1999 
 
Sample size: 
24,000HH in 506 
localities  
Modeling 
technique: 
First Difference 
model 
 
Drought reduces total 
expenditure and total food 
expenditure while 
increasing total calories 
available by reducing 
consumption of expensive 
calories (vegetables, fruits, 
and animal products).  
 
28 
Author: Hoddinott 
(2006) 
Publication: J of Dev. 
Studies 
Study area: 
Zimbabwe  
Natural Disaster: 
1994-95 Drought 
Database used: 
Annual longitudinal 
data on households 
and individuals 
Time period: 1994-
1999 
Sample size: 400 
HH 
Modeling 
technique: Fixed 
Effect estimation 
and First Difference  
Drought causes some 
households to draw down 
assets; adult men and older 
preschoolers were not 
adversely affected. 
However, young 
preschoolers (12–24 
months) were adversely 
affected along with adult 
women (who recovered 
quickly).  
 
 
29 
Author: Mueller and 
Osgood (2009a) 
Database used: HH 
Surveys, Climate: 
Research Institute 
Sample size: 
300,000 
A decrease of one SD of 
precipitation can have an 18 
percent effect on rural 
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Publication: J of Dev. 
Studies 
Study area: Brazil 
Natural Disaster: 
Drought 
for Climate and 
Society  
Time period: 
1992,1993, 1995 
individuals, 13,197 
weather stations 
Modeling 
technique: 
Reduced-form 
regression  
wages within 5 years and a 9 
percent effect on rural 
wages within 5-10 years. 
 
30 
Author: Mueller and 
Quisumbing (2011) 
Publication: J of Dev. 
Studies 
Study area: 
Bangladesh 
Natural Disaster: 
Flood 
Database used: 
Flood Impact panel 
household survey 
Time period: 1998 – 
2004 
Sample size: 757 
HH (126 villages) 
Modeling 
technique: 
Regression 
 
Real wages of agricultural 
workers declined only in 
the short-term, while 
magnitude of the salaried 
income losses was high 
(34.3-45.6 percent) with 
wages stabilized over time. 
 
 
31 
Author: Shah and 
Steinberg (2012) 
Publication: 
University of 
California, Davis 
Study area: India 
Natural Disaster: 
Rainfall shocks 
Database used: 
Rainfall data: Univ. of 
Delaware 
Schooling and 
Health: Annual 
Status of Education 
Report (ASER) 
Wages: National 
Sample Survey (NSS) 
Time period: 2005-
2009 
Sample size: 3 
million rural 
children 
Modeling 
technique: 
Regression  
 
Children and parents work 
less and have lower wages 
in drought years and the 
reverse for positive rainfall 
shocks. Early-life exposure 
to droughts has deleterious 
effects on health, schooling 
and later-life wages. 
32 Author: Foltz et al. 
(2013) 
Publication: AAEA 
conference 
presentation 
Study area: Ethiopia 
Natural Disaster: 
Drought, Rainfall and 
Temperature 
Database used: 
Ethiopia Rural 
Household Survey 
(ERHS) 
Time period: 1995-
2009 
Sample size: 15 
collection of 
villages 
Modeling 
technique: Logit 
regression 
 
Food and non-food 
consumption are a direct 
function of weather; being 
in a vulnerable area may 
not result in being worse-
off relative to being poor in 
a non-vulnerable area. 
 
33 
Author: Thomas et 
al. (2010) 
Publication: World 
Bank 
Study area: Vietnam 
Natural Disaster: 
Droughts, Floods and 
Cyclones 
Database used: Geo-
referenced 
meteorological data, 
National Living 
Standard 
Measurement 
Surveys 
Time period: 2002, 
2004, 2006 
Sample size: Over 
500,000 
Modeling 
technique: 
Regression  
 
Short-run losses from 
natural disasters can be 
substantial, with riverine 
floods causing welfare 
losses up to 23 percent and 
hurricanes reducing welfare 
by up to 52 percent in cities 
(population>500,000).  
 
34 
Author: Skoufias et 
al. (2012) 
Publication: Bulletin 
of Indonesian Econ. 
Studies 
Database used: IFLS2 
and IFLS3, 32 
weather stations 
Time period: 1997-
1998, 2000 
Sample size: 267 
communities 
Modeling 
technique: 
Regression  
 
A delay in monsoon onset 
does not have a significant 
impact on the welfare of 
rice farmers; HH located in 
areas exposed to low 
rainfall following the 
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Study area: 
Indonesia 
Natural Disaster: 
Rainfall shocks 
monsoon are negatively 
affected. 
 
35 
Author: Mueller and 
Osgood (2009b)  
Publication: Ag. 
Econ. 
Study area: Brazil 
Natural Disaster: 
Short-term 
precipitation shocks 
Database used: HH 
survey, NOAA, 
National Center for 
Environmental 
Prediction, Climate 
Prediction Center  
Time period: 1995 
Sample size: 
45,370 rural HH, 
40,005 urban HH 
Modeling 
technique: 
Regression  
 
Large precipitation shocks 
have long-term negative 
impacts on rural out-
migrants’ incomes; 
observed decline is likely 
from the loss of worthy 
alternatives as opposed to 
damage from migration 
itself.  
 
36 
Author: Baez and 
Santos (2008) 
Publication: UNDP 
Public Policy paper 
Study area: El 
Salvador 
Natural Disaster: 
Earthquake 
Database used: 
BASIS El Salvador 
Rural Household 
Surveys 
Time period: 1996-
2002 
Sample size: 700 
HH 
Modeling 
technique: Double-
Difference analysis 
 
Effect of both earthquakes 
is a reduction in household 
income of one-third of the 
pre shock average for 
households in the upper 
half of the ground shaking 
distribution; also an 
increase in the depth and 
severity of poverty. 
 
 
37 
Author: Hoddinott 
and Kinsey (2000) 
Publication: IFPRI 
Discussion Paper 
Study area: 
Zimbabwe 
Natural Disaster:  
1994-95 Drought 
Database used: 
panel data set of 
households 
Time period: 1994-
1997 
Sample size: 400 
HH 
Modeling 
technique: Fixed 
Effect estimation  
 
Poor women are more 
severely affected by 
drought. Ex ante private 
coping strategies (e.g. 
accumulation of livestock) 
protect women against 
adverse consequences 
compared to ex post 
ineffective public 
responses.  
 
38 
Author: Jensen 
(2000) 
Publication: 
American Econ. Rev. 
Study area:  
Cote d'Ivoire 
Natural Disaster: 
Rainfall shocks 
Database used: Cote 
d'Ivoire Living 
Standards Survey. 
Rainfall data: Agence 
Nationale des 
Aerodromes et de la 
Meteorologie 
Time period: 1985-
1988 
Sample size: 352  
Modeling 
technique: OLS and 
fixed-effect 
regression  
School enrolment rates 
decline 33-50 percent and 
malnutrition doubles in the 
presence of adverse rainfall 
shocks. HH are slightly 
more likely to send children 
to live elsewhere during an 
adverse weather shock. 
 
39 
Author: Cunguara et 
al. (2011) 
Publication: Ag. 
Econ. 
Study area: Southern 
Mozambique 
Natural Disaster: 
Drought 
Database used: 
panel survey data 
Time period: 2002 
(TIA02), 2005 
(TIA05), 2008 (TIA08) 
 
Sample size: TIA02 
and TIA05: 1154 
HH; TIA08: 1196 
HH 
Modeling 
technique: log 
linear regression 
 
Participation in nonfarm 
income-generating 
activities increases during 
drought. HH are unlikely to 
generate a higher mean net 
income necessary to 
compensate for the 
shortfall in income from 
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crops. Relatively poorer HH 
often earn less from 
nonfarm activities than 
wealthier ones. 
 
40 
Author: Van den 
Berg (2010) 
Publication: 
Ecological Econ. 
Study area: 
Nicaragua 
Natural Disaster: 
Hurricane Mitch 
Database used: 
Living Standard 
Measurement 
Survey (LSMS) panel 
data 
Time period: 1998-
2001, 2005 
 
Sample size: 3352 
Modeling 
technique: 
multinomial logit 
regression 
 
Annual farming and farm 
employment generate low 
incomes, whereas non-farm 
wage employment and 
livestock farming result in 
relatively high incomes. 
Poverty traps identified 
among HH that followed 
low-welfare coping 
strategies. 
 
41 
Author: UNISDR 
(2012) 
Publication: UNISDR 
Regional Office, 
Cairo 
Study area: Jordan, 
Syria, Yemen 
Natural Disaster: D, 
Fl, Fr, W-c and h, Q, 
Lq, Epi, Ss 
 
Database used: 
DESINVENTAR 
Time period: Jordan: 
1981-2010; Syria: 
1980-2009; Yemen: 
1971-2011 
 
Sample size: 
Jordan: 454; Syria: 
7326; Yemen: 8945 
Modeling 
technique: 
Descriptive 
 
Poverty is most severe in 
rural non-diversified 
regions where agriculture is 
severely limited by low 
rainfall, degraded lands, 
erosion and desertification. 
Climate variability and 
water shortage leads to 
stagnating rural incomes 
and increased poverty in 
Syria and Yemen. 
 
42 
Author: Lal, Rita and 
Khatri (2009) 
Publication: IUCN 
Study area: Fiji 
Natural Disaster: 
Floods 
Database used: 2009 
Flood Economic 
Survey 
Time period: 2009 
 
Sample size: 15-20  
percent of each 
category of firm 
Modeling 
technique: ECLAC 
Disaster 
Assessment 
Method 
The total economic cost of 
floods in the sugar belt is 
about $24 million. 77 
percent of the flood 
affected sugarcane families 
will fall below the poverty 
line, compared to 54 
percent of families, if no 
flooding. 
 
43 
Author: Kim (2012) 
Publication: 
Disasters 
Study area: Global 
Natural Disaster: 
Composite Natural 
Disasters 
Database used: WDI 
poverty data, EM-
DAT 
Time period: Poverty 
(2008), EM-DAT 
(1970-2006) 
Sample size: 208 
countries 
Modeling 
technique: Disaster 
Exposure indicator 
The total net increase of 
exposure between 1970-
2000 is determined by the 
increased concentration of 
the poor (26 percent) in 
disaster-prone areas. With 
varying time trend across 
regions, poor people in East 
Asia and Pacific are more 
exposed to natural 
disasters. 
 
44 
Author: Halliday 
(2012) 
Publication: 
European Econ. Rev. 
Database used: 
BASIS panel data 
Time period: 1997-
2002 
Sample size: 689 
(2001), 1365 
(1999,2001), 2008 
(1997,1999,2001) 
The 2001 earthquake 
resulted in a large negative 
effect on female migration, 
but had absolutely no effect 
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Study area: El 
Salvador 
Natural Disaster: Ag. 
shocks and 
earthquakes 
 Modeling 
technique: 
Regression 
on male migration. A 
dramatic increase in the 
number of women’s 
domestic labour hours. 
 
45 
Author: Attzs (2008) 
Publication: UNU-
WIDER Paper 
Study area: Jamaica 
Natural Disaster: 
Floods, Earthquake 
and Hurricanes 
Database used: EM-
DAT, poverty 
assessment studies 
(CARICOM) 
Time period: 1990s 
 
Sample size: 
CARICOM member 
states - 17 
countries 
Modeling 
technique: 
Descriptive stats. 
An increase in migration 
after hurricane and an 
increased flow of 
remittances that 
constitutes 87 percent of 
total income among the 
poorest deciles. Women are 
found more vulnerable (40 
percent of HH are headed 
by females). 
 
46 
Author: Masozera et 
al. (2007) 
Publication: 
Ecological Econ. 
Study area: New 
Orleans 
Natural Disaster: 
Hurricane Katrina 
Database used: 
Census, American 
Community Survey 
2004 
Time period: 2005-6 
 
Sample size: New 
Orleans (2002 
population - 
484,674) 
Modeling 
technique: GIS, 
vulnerability 
analysis 
 
Lower income groups 
suffered disproportionately 
during the response and 
recovery phases.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
47 
Author: Little et al. 
(2006) 
Publication: J of Dev. 
Studies 
Study area: South 
Wollo, Ethiopia 
Natural Disaster: 
Drought 
Database used: 7-
rounds of interviews 
Time period: 
Between 2000 and 
2003, 62 cases; recall 
data 1997-99 
 
Sample size: 416 
HH 
Modeling 
technique: 
Empirical analysis 
of larger sample 
and in-depth of 
smaller sample. 
 
The 1999–2000 droughts 
had a devastating short-
term impact on HH, 
particularly among the 
poorest, but did not 
increase overall rates of 
poverty in medium term. 
The greater the 
dependence on rain fed 
agriculture-based incomes 
and less diversification, the 
greater the risk of poverty. 
 
48 
Author: Neumayer 
and Plumper (2007) 
Publication: Annals 
of the Association of 
American 
Geographers 
Study area: Global 
Natural Disaster: D, 
Q, Epi, Ext. temp, 
Fam, Fir, Fl, Ins. Infes, 
L, V, S, Ws 
Database used: EM-
DAT; International 
Data Base of US 
Census, WB 
Time period: 1981 - 
2002 
 
Sample size: 141 
Countries, 4605 
Natural Disasters 
Modeling 
technique: 
Regression 
 
Disasters lower life 
expectancy of women and 
in certain cases at an earlier 
age compared to men. 
Disaster strength is 
positively related with 
gender gap in life 
expectancy; this effect 
deteriorates with higher 
level of women’s 
socioeconomic status. 
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49 
Author: Boustan et 
al. (2012) 
Publication: 
American Econ. Rev. 
Study area: 467 SEA 
(State Economic 
Area) 
Natural Disaster: Fl, 
Q,H,T 
Database used: 
American Red Cross 
–circulars. Migration 
data- from two panel 
datasets (1920-30 
and 1935-40). 
Time period: 1920-
1940 
Sample size: 15000 
randomly selected 
men 
Modeling 
technique: 
Conditional Logit 
regression 
In the 1920s and 1930s 
population exited from 
tornado-prone areas with a 
larger effect on potential in-
migrants than on existing 
residents, while flood 
events were associated 
with net in-migration. 
 
50 
Author: Shoji (2010) 
Publication: J of Dev. 
Studies 
Study area: 
Bangladesh 
Natural Disaster: 
Floods 
Database used: IFPRI 
survey 
Time period: 2004-
2005 
Sample size: 326 
HH 
Modeling 
technique: 
Recursive Bivariate 
Probit model 
 
Rescheduling plays the role 
of safety net by decreasing 
the probability that people 
skip meals during negative 
shocks by 5.1 percent; the 
effect is higher on the 
landless and females. 
 
51 
Author: Patnaik and 
Narayanan (2010) 
Publication: RePEc  
Study area: Uttar 
Pradesh, India 
Natural Disaster: 
Floods 
Database used: 
Primary HH Survey; 
EM-DAT 
Time period: 1950-
2007 
Sample size: 600 
villages 
Modeling 
technique: 
Multivariate Probit 
model 
 
HH adopt a wide variety of 
risk coping measures 
(monetary transfers, relief, 
selling of livestock and 
borrowing). Monetary 
transfers were the most 
effective but unlikely to be 
used to cope with health 
shocks. 
 
52 
Author: Janzen and 
Carter (2013) 
Publication: 
University of 
California, Davis 
Study area: Kenya 
Natural Disaster: 
Drought 
Database used: 
Index-based 
Livestock pilot 
project 
Time period: 2009, 
2011 
Sample size: 924 
HH 
Modeling 
technique: 
Difference-in-
Difference  
 
Insured HH are 18-50 pp 
less likely to draw down 
assets and 8-41 pp less 
likely to reduce meals 
compared to uninsured 
households. 
 
53 
Author: Yamamura 
(2013) 
Publication: RePEc  
Study area: Global 
Natural Disaster: 
Disasters in general. 
Database used: 
Standardized Income 
Distribution 
Database (SIDD); 
EM-DAT 
Time period: 1965-
2004 
Sample size: 86 
countries 
Modeling 
technique: 
Regression  
 
Natural disasters lead to 
increased income inequality 
in the short-term. 
Intriguingly, it has further 
been reported that this 
effect disappears in the 
medium-term. 
 
54 
Author: Baez and 
Mason (2008) 
Publication: SSRN 
Study area: Lat Am. 
and the Caribbean  
Natural Disaster: 
Ws/Fl (clim. ch 
impacts) 
Database used: 
EM-DAT, climate 
data, social 
vulnerabilities and 
public health data. 
Time period: 1970-
2007 
Sample size: Latin 
America and the 
Caribbean 
countries 
Modeling 
technique: 
Synthesis of 
evidences  
Weather inconsistencies 
are expected to have 
negative short-run and 
long-run consequences on 
the well-being of rural 
populations. Agricultural 
incomes are likely to be 
negatively affected due to 
weather variability. 
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55 
Author: Banerjee 
(2007) 
Publication: World 
Dev. 
Study area: 
Bangladesh 
Natural Disaster: 
Flood 
Database used: 
District-wise monthly 
real agricultural 
wage  
Time period: 1979-
2000 
Sample size: 20 
Districts 
Modeling 
technique: An 
autoregressive 
distributed lag 
process, 
Difference-in-
difference 
Floods have positive 
implications for wages in 
the long-run; magnitude 
depends on relative flood-
proneness of a district and 
relative severity of floods. 
 
56 
Author: De La 
Fuente (2010) 
Publication: Well-
Being and Social 
Policy 
Study area: Lat Am 
Countries 
Natural Disaster: 
Hurricane Mitch and 
floods afterwards 
Database used: 
Panel data from 
nationally 
representative 
household surveys, 
satellite rainfall 
records  
Time period: 
1998-2001 
Sample size: HH 
surveys 1998-2001.  
Modeling 
technique: 
difference-in-
difference  
HH having suffered a flood 
(caused by Mitch) had an 
income growth rate 20 
percent lower than other 
households. No significant 
medium-term effect on HH 
located in municipalities 
affected by the hurricane. 
 
57 
Author: Dillon et al. 
(2011) 
Publication: 
American Journal of 
Ag. Econ. 
Study area: Nigeria 
Natural Disaster: 
Extreme 
temperature  
Database used: HH 
survey (2008) on 
individuals who 
migrated from 
villages originally 
sampled in 1988, 
temperature data 
Time period: 1988, 
2008 
Sample size: 200 
HH (four villages) 
Modeling 
technique: linear 
probability model 
Males migrate in response 
to ex post risk.  
 
58 
Author: Hallegatte et 
al. (2010) 
Publication: OECD 
Working Paper No.27 
Study area: Mumbai, 
India 
Natural Disaster: 
Flood and climate 
change  
Database used: 
Rainfall observations 
(Indian 
Meteorological 
Department), 
Affected Exposure 
Map from Indian 
Remote Sensing 
Satellite 
Time period: 2005 
Sample size: 
700,000 HH  
Modeling 
technique: Cost-
Benefit Analysis 
Total losses (direct plus 
indirect) associated with a 
1-in-100 year event could 
triple compared to current 
scenario. By improving the 
drainage system in 
Mumbai, losses could be 
reduced by as much as 70 
percent. Extending 
insurance to 100 percent 
penetration could halve the 
indirect effects. 
 
59 
Author: Rabassa et 
al. (2012) 
Publication: World 
Bank  
Study area: Nigeria 
Natural Disaster: 
Rainfall shocks 
Database used: 
Nigeria Demographic 
and Health Survey, 
rainfall data 
Time period: 2003, 
2008 
Sample size: 
11,500 child-level 
records that 
includes birth dates 
and detailed child 
health. 
Modeling 
technique: 
Regression 
Rainfall shocks have an 
impact on child weight-for-
height and height-for-age, 
and on the incidence of 
diarrhoea. No evidence of 
nonlinear impacts. No 
gender-based 
discrimination in resources 
allocation.  
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Author: 
Bandyopadhyay and 
Skoufias (2015) 
Publication: Rev. of 
Econ. of the 
Household 
Study area: 
Bangladesh 
Natural Disaster: 
Rainfall variability 
Database used: 
Household 
Income Expenditure 
Survey (2010), 
rainfall data (BMD 
and CRU), flood data 
(BWDB) 
Time period: 2010, 
January 2011 (HIES), 
1948-2010 (rainfall) 
Sample size: 7,840 
rural HHs 
Modeling 
technique: 
Regression 
Rural households are found 
to adopt occupational 
diversification that comes 
at a cost of lower 
consumption. Access to 
market appears to be more 
effective compared to 
access to credit and safety 
nets in reducing the 
likelihood of costly 
occupational diversification.  
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Author: Rentschler 
(2013) 
Publication: World 
Bank  
Study area: Global 
Natural Disaster: Q, 
Fl and Ws 
Database used: 
MunichRE, nationally 
representative 
household income 
surveys 
Time period: 1980-
2012 
Sample size: Global 
Modeling 
technique: survey 
analysis 
Low-income countries incur 
disproportionately large 
damages relative to assets. 
The poor are significantly 
more vulnerable and 
exposed to the economic 
and human capital losses.  
62 Author: Mendiratta 
(2012) 
Publication: 
Published online 
(www. isid.ac.in) 
Study area: India 
Natural Disaster: 
Rainfall 
Database used: 
Global monthly 
rainfall data, DHS 
Time period: 1998-
99 
Sample size: 436 
districts, children 
aged 13-36 months 
Modeling 
technique: 
Reduced-form 
regression 
Height and weight-for-age 
for both girls and boys are 
neg. impacted by adv. 
rainfall while increase the 
risk of termination of 
breastfeeding during pos. 
rainfall. 
 Source: Authors’ elaborations. 
 
Notes: The acronyms used above are explained as follows: TIA (Trabalho de Inqu´erito Agr´ıcola – National 
Agricultural Survey), LSMS (Living Standard Measurement Survey), QPES (Qualitative Poverty and Exclusion 
Field Study), ENCOVI (Encuesta Nacional de Condiciones de Vida), APIS (Annual Poverty Indicators Survey), 
FIES (Family Income and Expenditure Survey), DHS (Demographic and Health Survey), EM-DAT (Emergency 
Events Database), DESINVENTAR (Disaster Information Management System), HDI, UNDP (United Nations 
Development Programme), UNISDR (United Nations International Strategy for Disaster Reduction), IUCN 
(World Conservation Union), ECLAC (Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean), BASIS 
(fielded by the Ohio State University and the Fundacio´n Salvadoren˜a para el Desarollo Econo´ mico y Social 
(FUSADES)), IFLS (Indonesian Family Life Survey), GHCN (Global Historical Climatology Network), CARICOM 
(Caribbean Community Secretariat), DHM (Department of Hydrology and Meteorology), NDMO (National 
Disaster Management Office), GLIDE (Global Identifier Number), FMS (Fiji Meteorological Service), HIES 
(Household Income Expenditure Survey), HPI (Human Poverty Index), IFS (International Financial Statistics), 
BMD (Bangladesh Meteorological Department), CRU (Climate Research Unit of University of East Anglia), 
BWDB (Bangladesh Water Development Board), ICRISAT (International Crops Research Institute for the 
Semi-Arid Tropics), WDI (World Development Indicators), WB (World Bank), dc (data card), G 
(governorates), OLS (Ordinary Least Squares), ND (Natural Disaster) - (D-Drought, , H-Hurricane,  Fl-Flood, 
Fr-Frost, R-Rainfall, L-Landslide, Lq-Liquefaction, W-Wave-cold and heat, Q-Quakes, Ss-Snowstorms, MMw-
Mass Movement wet, Epi-Epidemics, Ext.temp-Extreme Temperature, Fir-Fires, Fam-Famines, Ins. Infes – 
Insect Infestations, V-Volcano, S-surges, Ws-Windstorms, T-Tornado, Os-Others), HH (Household). 
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CHAPTER TWO 
POVERTY AND NATURAL DISASTERS: A REGRESSION META-ANALYSIS 
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2.1  INTRODUCTION 
Natural disasters - earthquakes, typhoons, hurricanes, floods, cold and heat waves, 
droughts and volcanic eruptions - are a constant presence in all our lives, but especially so for the 
poor. Disasters are especially prevalent in the most populous region of the world (Asia) and most 
catastrophic in the destruction they wreak in the poorest countries (e.g., Haiti in 2010). Disasters, 
however, occur everywhere, and their direct financial costs have been increasing for the past 
several decades.  
The poor, both in low- and higher-income countries are especially vulnerable to the impact 
of disasters, so that disasters are not only of interest to social scientists because of society-wide 
economic impact, their impact on the public sector which bears the costs of reconstruction, or 
because of their environmental impact, but also because of their importance in the processes of 
development, income growth, and income distribution. The World Bank, for example, devoted its 
2014 World Development Report to the risk faced by poor households, poor regions, and poor 
countries, with a special emphasis on risks that are associated with natural events. The need to 
understand the role of disasters and their impacts on the poor, in creating and sustaining poverty, 
and in generating poverty traps, is even more acute as the changes due to human-induced climate 
change are predicted to be more extreme in poorer countries and will thus place additional barriers 
to poverty alleviation.14 
 The empirical and theoretical research on disasters has been evaluating the impacts of 
natural disasters on a diverse range of social and economic issues: the economic growth impact of 
disasters in the short and long terms, the fiscal impact of disasters, the impact on international 
trade and financial flows, the impact on populations through migration and fertility choices, the 
impact on human capital accumulation, the importance of political economy in shaping the 
disasters’ aftermath, and other related topics. The research on the impact of disaster shocks 
specifically on the poor is one branch of this wider ‘disaster’ literature that has not yet been 
adequately summarized, nor has there appeared to be any attempt to reach any general 
                                                             
14 There is little certainty regarding the impact of climate change on the occurrence of natural disasters, though the 
most recent assessment by the IPCC concludes that the frequency of days with extreme temperature, of floods, and 
of droughts, is likely to increase (IPCC, 2012). In addition, the spatial distribution of extreme events is likely to change 
leading to further impact as these will affect areas that are less prepared for them. 
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conclusions from the numerous case studies (country-specific, disaster-type-specific, or disaster-
event-specific) that constitute the bulk of this research stream. 
This lacuna is at least in part attributable to the complex nature of the inter-relationship 
between disaster impacts and poverty and welfare outcomes, and the consequent diversity of 
impacts across the investigated case studies. An additional difficulty, given this diversity of 
outcomes, is in identifying the precise channels - both direct and indirect - that describe the causal 
mechanisms. We aim to fill this lacuna using meta-regression analysis.  
For readers who are not familiar with this methodology, meta-regression analysis is a 
statistical method, a regression that is used to evaluate a body of empirical research that is itself 
typically regression-based. It is especially appropriate for questions for which there are multiple 
studies using similar methodologies, but different datasets, different regression specifications, or 
different time-periods. Meta-regression analysis is a companion method to a narrative survey of 
the literature. It identifies empirical regularities in the investigated body of work that are more 
difficult to spot or to rigorously establish. It further establishes what characteristics of the data, 
the method, or the studies’ designs are most closely associated with the observed empirical 
regularities. Stanley (2001) provides further details about the justification and the theoretical 
underpinning of the meta-regression method. 
Here, we embark on an attempt to provide some generalizations about this literature 
through the use of a meta-regression analysis of this literature. Two strands of literature constitute 
our primary focus in this study. The first strand investigates the immediate (direct or first-order) 
effect of disasters on household welfare, on the poor specifically, and on society-wide incidence of 
poverty. The second strand explores the consequent indirect (higher-order) effects that have an 
impact on the lives of the poor, in generating additional poverty, or in the creation and sustenance 
of poverty traps.15 Given the nature of our quantitative meta-analysis, we restrict our investigation 
                                                             
15 Cavallo and Noy (2011), following the ECLAC (1991) methodology, distinguish between the direct impact of sudden-
onset disasters (the immediate mortality, morbidity, and physical damage) and the indirect impact that affects the 
economy in the aftermath of the actual damage caused (including secondary mortality and morbidity, and on 
economic activity). The World Bank, in its survey Natural Hazards Unnatural Disasters (2010), employs a different 
terminology that makes essentially the same distinction: first-order and higher-order effects. 
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to research projects that are empirical in nature, and thus exclude qualitative assessments, 
theoretical analyses, and work that relies on calibration of structural models.16 
The diverse foci of these empirical studies and the multitude of different empirical findings 
clearly demonstrate the importance of synthesizing these research results formally in meta-
regression analysis. According to guidelines suggested by Stanley et al. (2013), a statistical meta-
regression analysis is explicitly designed to integrate econometric estimates, typically regression 
coefficients or transformation of regression coefficients. To put differently, a meta-analysis is a 
quantitative summary of statistical indicators reported in a series of similar empirical studies; 
previous well-known examples include Card and Krueger (1995), Smith and Huang (1995), Brander 
et al. (2006), and Disdier and Head (2008). We essentially provide an exploratory synopsis of the 
empirical literature analyzing the direct and indirect relationship among poverty, household 
welfare and natural disasters attempting to generalize from the contextual idiosyncrasies of each 
case-study. 
Our contribution here is the synthesis of the microeconomic literature examining the 
heterogeneity of impact of disasters on the poor, using regression meta-analysis methodology. Two 
recently published papers, Lazzaroni and van Bergeijk (2014) and Klomp and Valckx (2014), both 
conducted regression meta-analysis of the macroeconomic literature. They both focus on the 
impact of natural disasters on aggregate growth and conclude that while the average indirect 
short-term impact is largely negative, there is significant heterogeneity across countries, time 
periods, and types of events. Our contribution, therefore, provides useful microeconomic detail 
complementing the macroeconomic insights derived from this previous work. 
The empirical studies utilized to conduct the quantitative analysis here illustrate the 
geographical coverage of this research: Asia (36.8 percent of research projects) and Africa (34.2 
percent) are the most studied regions compared to Central America (23.7 percent), South America 
(18.4 percent) and Oceania (15.8 percent). Regarding the types of natural disasters studied, hydro-
meteorological events (mainly floods, rainfall and tropical cyclones) are studied in 21 studies (55.2 
percent) followed by geo-climatological events (i.e. droughts and earthquakes) in 13 studies (34.2 
                                                             
16 A companion narrative review of the literature that also describes the projects that employ other methodological 
approaches is Karim and Noy (2016). 
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percent). The rest constitute seven studies that investigate multiple types of natural shocks (18.4 
percent).         
The organization of this paper is as follows: Section 2.2 details the data construction 
procedure. We first identify the algorithm that led to the choice of studies to include, and then 
providing detailed explanation of the specific categories of variables we included as both the 
independent and dependent variables in our regression analysis. This section follows closely the 
meta-analysis protocol outlined in Stanley et al. (2013). This section also includes the relevant 
descriptive and summary statistics. Section 2.3 presents the methodological framework with the 
specifications we use and the functional form of the meta-regression. Section 2.4 examines the 
regression output and provides interpretation of results comparing it with the results outlined in 
the existing literature we analyze. We describe robustness checks with restricted samples in 
Section 2.5 and end up with some conclusions and a further research agenda in Section 2.6.17 
 
2. 2        DATA CONSTRUCTION 
The empirical literature on poverty and natural disasters is relatively new with a substantial 
inflow of new studies during the past decade. This may be the case because of the availability of 
new data, the increasing media reporting of natural catastrophes, and/or the potential link to the 
changing climate. This short history assists us in as much as almost all the studies we found were 
completed using rigorous statistical/econometric approaches. In order to make sure our results are 
less biased than a more informal qualitative survey, we include every single paper that we found 
by following a well-defined procedure, and which includes all the relevant variables/measures we 
require for our statistical analysis. In our final sample of 38 papers, 28 had gone through a peer-
reviewing process. In order to attenuate any publication bias we also included working papers and 
other unpublished work we found while following our search procedure described below.18  
                                                             
17 Goodman et al. (2013) describe the steps that are dictated in a standard meta-analysis protocol: “1) a thorough 
literature search; 2) clear and transparent eligibility criteria for selecting studies to include in the analyses; 3) a 
standardized approach for critically appraising studies; 4) appropriate statistical calculations to assess comparisons 
and trends among study findings; and 5) evaluations of potential sources of heterogeneity and bias.” In this section, 
we describe steps (1)-(3), in the next section we describe step (4), while the last two sections include detailed 
descriptions of the evaluations we undertook (step 5). 
18 Unlike practice in some other research disciplines, in economics most research projects are posted online as working 
papers long before they are accepted for publication anywhere. Thus, by relying also on search engines that identify 
working papers we overcome much of the publication bias that could be a bigger concern had we not been able to 
access unpublished research. 
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Our base sample constitutes English-language papers identified through an extensive 
search using the main relevant search engines and electronic journal databases deploying 
combinations of keywords and terminologies. Papers have been collected between April and June, 
2013. We searched in: EconLit, Google Scholar, JSTOR, RePec, Wiley Online Library, and the World 
Bank working paper series. The keywords we used in these searches were: poverty and natural 
disasters, inequality and natural disasters, impacts of natural disasters on household, weather 
shocks and household welfare, and impacts of natural shocks on the poor. We followed this by 
examining the existing bibliographies within these papers we already identified to further widen 
our sample. The studies we collected range from journal articles, to project reports, book chapters 
and working papers.  
Out of 62 studies we identified, we were able to extract 161 separate observations from 38 
studies of direct and indirect impacts on poverty and welfare indicators impacted through different 
types of sudden and slow on-set naturally occurring events.19 The maximum number of 
observations taken from a single study is 20 and the average number is 4.2. Table 1 details the list 
of studies we analyzed and reports the number of observations derived from each study in the 
finalized sample of 38 papers. 
 
2.2.1     DISASTER TYPES AND OUTCOME VARIABLES: BROAD AND SUB-CATEGORIES 
Due to diverse range of foci within the available literature, we have accumulated the 
measures of poverty and welfare outcomes under several broad categories: income, consumption, 
poverty, wealth, health, education and labour. Within each category, we further sub-divided the 
measures into separate indicators, to enable us to examine whether the type of poverty/welfare 
measure used affects the results. The classification of types of natural disasters and the 
methodologies used were also recorded and classified for further analysis. Table 2 presents the 
lists of categories of variables and their descriptions. The frequency distribution of observations 
                                                             
19 We could not use 24 studies for our statistical analysis either because of the methodology they used (e.g., calibrated 
modelling), some of the data was missing in their reporting (e.g., number of observations in sample), or their focus 
was on evaluation of alternative coping strategies rather than impact analysis. In a companion paper (Karim and Noy, 
2016), we summarize some general information from all 62 studies including a study description (author, year of 
publication, study area and specification of natural disaster), data sources and time period used, sample size and 
methodology, and the results and main conclusions of each study. 
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and the descriptive statistics of for each of nine (9) types of outcome variables is described in Table 
3. Among the outcome values (in percentage changes), consumption1 displays the maximum 
number of observations (39) followed by health (29), poverty (20), and labour (20). Interestingly, 
the number of negative outcomes in these categories are 16 (consumption1), 19 (health), 12 
(poverty) and 15 (labour). This skewness of the observations suggests the presence of 
heterogenous impacts among the poverty-disaster outcome measures in this literature. 
The direct and indirect impacts of disasters have mostly been defined from the perspectives 
of income, consumption (for direct impact) and poverty and wealth indicators (for indirect or 
longer-term). We have further sub-divided income and consumption into two sub-categories while 
leaving wealth and poverty under one broad category. The direct and indirect impacts of shocks 
on health, education and labour outcomes have also been investigated in some of the studies in 
our sample; we classified health, education, and labour in one category each. 
In order to conduct our analysis, without assuming that ‘all disasters are created equal’, we 
classified three different types of disasters: disaster 1 (hydro-meteorological), disaster 2 (geo-
climatological) and disaster 3 (grouped natural shocks). Table 2 provides additional information. 
Information on our procedure for standardizing the dependent variables is available in the 
appendix. 
 
2.2.2    CONTROL VARIABLES 
We recorded a set of control variables for the observations in our sample. The control 
variables are included in a binary format based upon their usage in the selected studies; i.e., when 
a particular control variable had been used in a paper we have recorded 1 and when the specified 
model failed to control for a specific variable, we recorded 0. The set of control variables whose 
inclusion we recorded are household/community characteristics (i.e. household heterogeneity 
including characteristics regarding household head), year and seasonal effects, regional 
characteristics (i.e., district dummies), demographics (population and labour force characteristics), 
socio-economic indicators (occupation, land ownership and access to safety net) and features 
indicating geographical and natural-environmental features. Comprehensive descriptions of all 
these controls are provided in table 2. In Appendix Table 1 we document the descriptive statistics 
of all the variables used to conduct this meta-analysis.  
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2.3         METHODOLOGICAL FRAMEWORK 
Our main objective here is to generalize the direct and indirect impacts of natural disasters 
on households, poverty and welfare measures. We employ the following general econometric 
specification:  yi = αCi + β Di + δxi + µi. The dependent variable in our regression equation is a vector 
of percentage change of disaster-impact indicators, labeled yi. Ci is the vector of outcome variables 
that are potentially examined in each paper i. Di is the set of shock variables (disaster and 
methodology) variables in binary format measured in each study i, while xi is the set of control 
variables included in the regressions of the original studies, all these are also in binary format. µi 
represent the error term; we assume the error terms are clustered by study. α, β, and δ are the 
vectors of estimated coefficients. 
Heterogeneity in the precision of estimates is likely to be present due to between-study 
variation. Possible reasons could be differences in sample size or population, study design and 
methodologies employed. We therefore estimate the model with standard errors clustered by 
study.20  
We start with the most basic specification, estimated using ordinary least squares (OLS) 
with standard errors clustered by study. We continued with weighted least squares (WLS) 
estimation using the same control variable specifications as in the OLS regressions. The weights 
are determined by the square root of the number of observations in each of the original papers 
we investigated. Basing the weights on the square root of the sample size allows us not to place 
undue weight on the few studies with very large number of observations.21  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                             
20 Cipollina and Salvatici (2010), in their meta-analysis on reciprocal trade agreements, used clustered standard errors 
(by study). We also estimated the model without the clustered errors; results are very similar and are available upon 
request. 
21 Longhi et al. (2010), in their meta-study on the impact of immigration on employment and wages, adopted the 
technique of weighted least square with weights based on the square root of the sample size. 
  
 
62 
 
2.4         ESTIMATION RESULTS 
Our meta-regression results are reported in tables 4 and 5. We formulated three groups to 
obtain four different model specifications. Model (1) includes all variables22, Model (2) the 
outcome and shock variables, Model (3) the outcome and the control variables and finally Model 
(4) includes only the outcome variables.23  
We first examine the outcome variables in table 4. Generally, we find little statistical 
significance in the coefficients of these outcome variables. For income, for example, we mostly 
obtain a negative coefficient in most specifications. In this case, a negative coefficient is interpreted 
to mean that the impact of disasters on income (rather than on other outcome measures) is more 
negative. When compared to the average impact on other outcome measures, income is impacted 
more adversely, by 2.5 percentage point. That is, income declines by more. Disasters appear to 
decrease incomes more (in percentage terms) than other impact measures such as consumption. 
While the coefficient on income is mostly negative and the coefficient on consumption is generally 
positive, they are not statistically different from zero (not statistically significant). It is important to 
note, however, that the coefficients are at times quite large, even if they are imprecisely estimated. 
The largest coefficient we estimate point to an increase of consumption of 5.4 percentage points, 
ceteris paribus, relative to other variables of interest. The average decrease of an outcome variable 
was 2.0 percentage points (see Appendix Table 1). 
 This finding of a larger decrease in income, relative to consumption, in a post-disaster 
environment is the explicit conclusion arrived in several of the empirical case studies that are part 
of our sample.24 In general, this finding of decreased income that is larger than any impact on 
consumption is suggestive that, at least in part, households and individuals are able to realize 
(partial) consumption smoothing through the supply of ex post credit (formal or informal), relief 
support, tax relief, or other mitigation policies. More results about the types of income and 
consumption that are impacted are available in Table 5. 
More intriguingly, the longer-term welfare measures that are sometime investigated—
poverty indicators, wealth and labour market measures—do not yield unambiguous results in the 
                                                             
22 Model 1 excludes the education control as it is dropped because of multicollinearity. 
23 The fit (R2 and adjusted-R2) of some of the models, especially in table 5, appears to be better for OLS compared to 
WLS estimations; see Willett and Singer (1988). 
24 See Carter et al, 2007; Tesliuc and Lindert, 2002; Anttila-Hughes and Hsiang, 2013; Giesbert and Schindler, 2012; 
Morris et al, 2002; Asiimwe and Mpuga, 2007; Mueller and Osgood, 2009b; and Baez and Santos, 2008. 
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benchmark regressions in table 4. In the un-weighted regressions, poverty and wealth indicators 
are consistently negative, but these coefficients are not statistically significant, so we are reluctant 
to attach much importance to these estimates. 
Two variables appear to be consistently estimated to be statistically significant. These are 
the controls for household heterogeneity, and for socio-economic characteristics. This finding 
endorses a theme that is found in several research projects. They typically point to differential 
access to recovery funding and/or credit as a major determinant of the post-disaster economic 
dynamics (e.g., Sawada and Shimizutani, 2008, at the microeconomic level, and Noy, 2009, at the 
aggregate macro level). We can conclude here that disaster impacts are not ‘an equal opportunity 
menace’ and that disasters exact a differential impact on households with different characteristics 
belonging to different socio-economic strata. While we do not know the exact general pattern of 
differential impacts, prior evidence suggests that the poor are more adversely affected by disasters 
than groups from more privileged socio-economic backgrounds; especially when these affects are 
measured by poverty indicators or by health and labour outcomes (e.g. Noy and Patel, 2014).25 
Finally, when comparing the different columns in table 4, we observe that the weighted 
models, and the ones that include controls for the community, time, region, demographic, socio-
economic and geographical characteristics—models (1) and (3)—have a significantly higher fit 
(higher adjusted R2). 
A separate research agenda, whose methodology did not allow us to include many of the 
projects within this stream in the corpus of papers we examine, focus on the role of social cohesion 
in the affected communities and the various types of social capital (bonding, linking, bridging) in 
determining post disaster recovery. Aldrich (2012) includes a thorough investigation of this 
literature and a summary of the evidence.26 For example, Aldrich and Sawada (2015) provide a 
recent investigation of the importance of social capital in determining mortality due to the tsunami 
wave generated by the Sendai earthquake of 2011. So, it might be the case that the variables we 
interpret as proxies for access to resources (credit or otherwise) are also correlated with the 
presence of social capital in the affected communities. Given our method, we are unable to 
                                                             
25 We thank Stephane Hallegatte for suggesting this interpretation of the evidence. 
26 Kage (2011), Klinenberg (2002) and Chamlee-Wright (2010) are all book-length investigations of the role of social 
capital in specific case-studies. 
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differentiate between the two channels (nor do we think these are mutually exclusive 
interpretations of the evidence). 
In table 5, we investigate the impact of disasters on the various outcome variables in more 
detail, now distinguishing between the different types of income and consumption. We observe, 
for example, that while initially we concluded that indeed there is an exceptionally adverse impact 
of disasters on income in general, this result appears to be driven by a negative impact on per 
capita or household income (income_2) rather than aggregate measures of total, urban, or rural 
income. We note that agricultural income (income_1) increases, relative to other measures, in the 
post-disaster period. 
For consumption, the relatively milder impact of disasters on consumption focused on per 
capita consumption (consume_1) compare to aggregate measures of food and non-food 
consumption (consume_2). It is impossible to robustly compare the impacts of food and non-food 
consumption measures in further disaggregation due to limited number of observations. 
Human capital (education) and health outcomes appear to be especially adversely affected 
by disasters. This is more explicit in the models (models 1 and 3) that include household and socio-
economic controls (as in table 4, these are also the models with a higher adjusted R2). This decline 
in health and educational outcomes could potentially explain the observed and relatively milder 
impacts on consumption; though the methodology does not allow us to precisely identify that.27 
The results on labour market indicators also portray the adverse (negative) impact of disasters 
particularly in models 1 and 3.28 However, the impacts on wages and labour force participation 
rates could not be differentiated due to less variation in the disaggregated data.  
As before, we still observe negative and statistically significant coefficients for household 
heterogeneity and the socio-economic characteristics – again supporting the hypothesis of 
differential impact of disasters. In this case, the coefficient for household heterogeneity in Table 4 
(column 1 in OLS regression) indicates that if the estimated model does not control for household 
heterogeneity in the impacted households, this will mean that the estimated effect of disasters on 
income will be higher by 5.12 percentage points. That is, the impact on income would have been 
                                                             
27 This result corresponds with the findings of Tiwari et al. (2013) on children’s weight and adult women’s outcomes 
of Maccini and Yang (2009). 
28 This result corresponds with the findings of Mueller and Osgood (2009a), Mueller and Quisumbing (2011), Mahajan 
(2012) and Shah and Steinberg (2012). 
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larger than 2.5 percentage point if not controlled for household heterogeneity in our estimated 
model. We find no statistically consistently observable difference in estimation results for the 
poverty, wealth, and health, labour, and education indicators, and across the various 
methodological approaches adopted in this literature. Finally, the estimates regarding the disaster 
indicators mostly illustrates the comparison between hydro-meteorological events—primarily 
floods, rainfall and tropical cyclones—and geo-climatological ones. We find no robust evidence 
that different types of disasters have a differential impact.  
 
2.5 ROBUSTNESS CHECKS 
 As robustness checks, in Table 6, we split our sample to samples focused on consumption 
and non-consumption outcome measures, and conducted meta-regression analysis with our 
baseline model and these samples separately.29 We do not observe any systematic difference on 
poverty-disaster impact outcomes. The controls for household heterogeneity and socio-economic 
characteristics appear to be statistically significant in most cases as was the case previously. 
However, the coefficients for household characteristics are found positive and significant in 
consumption outcomes. This demonstrates consumption smoothing through cutting non-food 
consumption (e.g. education and health) and spending more on food consumption in the 
aftermath of a natural disaster. The coefficients for household characteristics and socio-economic 
controls are negative and significant in non-consumption outcome measures suggesting their 
presence would further worsen the impact of disasters on this category.  
 
2.6 CONCLUSIONS 
Natural disasters affect households adversely, and they do so especially for people with 
focusing especially on the poor and on poverty measures. We find lower incomes and wealth that 
are less able to smooth their consumption. We conducted a meta-regression analysis of the 
existing literature on the impacts of disasters on households, much heterogeneity in these impacts, 
and this is most likely the most important insight gleaned from our analysis. There is no ‘one-size 
fits all’ description of the ways disasters have an impact on poverty, and the poor.  
                                                             
29 This is due to having fewer observations in non-consumption outcome categories of interest.  
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Yet, several general patterns that are observed in individual case studies also emerge. 
Incomes are clearly impacted adversely, with the impact observed specifically in per-capita 
measures (so it is not due to the mortality caused by the observed disaster).  Consumption is also 
reduced, but to a lesser extent than incomes. Importantly, poor households appear to smooth their 
food consumption by reducing the consumption of non-food items; the most significant items in 
this category are spending on health and education. This suggests potentially long-term adverse 
consequences as consumption of health and education services is often better viewed as long-
term investment.  
 There are limits to what we can conclude using our methodology, especially since this meta-
analysis is covering a fairly large and diverse literature. These limits are especially obvious as we 
note that we observe no robust insight on the impact of disasters in the longer term. It might be 
the case that only very large disasters impose long-term consequences on the affected, but it may 
also be the case that our measurements are not focused enough to enable us to identify what 
these outcomes are. There is, after all, significant evidence that adverse but short-term shocks can 
imply long term adverse consequences, especially within the context of under-development and 
poverty traps (World Bank, 2014).  
 The literature on the impact of disasters—both intensive and extensive—on the welfare of 
households, is growing daily. A remaining important task is to identify the channels through which 
the shocks impose more costs than the immediate impacts, so that policy intervention may 
mitigate those, while also trying to prevent the initial losses. The observation that we consistently 
find; non-food spending decrease in the aftermath of natural disasters is especially of concern, as 
it implies the possibility that disasters prevent long-term investment and therefore trap 
households in cycles of poorer education and health outcomes and persistent poverty.  
The general pattern of post-shock dynamics is established with the meta-regression 
analysis we conducted here, and the need to develop the policy instruments that can deal with 
these dangers is clearer. One potentially promising tool for transferring this risk, and protecting 
households from the indirect impact of disasters is the provision of insurance. The distribution of 
insurance products, especially within the context of urban poverty in low-income countries, is 
facing significant challenges. This appears to be one potential tool that needs to be examined 
further.  
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      TABLE 1: NUMBER OF OBSERVATIONS FROM THE SELECTED STUDIES 
PAPER IDENTIFICATION PAPER SOURCE NO. OF OBSERVATIONS 
1 Rodriguez-Oreggia et al. (2013) 16 
2 Mogues (2011) 2 
3 Morris et al. (2002) 2 
4 Datt and Hoogeveen (2003) 2 
5 Carter et al (2007) 1 
6 Hoddinott and Kinsey (2001) 4 
7 Reardon and Taylor (1996) 1 
8 Lal et al. (2009) 1 
9 Jha (2006) 5 
10 Wong and Brown (2011) 2 
11 Silbert and Pilar Useche (2012) 3 
12 Tiwari et al. (2013) 4 
13 Maccini and Yang (2009) 6 
14 Asiimwe and Mpuga (2007) 7 
15 Dercon (2004) 3 
16 Glave et al. (2008) 4 
17 Tesliuc and Lindert (2002) 20 
18 Anttila-Hughes and Hsiang (2013) 13 
19 Jakobsen (2012) 2 
20 Lopez-Calva and Juarez (2009) 3 
21 Baez and Santos (2007) 7 
22 Auffret (2003) 1 
23 Skoufias et al. (2012) 6 
24 Mueller and Osgood (2009b) 4 
25 Mueller and Quisumbing (2011) 2 
26 Giesbert and Schindler (2012) 1 
27 Narayanan and Sahu (2011) 1 
28 Khandker (2007) 1 
29 Mahajan (2012) 2 
30 Foltz et al. (2013) 4 
31 Shah and Steinberg (2012) 10 
32 Thomas et al. (2010) 4 
33 Hou (2010) 2 
34 Hoddinott (2006) 4 
35 Hoddinott and Kinsey (2000) 4 
36 Jensen (2000) 4 
37 Baez and Santos (2008) 2 
38 Mueller and Osgood (2009a) 1 
   Source: Authors’ calculations. 
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   TABLE 2: LISTS OF CATEGORIES OF VARIABLES AND THEIR DESCRIPTIONS 
CATEGORIES DESCRIPTION OF VARIABLES 
Income 1 Farm/Agricultural/Rural income 
 Non-Farm/Entrepreneurial/Urban  income 
Income 2 Total Household Income 
 Per Capita Income 
 Total Income Loss  
  
Consumption 1 Household Consumption/Expenditure  
 Per Capita Consumption/Expenditure  
 Rural Consumption /rural per capita consumption 
 Urban Consumption  
 Consumption Growth/CECG  
Consumption 2 Food Consumption/Expenditure  
 Non-Food Consumption/Expenditure  
  
Poverty Poverty Incidence  
 Food Poverty Incidence  
 Asset Poverty Incidence  
 Capacities Poverty Incidence  
 Poverty Rate  
 Human Development Index  
  
Wealth Total livestock asset  
 Asset Index  
 Agricultural Productive Asset Index  
 Non-Productive Asset Index  
 Asset Growth  
 Asset Loss  
  
Health  Child Height (cm), cohort 1 - 12-24m  
 Child Height (cm), cohort 2 - 24-36m  
 Child Height (cm), cohort 3 - 36-48m  
 Child Height (cm), cohort 4 - 48-60m  
 Child Weight (kilo), cohort 1 - 12-24m  
 Child Weight (kilo), cohort 2 - 24-36m  
 Child Mortality , CM (female)  
 Malnourishment/malnutrition (by gender),  
MAL (rural HH)  
 Adult (women) height (cm) 
 Body Mass Index (men)  
 Body Mass Index (women)/mother  
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 Health Expenditure 
 
  
Education  Completed Grades of Schooling  
 School Attendance, SA (rural HH) 
 School Enrolment by gender 
 Educational Expenditure  
  
Labour  Agricultural/Farm/Rural wage 
 Non-Farm/Urban wage  
 Male wage  
 Female wage  
 Labour Force Participation-male  
 Labour Force Participation-female 
 Child Labour Force Participation/ CLFP (rural HH)  
  
Household / Community Household heterogeneity  
Characteristics Community/ village level heterogeneity  
and characteristics (e.g. access to roads, markets) 
 Head  of HH's education, age, gender, 
marital status, employment status 
 HH size 
 HH composition  
(e.g. number of adult male/female members, no. of 
children) 
 Control regarding HH level data limitation 
 Ethnicity 
  
Time variant 
characteristics 
Time fixed effect 
 Seasonal Fixed effect 
 Survey year fixed effect 
 Birth year-season, birth district-season  
and season specific linear time trends  
  
Regional characteristics Region /District/Province  fixed effect 
 Municipality fixed effect 
  
Demographic Life-cycle age of Households 
 Population characteristics in general 
 Labour force characteristics 
  
Socio-Economic HH ownership of business, land, animals 
 Occupation (e.g. farm/non-farm) 
 Asset (e.g. access to electricity, water, sanitation, 
 healthcare, credit, banks, savings) 
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 Pre-shock HH income/asset value 
 Post-shock inheritance 
  
Geography / Nature Natural and geographical characteristics  
(e.g. measures of latitude, altitude, surface length, avg. 
temp. and rainfall (max/min)) 
 Precipitation rate 
 Earth shaking distribution 
  
Disaster 1 Flood / riverine flood  
(Hydro-Meteorological) Rains / rainfall shocks 
 Positive rainfall including seasonal deviation 
 Negative Rainfall including variability  
(e.g. delay of monsoon / post on-set low rainfall) 
 Hurricane/Storms/Cyclone/Tornado/Typhoon  
 Tsunami  
Disaster 2 Frost 
(Geo-Climatological) Drought / dry spell including time horizons  
(1-5 years ago/6-10 years ago) 
 Earthquake  
 Forest Fire  
 Volcanic eruptions  
Disaster 3 Bunched natural shocks  
(Groups)  
  
Method  Linear  regression 
 Logistic regression 
 Multinomial /multivariate (logit) regression 
 Time series non-linear regression 
 Difference in difference regression  
 Reduced-form linear regression  
/ reduced form log-linear regression  
 Log linear regression  
 Dynamic model using regression  
 Multivariate Probit regression  
 Recursive bivariate Probit model  
 Foster-Greer-Thorbecke (FGT) poverty  index 
 Macroeconomic aggregates corresponding to ND  
 Income source decomposition  
 Case study analysis, group interviews 
 Cluster analysis  
 Source: Authors’ elaborations. 
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TABLE 3: FREQUENCY DISTRIBUTION OF OBSERVATIONS IN OUTCOME VARIABLES 
OUTCOME 
VARIABLES 
NO. OF 
OBSERVATIONS 
MEAN STD. DEV NUMBER OF 
NEGATIVE 
OUTCOME 
MIN MAX 
INCOME 1 11 
(6.8) 
5.53 6.96 1 
 
-6.76 22.2 
INCOME 2 10 
(6.2) 
-9.90 9.24 9 -32.23 .477 
CONSUMPTION 1 39 
(24.2) 
0.83 6.66 16 -11.66 22 
CONSUMPTION 2 13 
(8.0) 
-2.11 6.81 7 -15.04 10.3 
(NON)POVERTY b      20 
(12.4) 
-2.47 4.58 12 -16.1 1.28 
WEALTH 9 
(5.6) 
-4.81 6.06 6 -17.6 3 
HEALTH  29 
(18.0) 
-2.47 5.95 19 -22.98 7.1 
EDUCATION  10 
(6.2) 
-1.40 14.06 6 -21.8 24.96 
LABOUR  20 
(12.4) 
-5.64 7.58 15 -17.9 11 
 
      Source: Authors’ calculations. 
Note: a The numbers in parenthesis shows the percentage of number of observations against the 
corresponding variable. 
     b As we have changed the sign due to standardization, we use non(poverty) for ease of reading.  
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      TABLE 4: META-REGRESSION RESULTS A: THE DIRECT AND INDIRECT IMPACTS 
  (1) 
 
(2) 
 
(3) 
 
(4) 
 
 VARIABLES OLS WLS OLS WLS OLS WLS OLS WLS 
          
O
U
T
C
O
M
E
  
V
A
R
IA
B
L
E
S
 
INCOME -2.503 -1.228 -2.753 -6.739 1.856 0.995 -1.818 -4.761 
 (5.417) (3.026) (5.504) (6.315) (4.972) (4.120) (4.704) (4.100) 
CONSUMPTION 2.365 3.663 -0.193 -3.149 6.081 5.451* 0.0956 -0.999 
 (4.372) (3.081) (4.201) (5.273) (3.750) (2.972) (1.448) (2.262) 
POVERTY -1.677 1.167 -3.378 -4.768 2.651 3.955 -2.475 -2.241 
 (5.158) (4.855) (4.638) (6.080) (4.188) (4.555) (1.651) (1.479) 
WEALTH -5.398 -3.270 -5.704 -4.949 -0.632 0.165 -4.808** -2.942 
 (5.180) (5.122) (4.743) (5.680) (4.152) (3.885) (2.145) (2.053) 
HEALTH 0.711 2.248 -3.112 -4.951 5.251 4.409 -2.466** -3.142*** 
 (4.329) (3.968) (4.404) (5.360) (3.837) (4.411) (1.116) (0.907) 
LABOUR -3.459 -1.610 -6.368 -7.356 0.725 0.589 -5.642*** -5.242*** 
 (4.811) (4.565) (4.784) (5.735) (5.171) (5.152) (1.468) (1.527) 
EDUCATION   -1.998 -3.799 4.313 2.267 -1.401 -1.986 
   (6.751) (5.754) (6.116) (4.791) (5.620) (4.045) 
          
C
O
N
T
R
O
L
  
V
A
R
IA
B
L
E
S
 HHCOMMUNITY -5.115* -4.392**   -4.936* -3.899**   
 (2.998) (2.062)   (2.732) (1.767)   
TIME 0.0902 2.371   0.409 3.024   
 (1.609) (1.750)   (1.691) (1.950)   
REGION 2.839 1.732   3.612* 3.796   
 (2.261) (2.661)   (2.034) (2.486)   
DEMOGRAPHIC -2.668 -2.362   -2.731 -2.151   
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 (1.893) (1.496)   (1.960) (1.560)   
SOCIOECONOMIC -4.402*** -8.062***   -3.921** -7.327***   
 (1.503) (1.352)   (1.460) (1.475)   
GEOGNATURE -2.616 -4.012*   -2.662 -4.180   
 (1.900) (2.180)   (1.956) (2.670)   
          
S
H
O
C
K
 
V
A
R
IA
B
L
E
S
 
METHOD 4.779 6.880 1.752 2.533     
 (4.949) (5.203) (4.387) (5.057)     
DIS_1 0.658 -1.282 -1.283 -0.737     
 (6.294) (5.862) (1.575) (2.288)     
DIS_2 1.467 -1.096       
 (6.039) (5.394)       
DIS_3 -0.499 -0.997 -2.712 1.488     
 (5.997) (4.464) (4.577) (5.356)     
 OBSERVATIONS 161 161 161 161 161 161 161 161 
 R-SQUARED 0.267 0.311 0.128 0.162 0.250 0.296 0.116 0.159 
 ADJUSTED R-SQUARED 0.186 0.235 0.0705 0.107 0.184 0.234 0.0760 0.121 
 F-TEST (OUTCOME 
VARIABLES) 
2.06 
(0.0818) 
4.21 
(0.0025) 
1.71 
(0.1377) 
0.73 
(0.6463) 
2.64 
(0.0256) 
5.83 
(0.0001) 
4.14 
(0.0019) 
7.60 
(0.0000) 
 F-TEST(CONTROL 
VARIABLES) 
4.07 
(0.0031) 
11.79 
(0.0000) 
  3.26 
(0.0112) 
6.65 
(0.0001) 
  
 F-TEST (SHOCK 
VARIABLES) 
1.47 
(0.2312) 
1.73 
(0.1651) 
0.87 
(0.4666) 
0.14 
(0.9337) 
    
 Source: Authors’ calculations. 
 Notes: a Robust standard errors (clustered by studies) in parentheses *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. 
              b The numbers in parentheses under each set of F-test result shows P-value (Prob>F). 
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        TABLE 5: META-REGRESSION RESULTS B: THE DIRECT AND INDIRECT IMPACTS 
  (1) 
 
(2) 
 
(3) 
 
(4) 
 
 VARIABLES OLS WLS OLS WLS OLS WLS OLS WLS 
          
O
U
T
C
O
M
E
 V
A
R
IA
B
L
E
S
 
INCOME_1 4.714 3.481 10.25*** 5.060 8.519** 5.040 5.531*** 2.129 
 (4.451) (3.018) (2.753) (5.012) (3.215) (3.621) (1.643) (4.460) 
INCOME_2 -8.548 -3.797 -5.087 -6.388** -5.170 -2.945 -9.901*** -9.365*** 
 (5.833) (3.637) (4.415) (2.875) (4.463) (4.383) (3.623) (2.014) 
CONSUME_1 3.075 4.732 6.829** 3.475 5.779 4.996 0.829 0.193 
 (4.462) (3.435) (2.563) (3.078) (3.525) (3.169) (1.615) (1.809) 
CONSUME_2 1.449 0.390 2.713 -2.905 5.163 2.341 -2.106 -5.848 
 (4.897) (3.280) (2.802) (4.681) (4.111) (4.771) (1.800) (4.170) 
POVERTY -1.933 1.011 2.633 0.573 1.424 2.808 -2.475 -2.241 
 (5.003) (4.830) (2.536) (2.790) (3.531) (4.432) (1.662) (1.489) 
WEALTH -4.909 -2.945   -1.061 -0.313 -4.808** -2.942 
 (5.185) (4.978)   (3.811) (3.684) (2.159) (2.066) 
HEALTH 0.706 1.833 2.427 -0.173 4.592 3.074 -2.466** -3.142*** 
 (4.371) (4.104) (2.303) (2.113) (3.446) (4.447) (1.123) (0.913) 
LABOUR -3.626 -1.749 -0.777 -2.314 -0.0277 -0.598 -5.642*** -5.242*** 
 (4.851) (4.648) (2.702) (2.543) (4.796) (5.163) (1.477) (1.537) 
EDUCATION   3.508 0.982 3.723 1.299 -1.401 -1.986 
   (5.042) (3.871) (5.919) (4.994) (5.657) (4.071) 
          
C
O
N
T
R
O
L
 
V
A
R
IA
B
L
E
S
 
HHCOMMUNITY -5.377* -4.182*   -5.447** -3.466*   
 (2.788) (2.189)   (2.572) (1.996)   
TIME 1.290 2.712   1.402 3.619*   
 (1.523) (1.898)   (1.571) (2.022)   
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REGION 2.169 0.0695   2.792 2.733   
 (2.166) (2.731)   (1.820) (2.328)   
DEMOGRAPHIC -2.623 -1.954   -2.766 -1.829   
 (1.766) (1.605)   (1.855) (1.730)   
SOCIOECONOMIC -2.889* -7.065***   -2.574* -6.399***   
 (1.580) (1.549)   (1.467) (1.518)   
GEOGNATURE -2.441 -3.310   -2.487 -3.604   
 (1.854) (2.060)   (1.865) (2.433)   
          
S
H
O
C
K
 
V
A
R
IA
B
L
E
S
 
METHOD 1.899 7.111 -0.0782 2.685     
 (4.360) (5.139) (3.926) (4.963)     
DIS_1 2.375 -1.622 -4.874 -5.656     
 (5.985) (6.125) (4.639) (5.414)     
DIS_2 2.591 -1.911 -4.441 -5.557     
 (5.717) (5.651) (4.366) (5.523)     
DIS_3 0.0378 -2.227 -8.380*** -5.060     
 (5.733) (4.947) (2.631) (3.070)     
 OBSERVATIONS 161 161 161 161 161 161 161 161 
 R-SQUARED 0.338 0.339 0.255 0.242 0.328 0.323 0.242 0.240 
 ADJUSTED R-SQUARED 0.254 0.256 0.195 0.181 0.259 0.253 0.197 0.195 
 F-TEST (OUTCOME 
VARIABLES) 
2.29 
(0.0417) 
4.82 
(0.0004) 
3.72 
(0.0028) 
2.46 
(0.0302) 
2.98 
(0.0090) 
6.23 
(0.0000) 
6.57 
(0.0000) 
9.11 
(0.0000) 
 F-TEST(CONTROL 
VARIABLES) 
2.56 
(0.0358) 
7.82 
(0.0000) 
  2.57 
(0.0348) 
5.79 
(0.0002) 
  
 F-TEST (SHOCK 
VARIABLES) 
0.71 
(0.5894) 
1.66 
(0.1804) 
2.79 
(0.0402) 
0.84 
(0.5114) 
    
 Source: Authors’ calculations. 
 Notes: a Robust standard errors (clustered by studies) in parentheses *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. 
              b The numbers in parentheses under each set of F-test result shows P-value (Prob>F) at 95 percent confidence interval.
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TABLE 6: META-REGRESSION RESULTS WITH RESTRICTED OBSERVATIONS 
VARIABLES CONSUMPTION NON-CONSUMPTION 
 OLS WLS OLS WLS 
CONSUME_1 -29.85** -40.16***   
 (11.85) (10.51)   
CONSUME_2 -34.14** -48.18***   
 (12.25) (11.20)   
INCOME_1    5.71 
    (4.18) 
INCOME_2   -11.33** 0.95 
   (4.48) (4.15) 
POVERTY   -5.27 9.31** 
   (5.27) (4.43) 
WEALTH   -8.93**  
   (3.62)  
HEALTH   -2.34 7.13* 
   (3.20) (3.91) 
LABOUR   -6.91 4.39 
   (4.37) (4.53) 
EDUCATION   -3.32 5.21 
   (4.89) (5.78) 
HHCOMMUNITY 23.14*** 28.98*** -7.05** -5.44*** 
 (6.63) (6.78) (2.75) (1.64) 
TIME 0.69 -1.05 0.53 0.44 
 (3.70) (4.24) (2.82) (2.56) 
REGION -4.47 -7.77* 3.35 2.36 
 (3.17) (4.03) (2.83) (3.26) 
DEMOGRAPHIC -11.89** -15.27** -2.60 -3.36** 
 (4.84) (5.36) (2.00) (1.56) 
SOCIOECONOMIC -4.42 -4.48 -3.96** -8.63*** 
 (3.66) (4.11) (1.73) (1.49) 
GEOGNATURE 0.94 1.11 -3.75 -5.35** 
 (2.91) (4.10) (2.88) (1.99) 
METHOD 15.08* 22.66*** 7.35 13.09*** 
 (7.67) (7.47) (5.32) (3.66) 
DIS_1 -0.71 -0.39 2.96 -8.22** 
 (1.29) (1.46) (5.10) (3.94) 
DIS_2   2.18 -10.10** 
   (4.48) (4.15) 
DIS_3 5.08 9.56** -3.32 -23.45*** 
 (5.50) (4.46) (6.61) (6.05) 
OBSERVATIONS 52 52 109 109 
R-SQUARED 0.32 0.36 0.44 0.43 
ADJUSTED R-SQUARED 0.14 0.19 0.34 0.33 
Source: Authors’ calculations.  
Notes: Robust standard errors (clustered by studies) in parentheses *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. 
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  APPENDIX TABLE 1: DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS OF VARIABLES DEFINED 
VARIABLES    OBSERVATIONS MEAN MEDIAN STD. DEV. MIN MAX 
Y 161 -2.01 -0.75 7.89 -32.23 24.96 
N 161 28076.38 3823 69540.15 94 446780 
INCOME 161 0.13 0 0.34 0 1 
INCOME_1 161 0.07 0 0.25 0 1 
INCOME_2 161 0.06 0 0.24 0 1 
CONSUMPTION 161 0.32 0 0.47 0 1 
CONSUME_1 161 0.24 0 0.43 0 1 
CONSUME_2 161 0.08 0 0.27 0 1 
POVERTY 161 0.12 0 0.33 0 1 
WEALTH 161 0.06 0 0.23 0 1 
HEALTH 161 0.18 0 0.39 0 1 
LABOUR 161 0.12 0 0.33 0 1 
EDUCATION 161 0.06 0 0.24 0 1 
HH/COMMUNITY 161 0.80 1 0.40 0 1 
TIME 161 0.67 1 0.47 0 1 
REGION 161 0.76 1 0.43 0 1 
DEMOGRAPHIC 161 0.37 0 0.48 0 1 
SOCIOECONOMIC 161 0.62 1 0.49 0 1 
GEOG/NATURE 161 0.54 1 0.50 0 1 
METHOD 161 0.96 1 0.19 0 1 
DISASTER 161 1.46 1 0.66 1 3 
DIS_1 161 0.63 1 0.48 0 1 
DIS_2 161 0.27 0 0.45 0 1 
DIS_3 161 0.09 0 0.29 0 1 
  Source: Authors’ calculations. 
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   APPENDIX TABLE 2: META-REGRESSION RESULTS A: THE DIRECT AND INDIRECT IMPACTS 
  (1) 
 
(2) 
 
(3) 
 
(4) 
 
 VARIABLES OLS WLS OLS WLS OLS WLS OLS WLS 
          
O
U
T
C
O
M
E
  
V
A
R
IA
B
L
E
S
 
INCOME -2.503 2.042 -2.753 -1.790 1.856 0.995 -1.818 -4.761 
 (5.417) (4.051) (5.504) (4.522) (4.972) (4.120) (4.704) (4.100) 
CONSUMPTION 2.365 6.934* -0.193 1.799 6.081 5.451* 0.0956 -0.999 
 (4.372) (4.046) (4.201) (3.510) (3.750) (2.972) (1.448) (2.262) 
POVERTY -1.677 4.437 -3.378 0.181 2.651 3.955 -2.475 -2.241 
 (5.158) (4.835) (4.638) (2.958) (4.188) (4.555) (1.651) (1.479) 
WEALTH -5.398  -5.704  -0.632 0.165 -4.808** -2.942 
 (5.180)  (4.743)  (4.152) (3.885) (2.145) (2.053) 
HEALTH 0.711 5.518 -3.112 -0.00269 5.251 4.409 -2.466** -3.142*** 
 (4.329) (3.899) (4.404) (2.098) (3.837) (4.411) (1.116) (0.907) 
LABOUR -3.459 1.660 -6.368 -2.407 0.725 0.589 -5.642*** -5.242*** 
 (4.811) (4.570) (4.784) (2.618) (5.171) (5.152) (1.468) (1.527) 
EDUCATION  3.270 -1.998 1.150 4.313 2.267 -1.401 -1.986 
  (5.122) (6.751) (3.786) (6.116) (4.791) (5.620) (4.045) 
          
C
O
N
T
R
O
L
  
V
A
R
IA
B
L
E
S
 HHCOMMUNITY -5.115* -4.392**   -4.936* -3.899**   
 (2.998) (2.062)   (2.732) (1.767)   
TIME 0.0902 2.371   0.409 3.024   
 (1.609) (1.750)   (1.691) (1.950)   
REGION 2.839 1.732   3.612* 3.796   
 (2.261) (2.661)   (2.034) (2.486)   
DEMOGRAPHIC -2.668 -2.362   -2.731 -2.151   
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 (1.893) (1.496)   (1.960) (1.560)   
SOCIOECONOMIC -4.402*** -8.062***   -3.921** -7.327***   
 (1.503) (1.352)   (1.460) (1.475)   
GEOGNATURE -2.616 -4.012*   -2.662 -4.180   
 (1.900) (2.180)   (1.956) (2.670)   
          
S
H
O
C
K
 
V
A
R
IA
B
L
E
S
 
METHOD 4.779 6.880 1.752 2.533     
 (4.949) (5.203) (4.387) (5.057)     
DIS_1 0.658 -4.553 -1.283 -5.686     
 (6.294) (5.427) (1.575) (5.506)     
DIS_2 1.467 -4.366  -4.949     
 (6.039) (5.466)  (5.680)     
DIS_3 -0.499 -4.267 -2.712 -3.460     
 (5.997) (3.528) (4.577) (3.529)     
 OBSERVATIONS 161 161 161 161 161 161 161 161 
 R2 0.267 0.311 0.128 0.162 0.250 0.296 0.116 0.159 
 ADJUSTED R2 0.186 0.235 0.0705 0.107 0.184 0.234 0.0760 0.121 
 F-TEST (OUTCOME 
VARIABLES) 
2.06 
(0.0818) 
4.21 
(0.0025) 
1.71 
(0.1377) 
0.82 
(0.5648) 
2.64 
(0.0256) 
5.83 
(0.0001) 
4.14 
(0.0019) 
7.60 
(0.0000) 
 F-TEST(CONTROL 
VARIABLES) 
4.07 
(0.0031) 
11.79 
(0.0000) 
  3.26 
(0.0112) 
6.65 
(0.0001) 
  
 F-TEST (SHOCK 
VARIABLES) 
1.47 
(0.2312) 
1.85 
(0.1392) 
0.87 
(0.4666) 
0.61 
(0.6552) 
 
    
 Source: Authors’ calculations. 
 Notes: a Robust standard errors (clustered by studies) in parentheses *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. 
              b The numbers in parentheses under each set of F-test result shows P-value (Prob>F). 
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   APPENDIX TABLE 3: META-REGRESSION RESULTS B: THE DIRECT AND INDIRECT IMPACTS 
  (1) 
 
(2) 
 
(3) 
 
(4) 
 
 VARIABLES OLS WLS OLS WLS OLS WLS OLS WLS 
          
O
U
T
C
O
M
E
 V
A
R
IA
B
L
E
S
 
INCOME_1 4.714 1.570 10.25*** -0.497 8.519** 5.040 5.531*** 2.129 
 (4.451) (5.193) (2.753) (6.271) (3.215) (3.621) (1.643) (4.460) 
INCOME_2 -8.548 -5.708 -5.087 -11.95** -5.170 -2.945 -9.901*** -9.365*** 
 (5.833) (5.150) (4.415) (5.278) (4.463) (4.383) (3.623) (2.014) 
CONSUME_1 3.075 2.821 6.829** -2.082 5.779 4.996 0.829 0.193 
 (4.462) (4.817) (2.563) (5.005) (3.525) (3.169) (1.615) (1.809) 
CONSUME_2 1.449 -1.521 2.713 -8.462 5.163 2.341 -2.106 -5.848 
 (4.897) (5.671) (2.802) (6.024) (4.111) (4.771) (1.800) (4.170) 
POVERTY -1.933 -0.900 2.633 -4.984 1.424 2.808 -2.475 -2.241 
 (5.003) (5.660) (2.536) (5.931) (3.531) (4.432) (1.662) (1.489) 
WEALTH -4.909 -4.856  -5.557 -1.061 -0.313 -4.808** -2.942 
 (5.185) (5.248)  (5.523) (3.811) (3.684) (2.159) (2.066) 
HEALTH 0.706 -0.0778 2.427 -5.730 4.592 3.074 -2.466** -3.142*** 
 (4.371) (5.052) (2.303) (5.136) (3.446) (4.447) (1.123) (0.913) 
LABOUR -3.626 -3.660 -0.777 -7.871 -0.0277 -0.598 -5.642*** -5.242*** 
 (4.851) (5.395) (2.702) (5.486) (4.796) (5.163) (1.477) (1.537) 
EDUCATION  -1.911 3.508 -4.575 3.723 1.299 -1.401 -1.986 
  (5.651) (5.042) (5.729) (5.919) (4.994) (5.657) (4.071) 
          
C
O
N
T
R
O
L
 
V
A
R
IA
B
L
E
S
 
HHCOMMUNITY -5.377* -4.182*   -5.447** -3.466*   
 (2.788) (2.189)   (2.572) (1.996)   
TIME 1.290 2.712   1.402 3.619*   
 (1.523) (1.898)   (1.571) (2.022)   
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REGION 2.169 0.0695   2.792 2.733   
 (2.166) (2.731)   (1.820) (2.328)   
DEMOGRAPHIC -2.623 -1.954   -2.766 -1.829   
 (1.766) (1.605)   (1.855) (1.730)   
SOCIOECONOMIC -2.889* -7.065***   -2.574* -6.399***   
 (1.580) (1.549)   (1.467) (1.518)   
GEOGNATURE -2.441 -3.310   -2.487 -3.604   
 (1.854) (2.060)   (1.865) (2.433)   
          
S
H
O
C
K
 
V
A
R
IA
B
L
E
S
 
METHOD 1.899 7.111 -0.0782 2.685     
 (4.360) (5.139) (3.926) (4.963)     
DIS_1 2.375 0.289 -4.874 -0.0985     
 (5.985) (1.129) (4.639) (1.811)     
DIS_2 2.591  -4.441      
 (5.717)  (4.366)      
DIS_3 0.0378 -0.315 -8.380*** 0.497     
 (5.733) (4.963) (2.631) (5.071)     
 OBSERVATIONS 161 161 161 161 161 161 161 161 
 R2 0.338 0.339 0.255 0.242 0.328 0.323 0.242 0.240 
 ADJUSTED R2 0.254 0.256 0.195 0.181 0.259 0.253 0.197 0.195 
 F-TEST (OUTCOME 
VARIABLES) 
2.29 
(0.0417) 
4.29 
(0.0007) 
3.72 
(0.0028) 
2.34 
(0.0335) 
2.98 
(0.0090) 
6.23 
(0.0000) 
6.57 
(0.0000) 
9.11 
(0.0000) 
 F-TEST(CONTROL 
VARIABLES) 
2.56 
(0.0358) 
7.82 
(0.0000) 
  2.57 
(0.0348) 
5.79 
(0.0002) 
  
 F-TEST (SHOCK 
VARIABLES) 
0.71 
(0.5894) 
2.16 
(0.1096) 
2.79 
(0.0402) 
0.46 
(0.7133) 
    
 Source: Authors’ calculations. 
 Notes: a Robust standard errors (clustered by studies) in parentheses *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. 
              b The numbers in parentheses under each set of F-test result shows P-value (Prob>F) at 95 percent confidence interval.
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  APPENDIX: STANDARDIZATION OF DEPENDENT VARIABLES 
Following the data collection from the 38 papers included in our sample, we standardized and 
converted the estimates of different categories of variables taken from each study to a 
common metric to make them usable for a comparative meta-analysis. We calculated the 
percentage changes of the major indicators under representation. The literature sometimes 
uses other methods to standardize the dependent variable; for example, by using t-statistics 
if the question that is being answered relates to the precision of estimates (e.g., Lazzaroni and 
van Bergeijk, 2014). Given the diverse nature of our dependent variables, we chose to 
standardize by calculating the percentage change in the examined indicator. We considered 
other methods that rely on indicator-specific second moments as less appropriate in this case.  
In cases where seasonal impacts of disasters (e.g. rainfall) had been reported (e.g., Asiimwe 
and Mpuga, 2007), index values are used (e.g. Rodriguez-Oreggia et al., 2013), or 
anthropometric values are being recovered (Hoddinott and Kinsey, 2000 and 2001), we used 
the following measure as used in Rodriguez-Oreggia et al. (2013) to extract the respective 
observation: PC = CV/MV *100; where PC =  percentage Change, MV = Mean Value and CV = 
Coefficient Value. For more discussion on the various potential measures of the dependent 
variable in meta-analysis, see Borenstein et al. (2009, chapter 4). Other recent papers that 
follow a similar standardization procedure in a meta-regression context are Rose and Dormady 
(2011) and Mazzotta et al. (2014). In studies where impacts of particular type of disaster (e.g. 
typhoon) had been documented for various disaster strengths (e.g., Anttila-Hughes and 
Hsiang, 2013), we calculated the cumulative effect over the investigated horizon of a disaster 
of average strength. The standardization also includes a sign change (+/-) with a positive sign 
implying a positive (‘favourable’ in a normative sense) impact on poverty and welfare 
outcomes due to natural disaster whereas a negative sign suggesting the opposite. 
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CHAPTER THREE 
 
THE (MIS) ALLOCATION OF PUBLIC SPENDING IN A LOW INCOME COUNTRY: 
EVIDENCE FROM DISASTER RISK REDUCTION SPENDING IN BANGLADESH 
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3.1 INTRODUCTION 
A burgeoning literature has emerged investigating the efficacy of public spending in 
lower income countries. For example, recently Sennoga and Matovu (2013) provided an 
investigation of public spending in Uganda, Ramirez (2004) investigated public infrastructure 
spending in Mexico, Kruse et al. (2012) examine public health spending in Indonesia, and 
Rajkumar and Swaroop (2008) focus on a cross-country statistical analysis of levels of 
spending, institutional structures, and relevant outcomes. This literature also uses a wide 
variety of methodologies to approach this efficacy question: Sennoga and Matovu (2013) use 
general equilibrium modeling, Ramirez (2004) uses a vector error correction empirical model 
with impulse response functions, and Kruse et al. (2012) use panel data regression 
techniques.  
This literature assumes that public spending is indeed geared towards achieving the 
relevant favourable outcomes—productivity growth for infrastructure spending, better 
health service utilization for health spending, or improved literacy for education spending. 
More importantly, this literature implicitly assumes that funding is allocated optimally given 
these desired outcomes and the perceived community needs. It is this last assumption that 
we examine in this paper. We ask whether we can find evidence that public spending is indeed 
allocated rationally according to perceived needs, or whether we can identify other 
explanations for the pattern of de facto public spending. 
We focus on disaster risk reduction (DRR) spending in Bangladesh for several reasons. 
Disaster risk reduction spending has a clearly defined policy aim, and measurable outcomes. 
As such, DRR spending is maybe uniquely suited to examine the rationale for the regional 
allocation of public resources. Bangladesh has a long history with natural disasters due to its 
geography and its location on the shores of the Bay of Bengal. Natural hazards in Bangladesh 
range from floods and cyclones to river bank erosion and droughts. Flooding associated with 
the monsoon season occurs each year. The monsoon rain plays a pivotal role in securing 
domestic agricultural production, but can also kill and devastate crops and livelihoods. Along 
the coasts, the most destructive cyclones generate storm surges that can inundate vast land 
areas, and have in the last few decades killed hundreds of thousands of people. Given all 
these; it is obvious that disaster planning and government-led disaster risk reduction (DRR) 
program have been part of the Bangladesh government’s economic planning process for a 
long time.  
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Bangladesh, it is important to note, is widely perceived as poster-child for successful 
spending on DRR by a developing country. In particular, Bangladesh is often mentioned for its 
successful early warning programmes for cyclones, which is frequently favourably contrasted 
with neighbouring Burma after its catastrophic experience with cyclone Nargis in 2008. Most 
recently for cyclone Sidr in 2007, for example, Bangladesh managed to evacuate millions away 
from the coast and the storm’s surge (Paul and Dutt, 2010).30 Bangladesh’s successful disaster 
risk reduction policies is also mentioned in the context of the management of the annual 
monsoon floods (del Ninno et al., 2003). 
A demonstration of the crucial role that government safety net policies can play in 
DRR is the comparison of the severe flood of 1998 in comparison to an equally severe flood 
in 1974.31 In this case, in 1998, the government’s substantial disaster management facilities 
and emergency food and financial assistance through better management of targeted 
programs such as Vulnerable Group Feeding (VGF) and Food For work (FFW), it is claimed, 
helped prevent mass starvation and other associated risks compared with the severe flood 
impacts of 1974.32 
Besides the already mentioned ease of determining the aim of DRR spending in the 
Bangladeshi context, its importance is also well established. Ex ante spending choices on 
disaster risk management has been advocated for by all the international aid multilaterals, as 
DRR’s importance in reducing mortality, morbidity, and risk to livelihoods is undisputed in 
Bangladesh, and elsewhere. The most recent example of this emphasis is the Philippines’ 
decision to initiate a US$293 million national disaster risk reduction and management fund 
that is targeted to be used for pre-disaster risk reduction activities. In Bangladesh, as well as 
in the Philippines, one of the more important decisions the central government consistently 
needs to make is how to allocate DRR program spending across communities to minimize and 
mitigate the risks associated with the natural hazards both countries are exposed to.  
Our focus here amounts to answering a basic question: ‘what determines public 
spending in disaster risk reduction and mitigation in Bangladesh?’ We believe that this 
particular question has important implications not only for DRR spending in Bangladesh—as 
                                                             
30 For further data and a comparison of Sidr to previous storms, see p. 502 in IPCC (2012). 
31 The severity of the 1998 flood has been identified in terms of area affected (affecting two-thirds of the country) 
and lasted for a prolonged period (from early July till mid-September) in many areas and direct damages were 
estimated at US$2 billion (Khandker, 2007). 
32 For discussions and analysis of the impacts of floods in Bangladesh, see Khandker (2007) and Banerjee (2007). 
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important as that is—but also to DRR spending elsewhere, and more generally for 
government spending in low income countries and its challenges. 
We identify the determinants’ of per capita public spending on disaster risk reduction 
and mitigation at the local government (sub-district/upazila33) level in Bangladesh. The 
objective of this study is to identify the rationale behind the allocation of public spending 
based on the stated aims of these DRR safety net programs.  
After describing the, admittedly very limited, literature that examines the 
determinants of public expenditure in section 3.4, we discuss our data in section 3.5 in detail. 
Section 3.6 provides relevant descriptive and summary statistics of the variables we use along 
with the methodological framework and justifies our use of the Heckman two-step selection 
model. Section 3.7 examines the estimation results and interprets them. We also add some 
additional models as robustness checks in section 3.8. Finally, in Section 3.9 we conclude, 
identify potential caveats, and discuss possible future research.  
 
3.2  THE DETERMINANTS OF FISCAL SPENDING IN DEVELOPING COUNTRIES? 
Oftentimes, natural disasters are perceived as an exogenous shock to the economy 
resulting in additional fiscal expenditure or re-adjustment of existing expenditure to finance 
rehabilitation and reconstruction activities. The financial aspects of post-disaster fiscal 
management has been examined in country-specific policy papers (e.g. Bangladesh after the 
1998 flood is examined in Benson and Clay, 2002, while Belize is analysed in Borensztein et 
al., 2009). Several cross-country studies have also attempted to measure the average ex post 
fiscal costs (in lost revenue and increased expenditures) of a proto-typical disaster (e.g. Noy 
and Nualsri, 2011 and Lis and Nickel, 2010) and a global assessment is provided in Hochrainer-
Stigler et al. (2014). Yet, none of these papers examine ex-ante disaster risk financing.  
As we have already noted in the introduction, we are not aware of any literature that 
attempts to examine the rationale behind central government’s financing to the sub-national 
level in non-high income countries; neither in the context of disaster risk financing, nor in 
other contexts.34 We aim to investigate the determinants of regional financing for DRR 
                                                             
33 Bangladesh is divided into 7 administrative regions (Divisions), 64 districts (Zila) and 483 sub-districts (Upazila).    
Our primary focus in this investigation includes all 483 sub-districts. 
34 Vorhies (2012) summarizes the literature on fiscal spending on DRR, and also does not identify any research 
on the determinants of this spending. 
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activities and examine whether these flows of funds are conditional upon actual (or 
perceived) regional hazards, vulnerabilities, other socio-economic regional attributes, and 
political affiliations at the local government level.35 Aldrich (2010) and Takasaki (2011) identify 
the ability of elites to capture post-disaster reconstruction spending in India and rural Fiji, 
respectively. 
The research project most closely related to our own work is Miller and Vela (2014). 
They examine the allocation of disaster funding (both preventative and for recovery) for 
Peruvian regions (districts in the Bangladesh context), and focus on whether distribution of 
public expenditure in both recovery and prevention categories is conditional upon the 
occurrence of natural disasters in the recent past and on exposure and vulnerability. The data 
they use, their empirical approach, and the questions they ask are all quite different, but 
ultimately they also find it difficult to correlate the spending they examine with measureable 
risk. 
 
3.3        WHAT WE DEFINE AS DRR? 
We interpret the term DRR spending fairly broadly, given the often repeated insight 
that ‘an ounce of prevention is worth a pound of cure’ and the increased awareness that social 
and socio-economic vulnerability is as important in determining a disaster’s impact as is the 
natural hazard itself. The need for social protection through the provision of social safety nets 
has been reiterated in various papers that focus on DRR (e.g. Pelham et al, 2011; Rahman and 
Choudhury, 2012; and World Bank, 2010). Relevant examples of disaster safety net36 
programs incorporated into a country’s DRR policies are Bangladesh’s National Disaster 
Management Prevention Strategy and Ethiopia’s Productive Safety Net Program.37  
An additional type of DRR activity that we include in our analysis is ‘Investments in 
specific infrastructure’ whose aim is disaster prevention; again this type of DRR spending is 
widely recognized in the DRR literature (e.g. World Bank, 2010). For example, the Department 
of Disaster Management (DDM) in Bangladesh constructs bridges/culverts (up to 12 meters 
                                                             
35 Indirectly, Hodler and Raschky (2014) identify political favoritism in regional allocations by examining the 
intensity of nighttime light in regions associated with the political leadership.  
36 In this paper, the term ‘Disaster Safety Net’ refers to particular social safety net programs that has embedded  
structural mechanism to participate in disaster risk reduction activities. 
37 See Pelham et al (2011) for discussion of these two programs. 
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long) under its Annual Development Plan – the main aim for this infrastructure is DRR rather 
than development or poverty alleviation more broadly.  
The connection between the climate and disaster occurrence is obvious, but the 
causality from climatic change to disasters has only been emphasized in the past few years, 
and most forcefully by the IPCC in their Special Report on Extreme Events (IPCC, 2012). 
Another international organization that has emphasized the link between DRR and climate 
change adaptation is the United Nations International Strategy for Disaster Risk Reduction 
(e.g. UNISDR, 2009b).38 We therefore also include an investigation of the US$350 million 
allocated by the Government of Bangladesh in fiscal years 2009-2013 to tackle climate change 
impacts. 
 
3.4 THE POSSIBLE DETERMINANTS OF DRR  
The future probability of exposure to hazards (and their probable intensity) is proxied 
in this paper by past experience of this hazard. In this case, we focus on DRR activities that 
are mostly related to flood exposure, and therefore focus on flood risk. We measure the past 
exposure to hazards using details of rainfall record in each region.39  
The two other components of disaster risk, after the hazard itself, is the exposure of 
the population, and its vulnerability. Socio-economic vulnerability is as important as 
geographical exposure in order to more fully understand community-level adaptive capacity. 
The past literature has identified indicators of socio-economic vulnerability to natural hazards 
and emphasizes the importance of integrating them into national disaster prevention 
planning (Cutter et al. 2009; Tapsell et al. 2010). This widely discussed need to insert this 
socio-economic perspective into DRR planning motivates our use of socio-economic 
indicators. 
The political dimension of natural disaster policy has also been receiving attention in 
recent years with a primary focus on the evident failure of politicians’ and voters’ to prioritize 
prevention over post-event response; see for example Healy and Malhotra (2009) and Garret 
and Sobel (2003) on US post-disaster funding, Cole et al. (2012) on India, and Fuchs and 
                                                             
38 See also Shamsuddoha et al. (2013). 
39 The risk associated with geological hazards is much more difficult to forecast, and this partly justifies our choice 
to focus on Bangladesh, where disaster risk is generally only associated with climatological events (unlike, for 
example, Peru) – see, for example, Kerr (2011). 
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Rodriguez-Chamussy (2014) on Mexico. When funding is awarded ex ante, the evidence 
seems to suggest that governments favour spending in regions that are politically aligned with 
the party in power (e.g. Cohen and Werker, 2008), and this is the focus of our investigation 
into the political economy of fiscal spending on the sub-regions. 
 
3.5        THE DATA 
The data for this study were collected from various Bangladeshi government sources 
described below, both online and in print. Appendix table 1 provides the precise definition of 
all the variables and their data sources.  
 
3.5.1 DRR PROGRAMS IN BANGLADESH 
The disaster risk reduction public spending data at the local government level was 
collected from publications of Bangladesh’s Ministry of Food (former Ministry of Food and 
Disaster Management) – the information was collected from the Ministry’s web portal where 
sub-district (upazila) disaster risk reduction and mitigation funding allocation data from FY 
(fiscal year) 2010-11 to FY2013-14 was available. For each year, the dataset records the 
‘allocation’ (allocated spending) and ‘expenses’ (realized spending) for the various disaster 
safety net programmes - Test Relief (TR), Food For Work (FFW), Gratuitous Relief (GR) and 
Vulnerable Group Feeding (VGF). It also records the same information for the DRR 
infrastructure programme (bridges and culvert construction) and the climate change fund 
(also known as the climate investment fund). These various programs are described below. 
The Test Relief (TR) program has been implemented every year since 1975 in rural 
areas. This programme is mainly for repairing roads, damaged infrastructure such as schools 
and clinics, and other rural activities. It provides employment opportunities by providing 8 
kilograms of rice/wheat to every person in return for working 7 hours/day in specific projects 
related to disaster risk reduction and mitigation. The Gratuitous Relief (GR) programme 
(established in 1973) is designed to provide a maximum of 20 kilograms of rice/wheat to worst 
affected poor households with no associated work requirements. Vulnerable Group Feeding 
(VGF) is another form of gratuitous relief (i.e. without work requirement) and is normally 
launched during or after a disaster and attempts to assist people remaining vulnerable to 
hunger.  
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The Food For Work (FFW) program has been implemented since 1975 and is designed 
for construction, maintenance, reconstruction and development of rural infrastructure. 
Based on government food and monetary support, various rural infrastructural projects 
(many of them aimed at reducing vulnerability) are financed under this program during 
normal times and in post-disaster scenarios with work requirements. Among these 
infrastructure projects, the Department of Disaster Management funds construction of 
bridge/culverts (up to 12 meter long) under the Annual Development Programme of the 
Bangladesh Government (Bridges and Culverts programme).  
Data has been aggregated by adding up allocations in general and special categories 
under each DRR programme for each of the 483 sub-districts. We converted the food 
allocations in some of these programs into its monetary value using the contemporaneous 
(average) market price of rice in Dhaka (wholesale price). We aggregate both food and cash 
amount to get total allocation under each particular DRR activity for each sub-district. We 
then divide total allocated and realized spending amounts for each program/sub-district by 
the size of the population of each corresponding sub-district.  
 
3.5.2 RAINFALL HAZARD DATA 
Due to its geographical location in the South-Eastern part of Hindu-Kush Himalayan 
region and being at the confluence of three major rivers – the Ganges, the Brahmaputra and 
the Meghna, Bangladesh is an extremely flood-prone country. River-bank flooding, occurs 
mostly during the monsoon period (May-October) is the most frequent case.40 High rainfall is 
primarily the reason of river-bank floods. Here, we calculate a rainfall-based flood risk 
probability index for 483 sub-districts of Bangladesh to examine the sensitivity government 
DRR spending to flood risks. The index captures historical rainfall variability to determine local 
(sub-district) flood risks. In as much as this index is based on past experiences, it does not 
capture the projected future changes that are associated with climatic change. 
To develop this index, we collected annual rainfall data of 64 years for 35 weather 
stations covering the whole country from the Bangladesh Meteorological Department 
(BMD).41 The BMD records daily rainfall data since 1948 for all available weather stations 
across the country. We first calculated total monthly rainfall for each year under each weather 
                                                             
40 Other, less common types of flooding are the flash floods (in hilly areas) and storm surges (along the coast). 
41 The available data were for the years 1948-2012. 
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station. We next calculated the mean and standard deviation for each month for each sub-
district by matching weather stations with sub-districts.42 We develop two indexes of low- 
and high-risk indices. For the low flood risk, we count the number of months over the 64 years 
for which we have data with extreme rainfall using two thresholds: monthly rainfall exceeding 
15 percent of average annual rainfall for this sub-district; and monthly rainfall exceeding one 
standard deviation above the mean for that month throughout the available time period.43  
We calculate the average number of months with extreme rainfall to obtain the 
probability of flooding occurring annually in that particular weather station (and consequently 
sub-district). The mean probability is 0.93 with 0.16 standard deviation. The second index, 
high flood risk, is constructed similarly, but in this case the two thresholds are 20 percent of 
average annual rainfall and more than two standard deviation above the monthly mean. For 
the high-risk measure, the mean probability is 0.26 with 0.08 standard deviation.  
 
3.5.3 OTHER VARIABLES 
Population numbers and poverty rates for each sub-district (annually) were collated 
from government circular orders of the Department of Disaster Management. Our proxy for 
‘economic development’ for each sub-district is a composite variable averaging the shares of 
the population with access to basic amenities (electricity, safe drinking water, and sanitation 
facilities). This data were collected from the 2011 Population and Housing Census of 
Bangladesh.  
To capture the importance of politics in allocation of funding from the central 
government to the sub-regions, we construct a political binary variable that measures 
whether the Member of Parliament (MP) representing the sub-district belongs to the main 
political party in power. To construct this variable, we divide the 300 electoral constituencies 
with respect to 483 sub-districts based upon the electoral delimitation information on the 
Bangladesh Gazette (2013). Information regarding election results and the sub-district 
representatives has been collected from the Bangladesh Election Commission report of 2008.  
                                                             
42 In cases where a sub-district did not have a rainfall measurement station, we used an average of the three 
nearest stations.  
43 The historical coverage of rainfall data in BMD weather stations varies depending upon their establishment 
year. Therefore, we calculate the average number of months with extreme rainfall by dividing with the total 
number of rainfall years available to calculate the probability of annual flooding in that particular weather 
station. Guiteras et al. (2015) use satellite data for rainfall, but find that this data is poorly correlated with actual 
flooding.  
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According to the Coastal Zone Policy of the Government of Bangladesh (2005), the 
zone is divided into ‘exposed coast’ (the area/upazilas that front the sea directly, and ‘interior 
coast’ (the area/upazilas that are located behind the exposed coast). Here, we include both 
groups to create the ‘coastal belt binary variable’. Another dummy variable has been created 
to capture ethnic divisions within the sub-district. Bangladesh, unlike some of its neighbours, 
is relatively homogenous. We include a dummy variable noting if indigenous ethnic minorities 
reside in a particular sub-district. To create this ethnicity dummy, we use information from 
the 2011 Population and Housing Census of Bangladesh. We add two more binary variables. 
The first identifies the central sub-district in any particular district (in most cases that implies 
bigger populations, higher degree of urbanization and more industrialized). The other binary 
measure indicate urban sub-districts associated with the two mega-cities in Bangladesh 
(Dhaka and Chittagong).  
 
3.6 DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS AND MODEL SPECIFICATION 
Table 1 reports the descriptive statistics of public spending on DRR in Bangladesh, 
including both allocated and realized spending for the fiscal year 2010-11 to 2013-14 for each 
of the programmes described earlier. These statistics include mean, standard deviation, 
maximum and minimum of total DRR allocated and realized spending per capita for only 
positive observations (when funds were allocated) for Test Relief (TR), Vulnerable Group 
Feeding (VGF), Food For Work (FFW), Gratuitous Relief (GR), Infrastructure Spending (Bridges 
and Culvert construction under FFW) and Climate Investment Fund (CIF). The mean for DRR 
allocated (realized) spending per capita for only positive observations is 51.4 (41.4). On 
average, TR received the highest amount of funding per capita followed by VGF while the 
maximum amount in a single sub-district has been distributed through the VGF program.  
Table 2 documents the descriptive statistics of all the independent (RHS) variables. 
The mean population size in each sub-district is 0.26 million. The mean probability of low and 
high flood-risk assigned to each sub-district is 0.935 and 0.258 respectively. Although the 
current ethnic population size is just over 2 million people, 46 percent of the sub-districts 
include some ethnic minorities indicating their dispersal across a wide range of sub-districts. 
The political risk dummy indicates that fully 77 percent of sub-districts are represented by 
MPs from the ruling party as a consequence of the 2008 general election. 19 percent of the 
483 sub-districts are in the coastal zone.  
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We also examine the difference, in the Bangladeshi government’s accounts, between 
the allocated vs. realized spending, and whether the two are determined differently. We do 
not have a pre-conceived notion of the types of influences that affect the regional allocation 
of public spending, but for DRR spending, we assume that these are determined by the 
perception of risk, by socio-economic vulnerability, and by political and geographic factors.  
Some sub-districts do not receive any funding for some of the DRR programs we 
investigate over some fiscal years. Figures 1 and 2 demonstrate the number of sub-districts 
with no DRR funding. Out of 483 sub-districts; 211 sub-districts did not receive any funding at 
all. Two additional sub-districts were allocated some funding but this was not realised. The 
funding allocation decision-making process therefore appears to comprise of two questions: 
The first asks: should sub-district X be allocated disaster risk reduction funding? If the answer 
to the first was affirmative, the second asks: How much should be allocated? Due to this two-
stage decision-making process, we employ a two-stage Heckman selection model to identify 
the determinants’ of public spending on disaster risk reduction and mitigation. To construct 
this two-stage Heckman selection model, we start with the following premise: 
 
𝑆𝑃𝐸𝑁𝐷𝑖𝑗𝑡
𝑥 = 𝑓(𝑟𝑖𝑠𝑘𝑣 , 𝑝𝑜𝑝𝑖𝑡 , 𝑝𝑜𝑣𝑖𝑡 , 𝑑𝑒𝑝𝑖 , 𝐷𝑖)   [1] 
 
Public spending (SPEND) in sub-district (i), for program (j), at fiscal year (t), is a function of 
several variables. The perceived risk (risk) which is calculated as an index constructed from 
past exposure, with low and high thresholds (v). Spending is also a function of the population 
(pop) and poverty (pov) rates in the receiving sub-district, and measures of socio-economic 
deprivation (dep: measured as access to certain assets – see the data discussion earlier in 
section 3.5). This public spending is also a function of a set of characteristics, measured as 
binary variables (vector D), that include political affiliation with the centre, presence of ethnic 
minorities, being a district headquarter, belonging to either of the two large metropolitan 
areas, and a coastal location. The spending variable measures either the allocated or realized 
equivalent for each sub-district, fiscal year, and DRR programme (indicated by superscript x). 
Our theoretical prior is that these determinants’ should have positive correlation with 
sub-districts’ DRR funding allocation. Ceteris paribus, a sub-district with higher perceived risk, 
more poverty, less access to assets, more deprivation, more political connections, and a 
coastal location should be receiving more DRR funding (either allocated or realized). We are 
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agnostic regarding several of the other controls, including location as a district headquarter 
or as part of the two metropolitan agglomerations, and the presence of ethnic minorities. 
Given the truncated nature of this allocation (many sub-districts get nothing), we 
estimate the model in two stages. In the first stage, we estimate the probability of getting 
funding (𝑆𝑃𝐸𝑁𝐷𝑖𝑗𝑡
𝑥 > 0). More formally, the funding selection equation defines the cases 
where a particular sub-district has received or been allocated funding in any targeted 
program: 
 
𝑧𝑖𝑗𝑡 = {
1 𝑖𝑓 𝑆𝑃𝐸𝑁𝐷𝑖𝑗𝑡
𝑥 > 0
0 𝑖𝑓 𝑆𝑃𝐸𝑁𝐷𝑖𝑗𝑡
𝑥 = 0
  and   𝑧𝑖𝑗𝑡 = 𝛼𝑊𝑖𝑗𝑡 + 𝜀𝑖𝑗𝑡   [2] 
 
Where, 𝑧𝑖𝑗𝑡  is a latent variable indicating funding, and is the dependent variable of the 
selection equation [2]. 𝑊𝑖𝑗𝑡  is a vector of covariates, and 𝜀𝑖𝑗𝑡  is the random disturbance term. 
The selection variable 𝑧𝑖𝑗𝑡  is binary and we therefore use a Probit regression specification to 
estimate the first stage selection equation [2]. The second stage specifies the outcome (public 
spending) equation where public spending (allocated or realized) is the dependent variable. 
The model specification for the second stage equation is as follows: 
 
𝑌𝑖𝑗𝑡 = 𝛽𝑋𝑖𝑗𝑡 + 𝑢𝑖𝑗𝑡        [3] 
 
Where 𝑌𝑖𝑗𝑡  is the dependent variable of the outcome equation, 𝑋𝑖𝑗𝑡  is a vector of covariates, 
𝛽 is a vector of coefficients and 𝑢𝑖𝑗𝑡  is the random disturbance term. The selection equation 
(first stage) includes the population variable which is not included in the outcome equation 
(second stage). Population is excluded from the second stage as the LHS in this stage is the 
amount of funding available per capita. This exclusion assumption then implies that the 
decision on quantity is based on per capita considerations (i.e., once the government decided 
to award funding to a specific sub-district for a specific program, their quantity decision is 
based on a goal of achieving specific funding target per capita. Thus, the per capita funding 
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amount is not impacted by the size of the population.44 We estimate our model with robust 
standard errors clustered by sub-districts.  
 
3.7 ESTIMATION RESULTS 
The estimation results for the two-stage Heckman selection model for allocated 
spending are documented in tables 3-4. The first column show the estimated coefficients of 
low and high flood risks along with a set of socio-economic and geo-political controls where 
the column correspond to total allocated spending of disaster risk reduction spending per 
capita.45 Columns (2) and (3) present the estimated coefficients for obligatory public funding 
per capita46 and non-obligatory public funding per capita47 for low- and high- flood risks 
consecutively.  
Table 3 reports the results from the first stage selection regression displaying the 
marginal effects. For the highest low (high) flood risk sub-district, the probability of getting 
funded is approximately 12 percent (31 percent) higher than for the sub-district with the 
lowest risk of flooding (although both are statistically insignificant).48 The only exception in 
terms of statistical significance is for non-obligatory relief funding in the context of low flood 
risk. That is, for the highest low flood risk sub-district, the probability of getting non-obligatory 
funding is approximately 61 percent higher (and is statistically significant) than for the sub-
district with the lowest risk of flooding. Among the independent (RHS) variables; poverty rate, 
socio-economic status, coastal location, and population size are found to be sign consistent 
with our previous predictions. Note that estimations for the first stage regressions are 
identical for columns (1) and (2). This is because the group of sub-districts that received non-
                                                             
44 Heckman (1979) suggests that the outcome and selection equation are correlated and dependent variable 
(public spending) of the outcome equation is observed only if the a particular sub-district has received funding 
in any targeted program which also indicates: ui ~ N (0, σ), εi ~ N (0, 1), corr (ui, εi) = ρ; where ρ denotes the 
correlation between errors of the two stages been defined.  
45 This refers to the sum of all public funds (per capita) that were allocated for disaster risk reduction in all the 
previously described programmes except the climate investment fund. We estimated the impacts on the climate 
fund separately.  
46 Obligatory public funding are dispersed through programmes which include work requirements. Here, the 
obligatory programmes are Test Relief, Food For Work and Bridges and Culvert construction. 
47 Non-obligatory per capita public funding are dispersed through targeted safety net programs which do not 
have work requirements in their structural mechanism. Here, the non-obligatory safety net programs are 
Gratuitous Relief and Vulnerable Group Feeding. 
48 We identify low flood risk sub-district = (highest probability – lowest probability) * 0.10 and high flood risk 
sub-district = (highest probability – lowest probability) * 0.52.  
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obligatory funding is a subset of the obligatory ones (in other words, there is no sub-district 
that received non-obligatory funding but received no obligatory funding). In terms of 
statistical significance, coastal location is significant at the 1 percent level in all specifications, 
while economic development is consistently significant and positive at the 5 percent level; 
suggesting more developed areas receive more funding (per capita). Interestingly; ethnic 
minority presence, district headquarter and urban centre indicator variables all have negative 
coefficient estimates in most cases (though these are statistically insignificant). The most 
striking results are for the risk and political variables. Both low and high flood risk variables 
(based on past exposure) appear not to have a consistent statistical relationship with the 
amount allocated for DRR, with sometime even having a counter-intuitive negative sign; 
without any consistent statistical significance. The political connection to the centre indicator 
appears to get a negative sign too, though this estimate is statistically insignificant.  
Table 4 presents the second stage in the Heckman selection estimation where the 
dependent variable is DRR per capita allocated funding of the sub-districts which have 
received funding. The interpretation of the coefficient is a one percentage point increase in 
low (high) flood risk leads to a decrease of allocated per capita DRR funding by approximately 
123 (159) BDT respectively (but is statistically insignificant). The only exception here in terms 
of statistical significance is the coefficient for obligatory relief funding in the context of low 
flood risk. That is, a percentage point increase in low flood risk leads to decrease of a sub-
district’s per capita allocated obligatory funding approximately by 82 BDT. Among the 
independent variables; the poverty rate, economic development, and coastal effect again 
show positive signs (consistently with our priors) but with no statistical significance. In 
contrast to our selection estimation, the outcome for ethnicity and district headquarter 
showed largely positive association with DRR funding allocation.  
Similar to the first-stage regressions, political connections and flood risks showed 
negative association with allocated spending patterns but with no statistical significance. 
Taken overall, and in particular this finding about flood risk measure, our findings suggest 
there is no evident logic to the way the Bangladeshi government allocated its DRR funding.49 
                                                             
49 We obtain very similar results when included interaction terms for the flood risk variable, to examine whether 
the logic of DRR allocation is different for different groupings of districts (by their geographical location, their 
poverty rates, or their political connections). None of these interactions terms have a statistically significant 
coefficient in the second stage regression, further emphasizing our conclusions. 
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 We report the same set of first (showing marginal effects) - and second-stage 
Heckman selection regressions for realized funding (rather than allocated funding) in 
appendix tables 2 and 3 respectively. All columns in these two tables represent the same set 
of variables with the dependent variable being realized per capita funding in DRR. To a large 
extent, the results are very similar. In particular, we observe a similar pattern for the two 
variables we singled out earlier: flood risks and political connection. Again, low and high flood 
risks tend to show statistically insignificant coefficient estimates. 
We report Heckman two stage regression results for climate investment fund 
separately in tables 5 and 6. The first column in table 5 (the marginal effects) display the 
determinants of sub-district wise allocated per capita public spending on climate change. The 
second column portrays the impacts on realized per capita public spending for the same set 
of independent variables as in column (1). Among the independent variables, coastal location, 
urban centre, and district headquarter again shows signs consistent with our priors with 
coastal location and socio-economic status being statistically significant in both cases. 
Ethnicity and population size are not similarly consistent with ethnicity generating statistically 
significant estimates. As before, the results we are most interested in are the coefficients for 
the flood risk measures. High flood risk measure has a negative association with both 
allocated and realized climate fund spending but with no statistical significance, while low 
flood risk measure showed mixed evidence. None of the other variables seem to adequately 
explain the climate change funding allocation. 
The second stage regression results for the climate investment fund, in table 6, shows 
an even starker pattern. Among the RHS variables, nothing seem to consistently explain the 
amount of funding allocated. For the climate investment fund, we no longer observe the 
counter-intuitive negative coefficients for flood risks (but these results were never statistically 
significant in the second stage regression).50  
 
3.8         ROBUSTNESS CHECKS 
Our results to this point largely failed to uncover any rhyme or reason for the way the 
DRR funding is allocated to sub-districts in Bangladesh. In order to further verify that our 
results are not dependent on the modelling choice we made (the Heckman two-stage 
                                                             
50 An exception has been observed in case of low flood risk for allocated spending per capita. 
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selection model), we re-estimated our models with several other plausible models. We 
present results of these robustness checks in table 7 for allocated spending per capita. We 
show the same results in appendix table 4 for realized spending per capita as well. We present 
results for an OLS estimation, a negative binomial regression, zero-inflated Poisson 
regression, and a censored Tobit model. The RHS variables in these models are the same as 
the two stage Heckman selection model. Our original model choice is a combination of linear 
and non-linear regression framework. As robustness checks; we employ three additional 
specialized non-linear regression models (i.e. negative binomial regression, zero-inflated 
Poisson regression, and a censored Tobit model) suitably justified for cases with excess zeros 
(that is sub-districts receiving no funding at all) and its bounds at 0 and a positive value (Long, 
1997). We complemented our non-linear models with the classic OLS linear regression model 
to justify our findings. Our main result, that flood risk does not explain DRR funding, is 
consistently presented in all of these different estimations. 
 
3.9         CONCLUSION 
Bangladesh is a low-income country. Its natural disaster risk will not change 
dramatically in the near future, though its risk clearly extends beyond the immediate disaster 
effects to future impacts associated with climate change. As is true for almost any public 
programme of fiscal spending, rational allocation of limited public resources is critical to the 
stated aims of the programmes we examine (i.e., enhance households’ coping abilities to 
reduce and mitigate disasters risks). Clearly, the effectiveness of prevention spending is 
important, and equally obviously the first pre-condition for any effective spending, not 
exclusively for DRR, is that this spending is allocated rationally across space.  
It is well understood that any government’s public spending decision-making 
processes are affected by other considerations rather than need, but the balance between 
these competing pressures is not obviously clear. Our objective in this paper is to identify the 
determinants’ of publicly allocated and realized spending at the local government (sub-
district) level in Bangladesh. We employ the Heckman two-stage selection model to 
empirically estimate the covariates where we assume public spending is a function of the 
probability of flood risks, population size, poverty rate, socio-economic development, political 
connections, ethnic composition, and details about the geo-location of the sub-district.  
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While some of our results conform with our priors (where these priors are well 
formed), it is surprising to note that the presence of the ruling party’s elected candidates fails 
to become a statistically important factor when it is time to attract DRR funding. The most 
intriguing finding of this study, however, is the response to the sub-district flood risk 
probabilities as a factor affecting the DRR financing mechanism. This variable is consistently 
counter-intuitively negative and statistically significant. This result, we should add, is also 
observed when we do not control for coastal location, when we add other variables, and 
when we estimate a simpler linear model. 
To summarize, we find little evidence (and some counter-evidence) of rationality in 
the regional funding allocation decisions of the Bangladeshi government. The DRR regional 
allocations do not seem to be determined by risk and exposure, and only weakly by 
vulnerability. Even obvious and transparent political economy motivations do not seem to 
explain much of the variation in inter-regional funding. These funding decisions appear to be 
much murkier than we expected them to be. This surprised us, as the Bangladesh DRR 
program is considered a poster-child of DRR investments. Of course, our result are about DRR 
funding. We do not rule out the possibility that our results are biased because of the absence 
of long-term data, a possible omitted variable bias and reverse causality. All these justify 
future research in this area. Whether our conclusions apply to other types of central 
government funding in Bangladesh, or whether this is indeed typical of regional allocations in 
lower-income countries, are also all still open questions that require more evidence-based 
answers. 
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     FIGURE 1: DISASTER RISK REDUCTION PER CAPITA ALLOCATED SPENDING 
 
 
     FIGURE 2: DISASTER RISK REDUCTION PER CAPITA REALIZED SPENDING 
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TABLE 1: DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS A: LEFT-HAND SIDE VARIABLES 
 
Source: Authors’ calculations. 
Note: The acronyms used here represents Disaster Risk Reduction Allocated and Realized spending, Test 
Relief, Food For Work, Infrastructure, Gratuitous Relief, Vulnerable Group Feeding and Climate Investment 
Fund respectively (all in per capita terms). Allocated and realized for each safety net program indicates total 
(per capita) amount of public fund been allocated and total (per capita) amount of public fund been spent out 
of total allocation in disaster risk reduction consecutively. P and A represent only positive and all observations, 
respectively. The currency unit is in BDT (Bangladeshi Taka) [1 USD = 75.79 BDT]. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
VARIABLES 
 
OBSERVATION 
 
MEAN 
 
STANDARD 
DEVIATION 
 
MINIMUM 
 
MAXIMUM 
DRR TOTAL ALLOCATED SPENDING 272 (P) 51.35041 80.69222 0.3851942 968.5986 
DRR TOTAL REALIZED SPENDING 270 (P) 41.44611 73.12375 0.231117 966.675 
TR_ALLOCATED 483 (A) 12.37298 17.5886 0 137.6302 
TR_REALIZED 483 (A) 9.809799 14.28539 0 95.31361 
FFW_ALLOCATED 483 (A) 5.443759 13.4828 0 126.3999 
FFW_REALIZED 483 (A) 3.819665 9.05842 0 90.41516 
INFRA_ALLOCATED 483 (A) 3.15629 9.593239 0 102.8087 
INFRA_REALIZED 483 (A) 1.96463 7.554146 0 102.8087 
GR_ALLOCATED 483 (A) 2.145435 20.45798 0 374.9262 
GR_REALIZED 483 (A) 1.607032 17.19828 0 374.9262 
VGF_ALLOCATED 483 (A) 5.799361 42.9692 0 921.9801 
VGF_REALIZED 483 (A) 5.967508 43.00797 0 921.9801 
CIF_ALLOCATED 483 (A) 1.28391 5.476021 0 58.71323 
CIF_REALIZED 483 (A) 0.9925554 4.739405 0 58.46924 
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      TABLE 2: DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS B: RIGHT-HAND SIDE VARIABLES 
 
VARIABLES 
 
OBSERVATION 
 
MEAN 
 
STANDARD 
DEVIATION 
 
MINIMUM 
 
MAXIMUM 
POPULATION 483 255833.4 138584.8 17152 941005 
FLRISK_LOW 483 0.9347943 0.156718 0.6818 1.909 
FLRISK_HIGH 483 0.2577505 0.078411 0.123 0.7272 
POVERTY RATE 483 28.3388 13.23799 1.9 68 
ECONOMIC 
DEVELOPMENT 
483 52.60449 11.12422 8.1 73.5 
ETHNICITY 483 0.4637681 0.499203 0 1 
DISTRICT HQ 483 0.1325052 0.339391 0 1 
POLITICAL RISK 483 .7763975 .4170906   0 1 
URBAN EFFECT 483 0.0393375 0.194598 0 1 
COASTAL EFFECT 483 0.1904762 0.393084 0 1 
        Source: Authors’ calculations. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
113 
 
                            TABLE 3: ALLOCATED SPENDING: HECKMAN FIRST STAGE REGRESSION RESULTS 
ALLOCATED SPENDING FIRST STAGE   
 
VARIABLES 
 
DISASTER RISK 
REDUCTION_TOTAL(DY/DX) 
 
RELIEF _OBLIGATORY 
(DY/DX) 
 
RELIEF _NON-OBLIGATORY 
(DY/DX) 
    
FLRISK_LOW -0.10 -0.10 -0.50** 
 (0.19) (0.19) (0.20) 
FLRISK_HIGH -0.52 -0.52 0.21 
 (0.39) (0.39) (0.41) 
POVERTY RATE 0.25 0.25 0.18 
 (0.20) (0.20) (0.19) 
ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT 0.42* 0.42* 0.37* 
 (0.22) (0.22) (0.21) 
ETHNICITY -0.02 -0.02 0.02 
 (0.05) (0.05) (0.05) 
DISTRICT HQ -0.03 -0.03 -0.02 
 (0.08) (0.08) (0.08) 
POLITICAL RISK -0.08 -0.08 -0.08 
 (0.06) (0.06) (0.05) 
URBAN EFFECT -0.04 -0.04 -0.19 
 (0.15) (0.15) (0.13) 
COASTAL EFFECT 0.25*** 0.25*** 0.22*** 
 (0.07) (0.07) (0.06) 
POPULATION 0.26 0.26 0.13 
 (0.23) (0.23) (0.20) 
OBSERVATIONS 483 483 483 
                                              Source: Authors’ calculations. 
                                             Notes: a Robust standard errors (clustered by sub-district) in parentheses *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. 
                                              b The regression results in poverty rate and economic development are multiplied by 100 for ease of reading and the population variable is  
represented in millions. 
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                                                    TABLE 4: ALLOCATED SPENDING: HECKMAN SECOND STAGE REGRESSION RESULTS 
ALLOCATED SPENDING SECOND STAGE   
 
VARIABLES 
 
DISASTER RISK 
REDUCTION_TOTAL 
 
RELIEF _OBLIGATORY 
 
RELIEF _NON-OBLIGATORY 
    
FLRISK_LOW -122.88 -82.44* -259.32 
 (92.63) (49.72) (410.96) 
FLRISK_HIGH -159.07 -44.16 44.67 
 (260.06) (107.98) (288.62) 
POVERTY RATE 1.77 0.62 1.80 
 (1.48) (0.60) (2.06) 
ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT 0.85 0.29 1.17 
 (1.80) (0.83) (3.22) 
ETHNICITY 12.96 -4.75 35.50 
 (24.15) (10.85) (39.82) 
DISTRICT HQ 15.30 11.22 5.08 
 (25.80) (14.54) (29.41) 
POLITICAL RISK -42.25 -18.26 -49.65 
 (40.03) (15.84) (73.66) 
URBAN EFFECT -33.19 -12.36 -95.01 
 (47.26) (23.00) (163.89) 
COASTAL EFFECT 87.41 36.03 107.71 
 (77.93) (34.17) (165.70) 
CONSTANT -35.46 21.00 -104.34 
 (188.91) (86.93) (296.93) 
MILLS    
LAMBDA 221.53 114.83 217.96 
 (206.78) (95.38) (358.01) 
OBSERVATIONS 483 483 483 
                           Source: Authors’ calculations. 
                          Note: Robust standard errors (clustered by sub-district) in parentheses *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. 
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                              TABLE 5: CLIMATE INVESTMENT FUND: HECKMAN FIRST STAGE REGRESSION RESULTS 
 
 
CLIMATE INVESTMENT FUND – HECKMAN FIRST STAGE REGRESSION 
VARIABLES 
ALLOCATED SPENDING 
(DY/DX) 
REALIZED SPENDING 
(DY/DX) 
FLRISK_LOW -0.01 0.04 
 (0.14) (0.12) 
FLRISK_HIGH -0.15 -0.21 
 (0.34) (0.32) 
POVERTY RATE -0.09 -0.09 
 (0.10) (0.10) 
ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT -0.17* -0.18** 
 (0.09) (0.09) 
ETHNICITY -0.11*** -0.10** 
 (0.04) (0.04) 
DISTRICT HQ 0.02 0.02 
 (0.04) (0.04) 
POLITICAL RISK -0.05 -0.03 
 (0.03) (0.03) 
URBAN EFFECT 0.01 0.01 
 (0.05) (0.05) 
COASTAL EFFECT 0.19*** 0.19*** 
 (0.02) (0.02) 
POPULATION -0.12 -0.10 
 (0.10) (0.99) 
OBSERVATIONS 483 483 
                               Source: Authors’ calculations. 
                                                        Notes: a Robust standard errors (clustered by sub-district) in parentheses *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. 
                                                            b The regression results in poverty rate and economic development are multiplied by 100 for ease of reading and the population 
                                            variable is represented in millions.                                   
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                               TABLE 6: CLIMATE INVESTMENT FUND: HECKMAN SECOND STAGE REGRESSION RESULTS 
 
 
CLIMATE INVESTMENT FUND – HECKMAN SECOND STAGE REGRESSION 
VARIABLES ALLOCATED SPENDING REALIZED SPENDING 
   
FLRISK_LOW -13.05 7.87 
 (22.90) (38.27) 
FLRISK_HIGH 80.36 64.46 
 (75.13) (97.22) 
POVERTY RATE 0.20 0.23 
 (0.32) (0.35) 
ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT -0.21 -0.31 
 (0.36) (0.49) 
ETHNICITY 7.42 4.89 
 (25.48) (26.80) 
DISTRICT HQ -6.54 -4.95 
 (5.55) (4.91) 
POLITICAL RISK 9.60 8.53 
 (11.24) (10.22) 
URBAN EFFECT 3.40 6.05 
 (11.78) (10.69) 
COASTAL EFFECT -22.13 -17.17 
 (50.16) (64.00) 
CONSTANT 42.83 23.18 
 (47.02) (70.10) 
MILLS   
LAMBDA -18.68 -15.43 
 (27.17) (34.94) 
OBSERVATIONS 483 483 
                            Source: Authors’ calculations. 
                           Note: Robust standard errors (clustered by sub-district) in parentheses *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. 
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                       TABLE 7: ALLOCATED SPENDING: ROBUSTNESS CHECKS  
 
VARIABLES 
OLS REGRESSION NEGATIVE BINOMIAL 
REGRESSION 
ZERO-INFLATED 
POISSON REGRESSION 
TOBIT REGRESSION 
     
FLRISK_LOW -11929804.42*** -1.77** -1.75** -70.62* 
 (3,102,041.65) (0.70) (0.82) (40.25) 
FLRISK_HIGH 10123486.75 0.34 0.73 -65.70 
 (6,210,811.76) (1.50) (2.05) (93.61) 
POVERTY RATE 139,125.66*** 0.02** 0.01 1.07* 
 (45,105.02) (0.01) (0.01) (0.57) 
ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT 54,367.24** -0.01 -0.02** 0.21 
 (24,771.58) (0.01) (0.01) (0.45) 
ETHNICITY 4,144,180.70*** 0.03 0.20 9.74 
 (1,154,026.02) (0.18) (0.27) (13.37) 
DISTRICT HQ 644,919.67 0.22 0.11 9.16 
 (1,218,619.46) (0.23) (0.21) (12.31) 
POLITICAL RISK -2695571.44*** -0.38** -0.24 -21.02 
 (961,695.17) (0.18) (0.22) (13.74) 
URBAN EFFECT -7050462.68*** -0.72*** -0.97*** -26.15 
     
 (1,621,003.47) (0.26) (0.32) (19.63) 
COASTAL EFFECT 6,118,915.26*** 0.61*** 0.19 45.00*** 
 (1,174,980.32) (0.17) (0.18) (16.59) 
CONSTANT 7,379,671.70*** 4.84*** 5.80*** 38.75 
 (2,614,660.81) (0.78) (0.85) (45.28) 
LNALPHA  1.57***   
  (0.08)   
SIGMA    92.81*** 
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    (19.47) 
INFLATED VARIABLES     
POPULATION   -0.14**  
   (0.73)  
NUMBER OF UPAZILAS  
(BY DISTRICT) 
  -0.03  
   (0.03)  
OBSERVATIONS 483 483 483 483 
                       Source: Authors’ calculations. 
                      Note: Robust standard errors (clustered by sub-district) in parentheses *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. 
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    APPENDIX TABLE 1: DESCRIPTION OF VARIABLES DEFINED AND THEIR SOURCES 
 
NO. 
 
VARIABLES 
 
DESCRIPTION 
 
SOURCE 
1 POPULATION The total number of people residing in each sub-district.        
 
Department of Disaster Management, Government of 
Bangladesh. 
2 TR_ALLOCATED    The total (per capita) amount of public fund been allocated 
in disaster risk reduction through test relief program. 
 
Ministry of Food (Former Ministry of Food and Disaster 
Management), Government of Bangladesh.  
3 TR_REALIZED    The total (per capita) amount of public fund been spent out 
of total allocation in disaster risk reduction through test 
relief program. 
Ministry of Food (Former Ministry of Food and Disaster 
Management), Government of Bangladesh. 
4 FFW_ALLOCATED The total (per capita) amount of public fund been allocated 
in disaster risk reduction through Food For Work program. 
 
Ministry of Food (Former Ministry of Food and Disaster 
Management), Government of Bangladesh. 
5 FFW_REALIZED    The total (per capita) amount of public fund been spent out 
of total allocation in disaster risk reduction through Food For 
Work program. 
Ministry of Food (Former Ministry of Food and Disaster 
Management), Government of Bangladesh. 
6 INFRA_ALLOCATED The total (per capita) amount of public fund been allocated 
in bridges and culvert construction under Food For Work 
program. 
Ministry of Food (Former Ministry of Food and Disaster 
Management), Government of Bangladesh. 
7 INFRA_REALIZED The total (per capita) amount of public fund been spent out 
of total allocation in bridges and culvert construction under 
Food For Work program. 
Ministry of Food (Former Ministry of Food and Disaster 
Management), Government of Bangladesh. 
8 GR_ALLOCATED    The total (per capita) amount of public fund been allocated 
in disaster risk reduction through gratuitous relief program. 
 
Ministry of Food (Former Ministry of Food and Disaster 
Management), Government of Bangladesh. 
9 GR_REALIZED    The total (per capita) amount of public fund been spent out 
of total allocation in disaster risk reduction through 
gratuitous relief program. 
  
Ministry of Food (Former Ministry of Food and Disaster 
Management), Government of Bangladesh. 
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10 VGF_ALLOCATED The total (per capita) amount of public fund been allocated 
in disaster risk reduction through vulnerable group feeding 
program. 
Ministry of Food (Former Ministry of Food and Disaster 
Management), Government of Bangladesh. 
11 VGF_REALIZED    The total (per capita) amount of public fund been spent out 
of total allocation in disaster risk reduction through 
vulnerable group feeding program. 
Ministry of Food (Former Ministry of Food and Disaster 
Management), Government of Bangladesh. 
12 CIF_ALLOCATED The total (per capita) amount of public fund been allocated 
in climate investment fund to combat climate change 
induced risks. 
Ministry of Food (Former Ministry of Food and Disaster 
Management), Government of Bangladesh. 
13 CIF_REALIZED   The total (per capita) amount of public fund been spent out 
of total allocation in climate investment fund to combat 
climate change induced risks. 
 
Ministry of Food (Former Ministry of Food and Disaster 
Management), Government of Bangladesh. 
14 FLRISK_LOW Also defined as ‘low flood risk’. The number of times each sub-
district is likely to incur flood risk each year. The threshold is 
the number of months each sub-district has total rainfall 
higher than 15 percent of average annual rainfall and more 
than 1 standard deviation above the mean divided by the 
number of years’ rainfall data has been recorded for each 
weather station corresponding to each sub-district out of 64 
year time span.   
 
Bangladesh Meteorological Department (BMD) rainfall 
data of 64 years (1948-2012) for 35 weather stations of 
Bangladesh. 
15 FLRISK_HIGH Also defined as ‘high flood risk’. The number of times each 
sub-district is likely to incur flood risk each year. The threshold 
is the number of months each sub-district has total rainfall 
higher than 20 percent of average annual rainfall and more 
than 2 standard deviation above the mean divided by the 
number of years’ rainfall data has been recorded for each 
weather station corresponding to each sub-district out of 64 
year time span.   
Bangladesh Meteorological Department (BMD) rainfall 
data of 64 years (1948-2012) for 35 weather stations of 
Bangladesh. 
16 POVERTY RATE The number of people living below the national poverty line 
of US$ 2 per day. 
Department of Disaster Management, Government of 
Bangladesh. 
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17 ECONOMIC 
DEVELOPMENT 
This is a composite variable averaging the percentage of 
population under each sub-district to get access to safe 
drinking water, sanitation facilities and electricity.  
Population and Housing Census of Bangladesh, 2011. 
 
 
 
 
18 ETHNICITY Dummy variable; 1 if indigenous ethnic minorities resides in 
any sub-district, 0 otherwise. 
 
Authors’ elaborations using 
Population and Housing Census of Bangladesh, 2011. 
19 DISTRICT HQ Dummy variable; 1 if the sub-district is central (in most 
cases, bigger population size and main economic centre) in 
any particular district, 0 otherwise. 
 
Authors’ elaborations. 
20 POLITICAL RISK Dummy variable; 1 if the Member of Parliament (MP) is from 
the main political party in power, 0 otherwise. 
 
Authors’ elaborations using Bangladesh Election 
Commission Report, 2008 and Bangladesh Gazette 
(2013).  
21 URBAN EFFECT Dummy variable; 1 if the sub-district belongs to the bigger 
urban cities; Dhaka or Chittagong, 0 otherwise. 
 
Authors’ elaborations. 
22 COASTAL EFFECT Dummy variable; 1 if the sub-district belongs to any districts 
situated in the coastal belts a, 0 otherwise. 
 
Authors’ elaborations. 
Source: Authors’ elaborations. 
Note: ‘Coastal Zone’ is most frequently defined as land affected by its proximity to the sea and that part of the sea affected by its proximity to the land 
(Kamaluddin and Kaudstaal, 2003). According to the Coastal Zone Policy (2005) of the Government of Bangladesh (GOB), the zone is divided into 
‘exposed coast’ (the area/upazilas that embraces the sea directly and is subject to be affected highly by the anticipated sea level rise, also known as first 
tier coastal upazilas) and ‘interior coast’ (the area/upazilas that are located behind the exposed coast, can also be sub-divided into second and third tier 
coastal upazilas). Here, we consider the first and second tier coastal upazilas to create the ‘coastal effect’ dummy variable.                
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                     APPENDIX TABLE 2: REALIZED SPENDING: HECKMAN FIRST STAGE REGRESSION RESULTS 
REALIZED SPENDING FIRST STAGE   
 
VARIABLES 
 
DISASTER RISK 
REDUCTION_TOTAL (DY/DX) 
 
RELIEF _OBLIGATORY 
(DY/DX) 
 
RELIEF _NON-OBLIGATORY 
(DY/DX) 
    
FLRISK_LOW -0.12 -0.16 -0.49** 
 (0.19) (0.19) (0.20) 
FLRISK_HIGH -0.55 -0.39 0.24 
 (0.39) (0.39) (0.41) 
POVERTY RATE 0.27 0.25 0.17 
 (0.20) (0.20) (0.19) 
ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT 0.39* 0.35 0.42** 
 (0.22) (0.22) (0.21) 
ETHNICITY -0.01 -0.00 0.02 
 (0.05) (0.05) (0.05) 
DISTRICT HQ -0.02 -0.03 -0.01 
 (0.08) (0.08) (0.08) 
POLITICAL RISK -0.08 -0.06 -0.08 
 (0.06) (0.06) (0.05) 
URBAN EFFECT -0.03 -0.03 -0.18 
 (0.15) (0.15) (0.13) 
COASTAL EFFECT 0.25*** 0.27*** 0.20*** 
 (0.07) (0.07) (0.06) 
POPULATION 0.28 0.30 0.13 
 (0.23) (0.23) (0.20) 
OBSERVATIONS 483 483 483 
                     Source: Authors’ calculations. 
                                              Notes: a Robust standard errors (clustered by sub-district) in parentheses *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. 
                                               b The regression results in poverty rate and economic development are multiplied by 100 for ease of reading and the population  
                                  variable is represented in millions. 
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                         APPENDIX TABLE 3: REALIZED SPENDING: HECKMAN SECOND STAGE REGRESSION RESULTS 
REALIZED SPENDING SECOND STAGE   
 
VARIABLES 
 
DISASTER RISK REDUCTION_TOTAL 
 
RELIEF _OBLIGATORY 
 
RELIEF _NON-OBLIGATORY 
    
FLRISK_LOW -90.77 -56.97 -247.05 
 (87.37) (44.77) (420.40) 
FLRISK_HIGH -201.62 -64.87 70.87 
 (255.48) (83.07) (311.09) 
POVERTY RATE 1.81 0.63 1.78 
 (1.43) (0.49) (2.13) 
ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT 0.93 0.23 1.63 
 (1.64) (0.62) (3.79) 
ETHNICITY 19.23 -0.23 39.73 
 (23.49) (8.73) (44.93) 
DISTRICT HQ 16.80 10.30 6.34 
 (25.49) (13.22) (30.42) 
POLITICAL RISK -42.09 -14.96 -54.71 
 (37.23) (11.56) (80.92) 
URBAN EFFECT -29.49 -8.56 -98.01 
 (45.67) (20.84) (170.21) 
COASTAL EFFECT 85.61 36.56 102.20 
 (74.42) (29.89) (164.07) 
CONSTANT -69.44 -2.10 -152.93 
 (172.11) (68.87) (347.18) 
MILLS    
LAMBDA 214.95 103.02 224.97 
 (194.80) (78.54) (378.41) 
OBSERVATIONS 483 483 483 
                        Source: Authors’ calculations. 
                        Note: Robust standard errors (clustered by sub-district) in parentheses *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. 
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                       APPENDIX TABLE 4: REALIZED SPENDING: ROBUSTNESS CHECKS  
 
VARIABLES 
OLS REGRESSION NEGATIVE BINOMIAL 
REGRESSION 
ZERO-INFLATED 
POISSON REGRESSION 
TOBIT REGRESSION 
     
FLRISK_LOW -7791982.56*** -1.37** -1.05 -46.93 
 (2,421,626.26) (0.68) (0.78) (33.39) 
FLRISK_HIGH 5,849,044.78 -0.24 0.01 -79.72 
 (5,063,921.41) (1.47) (2.16) (86.38) 
POVERTY RATE 117,208.63*** 0.02** 0.02 1.00* 
 (36,059.99) (0.01) (0.01) (0.52) 
ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT 34,715.24 -0.01 -0.01* 0.20 
 (21,105.00) (0.01) (0.01) (0.42) 
ETHNICITY 3,858,568.79*** 0.12 0.33 12.69 
 (926,362.99) (0.19) (0.30) (12.11) 
DISTRICT HQ 539,520.72 0.23 0.11 8.65 
 (990,918.02) (0.24) (0.24) (10.68) 
POLITICAL RISK -2606937.39*** -0.40** -0.35 -20.76 
 (840,510.66) (0.19) (0.24) (13.26) 
URBAN EFFECT -6522802.53*** -0.71** -1.06*** -23.56 
 (1,490,083.88) (0.29) (0.37) (18.23) 
COASTAL EFFECT 5,581,593.30*** 0.63*** 0.24 40.18** 
 (1,065,229.21) (0.18) (0.20) (16.33) 
CONSTANT 5,231,897.22** 4.29*** 4.94*** 19.26 
 (2,137,943.79) (0.75) (0.81) (38.94) 
LNALPHA  1.55***   
  (0.08)   
SIGMA    82.29*** 
    (21.08) 
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INFLATED VARIABLES     
POPULATION   -0.15**  
   (0.73)  
NUMBER OF UPAZILAS  
(BY DISTRICT) 
  -0.03  
   (0.03)  
OBSERVATIONS 483 483 483 483 
                     Source: Authors’ calculations. 
                      Note: Robust standard errors (clustered by sub-district) in parentheses *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. 
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CHAPTER FOUR 
 
THE HOUSEHOLD RESPONSE TO PERSISTENT NATURAL DISASTERS:  
EVIDENCE FROM BANGLADESH 
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4.1         INTRODUCTION 
 
Bangladesh has a long history with natural disasters due to its geography and its 
location on the shores of the Bay of Bengal. Climate change models predict Bangladesh will 
be warmer and wetter in the future.51 This changing climate induces flood risk associated with 
the monsoon season each year (Gosling et al. 2011). It is now widely understood that climate 
induced increasingly repeated risks threaten to undo decades of development efforts and the 
costs would be mostly on developing countries impacting existing and future development 
(OECD, 2003; McGuigan et al., 2002; Beg et al., 2002). Recent literatures examine the short-
run effects of natural disasters on household welfare and health outcomes (Arouri et al., 
2015; Lohmann and Lechtenfeld, 2015; Silbert and Pilar Useche, 2012; Rodriguez-Oreggia et 
al. 2013, Lopez-Calva and Juarez, 2009). However, less advancement has been observed in 
the use of self-reported data to capture the short-run disaster-development nexus in least 
developed countries with high climatic risks.52 In this paper, we ask: ‘what are the impacts on 
household income, expenditure, asset and labour market outcomes of recurrent flooding in 
Bangladesh?’  
We examine the short-run economic impacts of recurrent flooding on Bangladeshi 
households surveyed in 2000, 2005 and 2010. In 2010 Household Income and Expenditure 
Survey (HIES), households answered a set of questions’ on whether they were affected by 
flood and its likely impacts. Therefore, this paper makes two key contributions in the ‘disaster-
development’ literature: First, we develop a difference-in-difference (DID) model and 
estimate the impacts of recurrent flooding through identification of two different treatment 
(affected) groups using self-reported information and historical rainfall data based flood risk 
index for Bangladesh. We further extend our analysis using a quantile regression and quantify 
the impacts on the ‘ultra’ (extreme) poor.53 The development responses of the climatic 
disasters may therefore depend on the novel approach i.e. accuracy in identifying the 
treatment groups using self- and non-self-reported data. Second, we show that there is 
                                                             
51 See Bandyopadhyay and Skoufias (2015). 
52 Poapongsakorn and Meethom (2013) looked at the household welfare impacts of 2011 floods in Thailand (an 
upper-middle income country by World Bank definition) and Noy and Patel (2014) further extended this to look 
at spill over effects.  
53 The term ‘ultra-poor’ was coined in 1986 by Michael Lipton of the University of Sussex and is defined as ‘a 
group of people who eat below 80% of their energy requirements despite spending at least 80% of income on 
food’. In this paper, we refer to the households who belong to the bottom 15thquintile of per capita 
income/expenditure brackets. 
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inconsistency between self- and non-self-reported information based estimates with 
literature outcomes questioning the designation of survey questions (related to natural 
shocks) and their usefulness to capture development impacts. 
The paper is designed as follows: Section 4.2 reviews the ‘new’ macro-micro literature 
highlighting recent insights to explore the nexus between climate disasters and economic 
development. Section 4.3 portrays our identification strategy while Section 4.4 describes the 
data, provides detailed breakdown of our methodological framework, identifies the key 
variables and justifies the choice of the covariates with added descriptive statistics. In Section 
4.5, we present and analyse the estimation results with previous literature along with some 
robustness checks in Section 4.6. Finally, in Section 4.7 we conclude with relevant policy 
implications and also some insight for further advancements. 
 
4.2         CLIMATE DISASTERS AND DEVELOPMENT: THE NEW ‘MACRO-MICRO’ LITERATURE 
 The last few years have seen a new wave of empirical research on the consequences 
of changes in precipitation patterns, temperature and other climatic variables on economic 
development and household welfare. Climate-related natural disasters are expected to rise 
as the earth is getting warmer with prospect of significant negative economic growth mostly 
affecting the poor countries (Felbermayr and Gröschl, 2014; Acevedo, 2014). Vulnerable 
economies for example, the Pacific islands could expect a growth drop by 0.7 percentage 
points for damages equivalent to 1 percent of GDP in the year of the disaster (Cabezon et al., 
2015). On the causality between catastrophic events and long-run economic growth using 
6,700 cyclones, Hsiang and Jina (2014) find robust evidence that national incomes decline 
compared to pre-disaster trends and the recovery do not happen for twenty years for both 
poor and rich countries. This finding contrasts with the earlier work of Noy (2009) and Fomby, 
Ikeda and Loayza (2009)54 to some extent and carry profound implications as climate change 
induced repeated disasters could lead to accumulation of income losses over time. Therefore, 
climate disasters have become a development concern with likelihood of rolling back years of 
development gains and exacerbate inequality.  
 Climate resilience has become integral in the post-2015 development framework and 
recent cross-country ‘micro’ literatures explore the channels through which climate disasters 
                                                             
54 These studies focus on the short-run effects of natural disasters.  
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impacted poverty.55 Two recent studies on rural Vietnam looked at the impacts on climate 
disasters such as floods, storms and droughts on household resilience and health outcomes 
(Arouri, Nguyen and Youssef, 2015 and Lohmann and Lechtenfeld, 2015). Arouri et al. (2015) 
pointed out that micro-credit access, internal remittance and social allowances could 
strengthen household resilience to natural disasters. However, high resilience might not 
necessarily reflect low vulnerability as evident in a study conducted on tropical coastal 
communities in Bangladesh (Akter and Mallick, 2013). Moreover, another study on the Pacific 
island of Samoa by Le De, Gaillard and Friesen (2015) suggests that differential access to 
remittances could increase both inequality and vulnerability. Bandyopadhyay and Skoufias 
(2015) show that climate induced rainfall variability influence employment choices impacting 
lower consumption in flood-prone sub-districts in rural Bangladesh. Assessing relationship 
between household heterogeneity and vulnerability to consumption patterns to covariate 
shocks as floods and droughts, Kurosaki (2015) identified landownership to be a critical factor 
to cope with floods in Pakistan. A recent study on the Indian state of Tamil Nadu by 
Balasubramanian (2015) estimates the impact of climate variables (i.e. reduction in ground 
water availability at higher temperature than a threshold of 34.310 C) on agricultural income 
impacting small land owners to get low returns to agriculture. In one particular examination 
on occurrence and frequency of typhoons and/or floods in Pasay City, Metro Manila by Israel 
and Briones (2014) reveals significant and negative effects on household per capita income.  
 This growing ‘Climate-Development’ literature further explores empirical patterns in 
risk, shocks and risk management by using shock modules in questionnaire-based surveys to 
complement existing risk management tools. This usage of self-reported information on 
natural shocks motivated researchers to develop different dimension of identification 
strategies and compare impact findings using econometric models. Two recent studies by Noy 
and Patel (2014) and Poapongsakorn and Meethom (2013) investigate household welfare and 
spill over effects of the 2011 Thailand flood identifying self-reported affected (treatment) 
group in a difference-in-difference modelling framework. Nevertheless, evidences suggest 
careful use of self-reported data in identifying the true impacts which is also one of the 
highlights in this paper.56 
                                                             
55 Karim and Noy (2016) provide a qualitative survey of the empirical literature on poverty and natural disasters. 
56 See Guiteras, Jina, and Mobarak (2015) and Heltberg, Oviedo and Talukdar (2015). 
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4.3        IDENTIFICATION STRATEGY 
Our objective in this paper is to analyse the short-run impacts of recurrent flooding on 
household income, expenditure, asset and labour market outcomes through identification of 
treatment (affected) groups using both self- and non-self-reported data (historical rainfall 
data based flood risk index). We use the term ‘persistent natural disasters’ to refer to 
repeated natural disasters (e.g. flood) that occurs almost every year and possess increase risks 
of occurrence due to rainfall variability.57 Our estimation strategy compares households 
surveyed on and before year 2010 (in which shock module was introduced with questionnaire 
related to natural disasters). Therefore, we define year 2010 as post. Although there was no 
major flood event in 2010, we identified those sub-districts that were surveyed with shock 
questionnaire in 2010 and compared them in the earlier years (i.e. 2000 and 2005). The key 
assumption in our identification strategy is that in the absence of 2010 treatment (self-
identified flood impact), the evolution of the outcome of interest (e.g. income, expenditure, 
asset and labour market outcomes) would have followed the same trend as the control group 
(i.e. common trend assumption).  
We identify two treatment groups using self- and non-self-reported data as a) shock 
module was introduced in the 2010 Household Income and Expenditure Survey (HIES) and no 
new surveys have been conducted at the national level since then58 and b) self-reporting in 
terms of being affected could be subjective and might bring biased results due to sorting or 
selective reporting.59 Self-reported data could not only be a subject of recall error, but also to 
other forms of cognitive bias like reference dependence (Guiteras, Jina and Mobarak, 
2015).The module on shocks and coping responses was first introduced in HIES 2010 to 
identify households affected by various idiosyncratic and covariate shocks. As our focus in this 
paper is on covariate shocks i.e. flood, we identify households who have self-reported to be 
affected by floods only in 2010 survey. The earlier surveys – 2000 and 2005 did not have any 
shock module and hence identification of self-reported affected groups were not possible. 
However, Bangladesh as a disaster-prone country, disasters particularly flood is a repeated 
phenomenon every year. Therefore, a comparison control group could be those households 
                                                             
57 See Bandyopadhyay and Skoufias (2015) and Gosling et al. (2011). 
58 The decision process of 2015 survey is currently underway according to the information provided by the 
current Project Director of HIES.   
59 See Heltberg, Oviedo and Talukdar (2015) for a discussion on how survey modules falls short of expectations 
in several ways. 
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who are not affected by specific natural disasters, if any, in the survey regions in that 
particular year. Here, we took flood as persistent natural disaster due its repeated occurrence 
every year mostly during the monsoon period (May-October). Due to absence of shock 
modules in the dataset in years 2000 and 2005, we identify two ‘treatment’ groups – 
treatment group A and treatment group B. 
 To identify our first treatment group i.e. treatment group A, we use a rainfall-based 
flood risk probability index using historical rainfall dataset from the Bangladesh 
Meteorological Department (BMD) to identify upazilas/thanas (in particular, the survey areas) 
which are affected by excessive rainfall more than average rainfall over a long period (1948-
2012).60 The rule of thumb is the survey areas which experienced more than average rainfall 
compared to the benchmark of average rainfall of 64 years in the corresponding weather 
station in respective survey years (e.g. 2000, 2005 and 2010), the surveyed households’ falls 
under treatment group A. The control (not affected) group i.e. control group A are those 
households who resided in survey areas that did not experience excessive rainfall compared 
to the average rainfall of 64 years in the corresponding weather station in respective survey 
years (here, 2000, 2005 and 2010).  Figures 1 and 3 presents the evolution of per capita total 
income and expenditure for treatment and control group A, respectively. These figures were 
created by averaging the residuals of income and expenditure after controlling for covariates 
by year and separately for the treatment and control group A. It can be seen that the 
trajectories in both groups (treatment and control) are quite similar in 2000 and 2005 (pre-
treatment years), an indication that the common trend assumption holds in these periods.   
The second treatment group i.e. treatment group B is identified through a 
combination of both self-reported and non-self-reported information due to absence of shock 
modules before 2010 and prevalence of flooding every year. From 2010 survey, the treatment 
group is the respondents who have said ‘Yes’ as being affected by natural disasters such as 
flood. The benefits of using a rainfall-based flood risk criterion are twofold. First, it justifies 
homogeneity among affected households in terms of a common natural shock i.e. flood. 
Second, we can compare the development impacts with two different treatment groups and 
                                                             
60 See Karim and Noy (2015) for a detailed breakdown of the index construction. 
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the differences could refer to discrepancies in capturing the true impacts using shock 
modules. The second control group i.e. control group B is also identified through a 
combination of both self-reported and non-self-reported information due to absence of shock 
modules in years 2000 and 2005. In 2010, the controls are those households who have 
responded ‘No’ to being affected by flood.  We use the rainfall-based flood risk measure to 
identify the control households for 2000 and 2005 in control group B. To check for the validity 
of the common trend assumption using treatment and control group B, we show the 
evolution of per capita total income and expenditure in figures 2 and 4 respectively. These 
figures were created by averaging the residuals of income and expenditure after controlling 
for covariates by year and separately for the treatment and control group B. The trajectories 
here again validate the common trend assumption in pre-treatment years (e.g. 2000 and 
2005).  
 
4.4         DATA AND METHODOLOGY 
4.4.1    DATA DESCRIPTION 
We use Household Income and Expenditure Survey (HIES) of the Bangladesh economy 
spanning over a time period of 10 years and consists of three (3) waves: 2000, 2005 and 2010. 
The HIES is the nationally representative dataset conducted by the Bangladesh Bureau of 
Statistics (BBS) (in affiliation with the Ministry of Planning, Government of Bangladesh and 
technical and financial assistance from the World Bank) that records information regarding 
income, expenditure, consumption, education, health, employment and labour market, 
assets, measures of standard of living and poverty situation for different income brackets in 
urban and rural areas. The BBS conducts this survey every five (5) years. The latest HIES 
conducted in 2010 added four (4) additional modules in which one refers to ‘Shocks and 
Coping’ (Section 6B) in the questionnaire. The BBS HIES is a repeated cross-section dataset 
with randomly selected households in designated primary sampling units (PSUs). Therefore, 
the strength of the dataset is large sample size covering a broad range of households. 
However, limitations are there in capturing the impacts over time. The number of households 
in year 2000 is 7,440 with 10,080 and 12,240 in year 2005 and year 2010 respectively. We also 
use the Bangladesh Meteorological Department (BMD) rainfall dataset from 1948-2012 (i.e. 
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64 years) for 35 weather stations across the country to identify flood-affected treatment 
group in respective survey years under consideration.  
 
4.4.2    METHODOLOGICAL FRAMEWORK 
We employ the difference-in-difference (DID) estimation framework to estimate the 
development impacts on affected households due to flood. We start with the following 
specification:  
 
𝑦𝑖t = 𝛽0 + 𝛽1post2010 + 𝛽2treated𝑖 + 𝛽3post2010.treated𝑖 + 𝛽4𝑋𝑖t + 𝛽5year2005 
+ 𝛽6year2005. treated𝑖 + u𝑖t            (1) 
 
Where post = 1 if the observation is from 2010, 𝛽2 is the difference between treatment and 
control groups on the baseline, 𝑋𝑖t denotes the covariates indicating household (i) and 
socio-economic characteristics and infrastructural features, 𝛽5 is time fixed effect for year 
2005, 𝛽6 is the interaction term and u𝑖t indicate the error term. The 𝛽3 coefficient measures 
the difference-in-difference (DID) impact of a natural shock on outcome variables 
(development impact indicators), 𝑦𝑖t. We use robust standard errors for our hypothesis 
tests.  
We further conduct quantile regression (estimating five different quintiles e.g. 15th, 
25th, 50th, 75th and 85th quintiles) using the same DID framework to compare our results for 
different income and expenditure brackets.61  
 
Q𝑦𝑖t = 𝛽0(α) + 𝛽1(α)post2010 + 𝛽2(α)treated𝑖 + 𝛽3(α)post2010.treated𝑖 + 𝛽4 (α)𝑋𝑖t + 𝛽5(α)year2005 
+ 𝛽6(α)year2005. treated𝑖 + u𝑖t             (2) 
 
Where Q refers to quantile regression, α denotes selected quintiles (0.15, 0.25, 0.50, 0.75 
and 0.85) and all other variables are as previously defined (as the treatment groups are not 
randomly assigned in our context).62 We also estimate the following semi-logarithmic 
                                                             
61 See Khandker, Bakht and Koolwal (2009). 
62 We also regress equation (2) without the control variables and the results are presented in the appendix. 
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regression model by log-transformation of the dependent and continuous independent 
variables as robustness checks for our main results:63 
 
log𝑦𝑖t = α0 + α1post2010 + α2treated𝑖 + α3post2010.treated𝑖 + α4𝑋𝑖t + α5 year2005  
+ α6year2005. treated𝑖 + u𝑖t             (3) 
 
4.4.3    OUTCOME VARIABLES AND CHOICE OF COVARIATES 
Appendix tables 1 and 2 show the list of key outcome variables and the covariates 
(continuous and categorical) and their descriptive statistics for two different sets of treatment 
and control groups. Our outcome variables of interest include four sets of development 
indicators. They are: income (income by category), expenditure (expenditure/consumption 
by category), asset types and labour market outcomes. Income and expenditure are divided 
into various sub-groups with statistics shown in per capita household measures. Asset and 
labour market outcomes are also sub-divided into various categories (also described in 
appendix tables 1 and 2). The continuous (monetary) variables in each category are inflation-
adjusted using consumer price index (CPI) data from the Bangladesh Bank to allow for 
comparisons across different years.  
Alleviating poverty is a fundamental challenge for Bangladesh with the majority of the 
extreme poor living in rural areas with considerable flood risk bringing annual agricultural and 
losses to livelihoods (JBIC, 2007; Fadeeva, 2014; Ferdousi and Dehai, 2014). Hence, we control 
for ‘rural’ that takes the value 1 if the household resides in a rural area and 0 if otherwise 
reported. The male member as household head is generally considered as ‘bread earner’ and 
a good amount of literature also highlighted the positive association between female-headed 
households and poverty especially in developing countries (Mallick and Rafi, 2010; Aritomi et 
al., 2008; Buvinic and Rao Gupta, 1997). Therefore, a dummy variable has been created 
indicating 1 if the household head is male and 0, if reported otherwise. Household 
characteristics such as age structure and number of dependents is critical to analyse poverty 
status and one might expect larger number of dependents leads to greater poverty (Kotikula 
et al., 2010; Haughton and Khandker, 2009; Lanjouw and Ravallion, 1995). Education is also 
related with lower poverty (Kotikula et al., 2010). Community-level characteristic such as 
                                                             
63 Since this type of transformation closely follows normal distribution. See Sugiyarto (2007) for more discussion. 
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access to sanitation and access to safe drinking water is clearly associated with better health 
outcomes improving poverty status (World Bank, 2014; Duflo et al., 2012) of households with 
access to electricity also showing a positive trend in living standards (Kotikula et al., 2010). 
Therefore, three (3) binary variables are created indicating 1 to imply access to these services, 
0 otherwise. Ownership status of households such as house and land has also been argued as 
important determinant of poverty with owners of a dwelling place are found to be less 
vulnerable to flood risk (e.g. Khatun, 2015; Tasneem and Shindaini, 2013; Gerstter et al., 2011; 
Meinzen-Dick, 2009; Rayhan, 2010). A description of these variables including summary 
statistics is also provided in appendix tables 1 and 2. 
 
4.4.4    DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS 
We provide two sets of descriptive statistics for two different treatment and control 
groups (treatment group A and treatment group B) in appendix tables 1 and 2 respectively. 
We present mean and standard deviation for various outcome categories and covariates for 
both rainfall-based and self-reported treatment (affected) and control (not affected) groups. 
Most of the income categories especially agricultural (crop and non-crop) income seems to 
be much higher for the control group compared to treatment for treatment group A with 
exception in ‘other income’ category. The total income per capita for the control group is on 
average, almost 80 percent higher compared to the treatment group. The other treatment 
group i.e. treatment group B intriguingly does not show too much variation in terms of mean 
income by categories. However, mean of ‘other income’ turns out to be almost 11 percent 
lower for the controls compared to treatment in treatment group B. The expenditure 
categories also show almost similar patterns i.e. larger variations between treatment and 
control groups for treatment group A compared to smaller variation for treatment group B. 
The expenditure per capita for the control group A is, on average, almost 82 percent higher 
compared to the treatment group (rainfall-based). Moreover, the education and health 
expenditure measures show considerably less variation in self-reported treatment group 
compared to non-self-reported one. The control group A displays on average, almost 76 
percent more educational expenditure compared to the treatment group. The proportion of 
household members in control group A getting access to formal education is around 30 
percent more compared to treatment group A. There are substantial variations in terms of 
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total change in agricultural and other business asset categories between treatment and 
control groups using both rainfall-based and self-reported identifications. This variation is 27 
percent higher for the rainfall-based control group compared to the self-report control group. 
Observable variations can also be seen in labour market outcomes between treatment and 
control groups. Both daily and salaried wage for the control group A (rainfall-based) seems to 
be almost 76 percent higher compared to the treatment group. The self-reported 
identification (treatment group B) does not seem to vary considerably with respect to labour 
market outcomes. There are interesting parallel trends in the mean results of the covariates 
(independent variables) between the two treatment groups. The affected households in 
treatment group A have more working adults i.e. fewer dependents (around 25 percent) 
compared to treatment group B. However, the self-reported treatment group owns more 
land (16.3 percent more) compared to non-self-reported one. Proportion of household 
members getting access to formal education is almost 16 percent higher in self-reported 
treatment group compared to rainfall-based treatment identification. Community 
characteristics such as access to sanitation, safe drinking water and electricity also show 
parallel trends in their mean outcomes in both treatment group – A and B.  
 
4.5        ESTIMATION RESULTS 
 We start by estimating our benchmark difference-in-difference (DID) model with two 
treatment groups: treatment group A and treatment group B for four development outcomes: 
income, expenditure, asset and labour market. We compare the results for each category (in 
terms of aggregate and disaggregated outcome measures) and show the robustness under 
various income and expenditure brackets.  
 
4.5.1 INCOME 
We report impacts of recurrent-flooding on different income categories i.e. crop, non-
crop, business and other income for rainfall-based flood affected and self-reported treatment 
groups in tables 1 and 2 respectively. We find both treated (affected) households experience 
negative impacts on total income being consistent with previous disaster literatures (e.g. 
Asiimwe and Mpuga, 2007; Thomas et al., 2010; De La Fuente, 2010). Our results indicate that 
total income reduces by almost 11 percent more (estimated to be approximately BDT 17,807) 
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for treatment group A compared to the mean.64 A decline in crop income is higher for 
treatment group A (by BDT 7,428) whereas treatment group B observe comparatively greater 
reduction in non-crop income (by BDT 26,644) being consistent with evidences that show 
decline in agricultural income due to rainfall shocks (e.g. Skoufias et al., 2012; Baez and 
Mason, 2008; UNISDR, 2012). We do not observe any significant negative impacts on business 
income (non-agricultural enterprise) and other income in both treatment cases. These results 
could also be justified by previous works done by Attzs (2008) and Patnaik and Narayanan 
(2010). Among the covariates; male-headed households and formal education seems to have 
a stronger positive association with total income in addition to community variables such as 
access to sanitation and access to electricity. Ownership of land show moderate to strong 
impact on total income. Intriguingly, both average age of households and the number of 
dependents show a positive association with total income. This might be due to the fact that 
there exists a relationship between household head and household members who are over 
65 years old.65 It is more likely that the senior members are household heads and possess 
control over ownership of land and house.66  
The impact on various categories of income - such as crop, non-crop, business and 
other income - also varies across different time horizons i.e. short- and medium to long-run 
impacts. The rainfall-based affected group (treatment group A) experiences a fall in both crop 
and non-crop income (although coefficient of crop income is significant). Similarly, the self-
reported affected group also observes a significant fall in both crop and non-crop income. The 
interesting thing to note here is that treatment group A (rainfall-based) experienced a 
significant drop of almost BDT 4,559 more in crop income compared to treatment group B 
(self-reported). However, self-reported impact is of higher magnitude (difference of BDT 
14,944) with regards to non-crop income compared to non-self-reported one. The other two 
categories of income we analyse are more indirect and have medium to long-run impacts on 
households. Business income in both of these treatment groups are found to be positive (and 
significant in the self-reported group) with an increase of approximately BDT 13,706 in the 
self-reported case. The other income category show negative sign (not significant) in both 
                                                             
64 1 US Dollar = 77.88 Bangladeshi Taka (BDT). 
65 We define household members who are less than 15 and greater than 65 years old as ‘dependents’.  
66 See Zaman (1999). 
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treatment cases with less variation. The coefficients of the covariates do not vary substantially 
in terms of sign and significance between the two treatment groups.  
To observe the income distributional effects of repeated-flooding on household 
income, we estimate both conditional and unconditional quantile regression model at various 
quintiles (0.15, 0.25, 0.50, 0.75 and 0.85). Tables 9 and 10 displays the quantile treatment 
effects for income categories conditional on all the covariates as in our baseline model and 
time fixed effect for both treatment groups – A and B. We observe a contrast in terms of the 
impacts of repeated-flooding on the ultra-poor (i.e. the bottom 15 percent) between both 
treatment groups. Total income for the extreme poor are found to be negatively affected for 
self-reported treatment group (treatment group B) whereas income effect is much stronger 
for the middle 50 percent for treatment group A.67 However, the richer households are not 
found to be negatively affected in treatment group B compared to a significantly negative 
effect for richer households (i.e. the top 15 percent) for rainfall-based treatment group 
(treatment group A). Nevertheless, crop income show significantly negative impact (drop by 
BDT 3,198) on the bottom 15th quintile for treatment group A while treatment group B 
revealing a much stronger impact for the middle to higher income brackets (in per capita 
measures). We observe significant negative impacts (by BDT 319,522) on business income for 
the ultra-poor for self-reported treatment group (treatment group B). Households also 
experience significant negative impacts in other income category in both treatment cases. 
However, we also estimate an unconditional quantile regression as traditional estimators 
might be more appropriate when identified without control variables (Powell, 2016).68  
 
4.5.2 CONSUMPTION / EXPENDITURE 
We report impact estimates of various expenditure categories i.e. food, non-food, 
crop, non-crop, agricultural input, education and health for non-self- and self-reported 
treatment groups in tables 3 and 4 consecutively. Our results show a significant decline of 
                                                             
67  According to Tesliuc and Lindert (2002); the poor are disproportionately more exposed to natural disasters 
and agriculture related shocks and income inequality increased by 16% as a result of shocks. Yamamura (2013) 
also conclude an increase in income inequality in the short-term due to disasters in general.  
68 We present our results for unconditional quantile regression in appendix tables 9 and 10 for treatment groups 
A and B respectively. The difference across various quintiles among income categories between the two 
treatment groups could possibly be explained through the presence of household heterogeneity issues in our 
benchmark quantile estimation (equation 2).  
 
  
140 
 
around 14 percent compared to the mean for total expenditure (i.e. drop by BDT 22,007) for 
treatment group A (non-self-reported) being consistent with previous literatures (e.g. Dercon, 
2004; Auffret, 2003; Asiimwe and Mpuga, 2007; Jha, 2006; Shoji, 2010; Foltz et al. 2013). 
Interestingly, treatment group B (self-reported) reveal a positive impact on total expenditure 
due to flooding. This result could also be justified by coping strategies, safety net and micro-
credit borrowing by households.69 Our focal categories i.e. crop expenditure and agricultural 
input expenditure (as we assume these categories are directly related to rainfall shocks and 
flood) show negative impacts in both treatment cases. However, although both categories 
show sign consistencies, agricultural input expenditure is found statistically significant in 
treatment group A while treatment group B display statistical significance in crop 
expenditure. In accordance with income estimates for two treatment groups, the covariates 
in the expenditure categories also reveal almost similar types of relationship with expenditure 
outcome categories. In both treatment cases, in addition to male-headed households and 
formal education, all three community characteristics (e.g. access to electricity, sanitation and 
pure drinking water) demonstrate strong positive association with total expenditure. We also 
anticipate similar reasoning for positive outcomes of average age and number of dependents 
for both treatment group – A and B.  
The various categories of expenditure - food, non-food, crop, non-crop, agricultural 
input, educational and health expenditure - could also be categorized based upon their time 
horizons e.g. short- and medium to long-run impacts. Expenditure categories as food, non-
food and agricultural consumption indicate the short-term impacts whereas education and 
health expenditures may lead to long-term impacts. The treatment households (A and B) 
experienced significant contrast in terms of the direct impacts (food and non-food) where the 
self-reported treatment group observed positive and significant impacts. Both affected 
groups show contrasting estimates in education and health spending as well. However, the 
self-reported households experience a rise in educational expenditure (approximately by BDT 
2,189) accompanied by a significant decline in health expenditure (approximately by BDT 
689). Interestingly, the total expenditure in the self-reported treatment group (B) increases 
(although not significantly) compared to a significant decline for the non-self-reported group.  
                                                             
69 See Khandker (2007); Demont (2013); Vicarelli (2010). 
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Similar to income categories, we further extend our analysis by looking at various 
quintiles for expenditure categories. Tables 9 and 10 also displays the quantile treatment 
effects for expenditure categories conditional on all covariates and time fixed effect for both 
treatment groups – A and B. We observe a contrast in estimation results for different quintiles 
for non-self and self-reported treatment groups. We find significant negative impacts for the 
bottom 15 percent with a much stronger impact for the middle 50 percent for treatment 
group A. Intriguingly, we find a significant positive outcome for the bottom 15 percent for 
treatment group B (also justified by previous work)70 which however demonstrate 
significantly negative impact for the bottom 25 percent (by BDT 301,632) and for the top 15 
percent (drop by BDT 47,967). Again, crop expenditure reveals significantly negative impact 
for the ultra-poor (i.e. the bottom 15th quintile) in treatment group A and B. However, 
although agricultural input expenditure show negative impacts for treatment group A, it 
reveals a positive outcome for treatment group B with statistical significance in both cases. 
We also observe a contrast in educational and health expenditure outcomes for non-self and 
self-reported treatment groups as well. Furthermore, we also estimate an unconditional 
quantile regression in expenditure categories. Appendix tables 9 and 10 portrays the 
unconditional quantile treatment effects for expenditure categories for treatment groups A 
and B. 71  
 
4.5.3 ASSET 
Tables 5 and 6 demonstrate the impacts of repeated-flooding on three asset 
categories: changes in agricultural and other business asset, agricultural input asset value and 
consumer durable asset value for both affected (treatment) groups. We do not observe much 
contrast in these categories though. The rainfall-based flood affected group (treatment group 
A) observe negative impacts (although not statistically significant) on change in agricultural 
and other business asset (by BDT 6,144) while self-reported treatment group (treatment 
group B) reveal significant negative impacts (by BDT 103,611) in similar category quite 
consistent with previous evidences on asset categories (e.g. Mogues, 2011; Anttila-Hughes 
                                                             
70 Ibid. 
71 The difference across various quintiles among expenditure categories between the two treatment groups 
could again possibly be explained through the presence of household heterogeneity issues in our benchmark 
quantile estimation (equation 2).  
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and Hsiang, 2013). The noticeable aspect to note here is that the impact on the self-reported 
group is BDT 97,467 more compared to the non-self-reported one. Nevertheless, treatment 
group B reveals significant positive impact on agricultural input asset value compared to a 
negative value for treatment group A in this category.  
 
4.5.4 LABOUR MARKET 
We present impacts on labour market for both treatment group – A and B in tables 7 
and 8 sequentially. Daily wages are not found to be severely affected in both treatment 
groups (positive impact) with statistical significance for self-reported treatment case (by BDT 
101). This somewhat been justified in some previous empirical researches (e.g. Shah and 
Steinberg, 2012; Banerjee, 2007).72 Interestingly, salaried wage seems 7 percent higher 
compared to the mean (i.e. by BDT 3,894) in treatment group B with 1 percent drop 
(compared to the mean) for treatment group A (but in this case without statistical 
significance). This result is also partially found consistent with the findings of Mueller and 
Quisumbing (2011). We also observe a contrast in estimates of yearly benefits for both 
treatment group.  
 
4.6        ROBUSTNESS CHECKS 
As robustness checks, we further examine these impacts by estimating a semi-
logarithmic regression model (as specified in equation 3) and compare the results with our 
benchmark estimation results. In the income category, we observe significantly negative 
impact on total income (drop by BDT 28,078 compared to the mean) for treatment group A 
(rainfall-based). The interesting thing to note here is that treatment group B (self-reported) 
experiences an additional total income decline of BDT 52,581 more (and is significant) 
compared to the non-self-reported one. Most of this excess decline (approximately BDT 
29,442) resulted from crop income for the self-reported treatment group B. However, 
treatment group A experience a significant drop of BDT 6,572 on average in the non-crop 
                                                             
72 Banerjee (2007) find that floods have positive implications for wages in the long run. Interestingly, Mueller 
and Osgood (2009) reveal that droughts have significant negative impacts on rural wages in the long run. We 
are quite agnostic on the general implications of natural disasters on wages due to limitations in this study.   
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income category. Business income in both treatment groups reveals positive impact (with 
statistical significance in treatment group A) being consistent with our prior estimations. We 
observe a significant increase of BDT 13,030 on average for treatment group A in business 
income category. The other income category also reveals a significant increase of BDT 4,146 
more (compared to the mean) for rainfall-based treatment group A compared to the self-
reported one (treatment group B).  
We find consistent patterns in total expenditure category in the semi-logarithmic 
regression results compare to our baseline model specifications. Similar to total income 
patterns, the self-reported treatment group B experience an average decline in total 
expenditure by BDT 46,551 more compared to treatment group A (rainfall-based). The self-
reported treatment group reported an additional decline of BDT 8,694 on average in non-crop 
expenditure due to flood compared to the non-self-reported one. The difference in our focal 
categories (i.e. crop expenditure and agricultural input expenditure) is strikingly more in 
agricultural input expenditure for treatment group B (drop by BDT 25,761 on average) 
compared to treatment group A. Although educational and health expenditure reveals a 
significantly positive impact, the difference is not too high between the two treatment groups 
compared to the mean. The food and non-food expenditure categories display significantly 
declines for both rainfall-based and self-reported treatment cases. Despite households 
experience significant decline in food and non-food expenditure, flood impacts are reported 
much higher by the self-reported treatment group B (drop by BDT 15,288 more on average) 
in non-food expenditure category compared to rainfall-based treatment group A.  
The impacts on agricultural input asset value show significantly negative impacts for 
both treatment cases in our semi-logarithmic regression results. The noticeable aspect here 
is that the self-reported treatment group reveals an excess decline of BDT 31,626 in 
agricultural input asset value compared to the non-self-reported one. The category on 
consumer durable asset value also illustrate significant negative impacts in both treatment 
cases. Treatment group A experience a significant average decline of BDT 16, 0108 which is 
comparatively higher than for treatment group B (self-reported).  
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4.7         CONCLUSION 
Our objective in this paper is to estimate the impacts of recurrent flooding on income, 
expenditure, asset and labour market outcomes. We start with identification of the treatment 
(affected) groups with setting two benchmarks i.e. using self- and non-self-reported 
(historical rainfall data based flood risk index) information. We employ a difference-in-
difference estimation model to understand the impacts of disaster on households surveyed 
on and before year 2010 (defined as post). Our results suggest a sharp decline in agricultural 
income (crop and non-crop) for both treatment group – A (rainfall-based) and B (self-
reported). This significant decline in agricultural income, being consistent with previous 
literatures reveals a clear message on timely adoption of insurance in the context of increased 
climatic threat to achieve sustainable poverty goals for the ultra-poor especially in 
agriculture-based economy like Bangladesh. As per expenditure in concerned, we also 
observe a negative response to crop and agricultural input expenditure consistent with our 
theoretical prior in both treatment cases.  
We extend our analysis for income and expenditure categories for households of 
various socio-economic backgrounds. We find a contrast in terms of impact for the ultra 
(bottom 15 percent) poor in total income and expenditure between treatment group – A and 
B. We also observe a contrast in educational and health expenditures for both non-self and 
self-reported treatment group. We further strengthen our results using semi-logarithmic 
regression model as robustness checks and observe consistencies in most cases with our 
benchmark estimation results. 
 The ‘disaster-development’ literature has made considerably less progress on the use 
of shock modules to empirically estimate the impacts of natural disasters on development 
outcomes. The recent addition of shock questionnaires in nationally representative 
household income and expenditure surveys provides an ample scope to identify the self-
reported affected groups in repeated natural disasters. This self-identification in the 
questionnaire could be advantageous to capture the disaster impacts on households’ more 
precisely when compared to index-based identifications based on geographical exposure. 
However, questions’ based on ‘yes/no’ responses (i.e. close-ended) might not be sufficient to 
identify the true development impacts. The selection of the respondents (sample) in this 
particular set of questionnaire (shock questions on natural disasters) is also questionable 
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depending on criteria.73 There is an obvious need to employ both qualitative and quantitative 
techniques to understand the degrees of experience in impact analysis.74  
 We do not rule out the fact that the dissimilarities in our results in two benchmark 
treatment cases might also be due to absence of shock modules in self-reported treatment 
group (treatment group B) in years 2000 and 2005 in the household data that we use. One 
possible solution is of course, more respondents in addition to incorporating degrees of actual 
hazard awareness, experience and preparedness questions’ to identify the real affected group 
in repeated natural shocks. However, the evidences and the novel approach that we adopt in 
this paper could justify future research in estimating welfare adaptation costs of climate-
induced persistent natural events in developing countries.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                             
73 See Hawkes and Rowe (2008).  
74 See Bird (2009).  
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     FIGURE 1: PRE-TREATMENT TRENDS OF PER CAPITA TOTAL INCOME (TREATMENT GROUP A) 
 
 
     FIGURE 2: PRE-TREATMENT TRENDS OF PER CAPITA TOTAL INCOME (TREATMENT GROUP B) 
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     FIGURE 3: PRE-TREATMENT TRENDS OF PER CAPITA TOTAL EXPENDITURE (TREATMENT GROUP A)
 
 
    FIGURE 4: PRE-TREATMENT TRENDS OF PER CAPITA TOTAL EXPENDITURE (TREATMENT GROUP B)
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    TABLE 1: IMPACT ON HOUSEHOLD INCOME PER CAPITA (TREATMENT GROUP A: RAINFALL-BASED FLOOD AFFECTED GROUP) 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
VARIABLES TOTAL INCOME CROP INCOME NON-CROP INCOME BUSINESS INCOME OTHER INCOME 
      
POST (YEAR 2010) 173,513.18*** 49,542.34*** 60,365.63*** 61,746.82*** -8,946.92*** 
 (11,755.80) (3,754.90) (5,937.03) (8,236.91) (3,243.78) 
TREATMENT GROUP A 11,237.98** 3,334.38*** 708.17 1,650.77** 5,431.69 
 (4,902.10) (508.65) (1,565.30) (791.68) (4,618.95) 
POST * TREATMENT GROUP A -17,806.84 -7,427.99*** -11,700.08 4,882.17 -2,494.28 
 (18,374.86) (2,615.96) (15,711.15) (8,503.48) (4,706.93) 
RURAL -1,630.66 2,627.40* 5,300.90 -7,793.94** -3,571.06*** 
 (7,084.05) (1,446.14) (7,041.19) (3,954.21) (828.62) 
MALE HOUSEHOLD HEAD 108,945.46*** 5,148.74*** 157,383.63*** 1,519.88 -16,245.62*** 
 (16,197.13) (582.16) (20,503.23) (2,706.72) (2,505.51) 
AVERAGE AGE 2,315.59*** 283.44*** 1,556.93*** 824.99*** 336.68** 
 (180.45) (26.78) (119.46) (63.94) (147.27) 
DEPENDENT 7,864.25*** 1,256.42*** 2,049.30*** 4,570.11*** -10.29 
 (122.40) (39.53) (55.94) (89.85) (17.64) 
PROPORTION_FORMAL 
EDUCATION 
20,985.31*** 6,013.26*** -6,028.35 15,674.08*** 13,960.31*** 
 (5,623.03) (1,064.36) (4,323.55) (3,171.69) (3,118.61) 
ACCESS TO SANITATION 27,257.80*** 3,278.84*** 9,958.72* 5,823.20* 11,177.45*** 
 (6,113.44) (1,145.45) (5,794.88) (3,353.51) (525.85) 
ACCESS TO DRINKING WATER 10,073.11 -2,377.53 3,013.07 11,685.06 1,266.68 
 (14,602.87) (3,066.21) (14,685.96) (7,606.62) (1,013.41) 
ACCESS TO ELECTRICITY 13,288.81** 2,802.05** -3,369.29 4,512.12 10,477.40*** 
 (6,679.32) (1,202.26) (6,473.20) (3,521.21) (503.88) 
HOUSE OWNERSHIP 9,691.26 1,710.23 7,507.14 -2,791.68 3,013.80 
 (8,678.10) (1,961.60) (9,530.13) (5,167.52) (2,422.80) 
LAND OWNERSHIP 67.66* 54.50*** -17.08 12.62 18.75*** 
 (37.87) (8.81) (30.92) (19.14) (3.39) 
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YEAR_2005 -869.04 822.97 3,848.34 8,108.52*** -3,604.57*** 
 (2,906.62) (713.53) (2,423.27) (2,558.31) (979.61) 
YEAR2005 * TREATMENT GROUP 
A 
-6,838.77 -2,268.54** -530.05 -953.83 -4,519.26 
 (5,382.66) (884.05) (2,106.37) (3,073.81) (4,774.07) 
CONSTANT -194,510.80*** -16,803.71*** -204,620.98*** -37,911.90*** 5,233.63 
 (24,052.42) (3,899.24) (27,747.18) (9,572.22) (4,233.48) 
      
OBSERVATIONS 26,158 19,866 23,452 21,285 26,145 
R-SQUARED 0.55 0.59 0.10 0.58 0.03 
  Source: Author’s calculations. 
  Note: Robust standard errors in parentheses *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.  
  
 
      TABLE 2: IMPACT ON HOUSEHOLD INCOME PER CAPITA (TREATMENT GROUP B: SELF-REPORTED FLOOD AFFECTED GROUP) 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
VARIABLES TOTAL INCOME CROP INCOME NON-CROP INCOME BUSINESS INCOME OTHER INCOME 
      
POST (YEAR 2010) 174,941.92*** 48,880.68*** 75,981.24*** 49,576.85*** -9,530.30*** 
 (14,587.51) (3,940.08) (10,370.98) (9,007.10) (3,233.50) 
TREATMENT GROUP B 11,227.45** 3,330.21*** 666.64 1,683.56** 5,436.30 
 (4,901.54) (508.68) (1,566.91) (790.73) (4,619.02) 
POST * TREATMENT GROUP B -14,430.78 -2,868.78* -26,643.73** 18,588.52*** -4,091.70 
 (12,744.96) (1,738.30) (10,800.95) (4,875.60) (4,737.34) 
RURAL -1,637.52 2,627.25* 5,157.57 -7,679.24* -3,568.37*** 
 (7,082.60) (1,446.77) (7,034.98) (3,951.35) (829.35) 
MALE HOUSEHOLD HEAD 109,047.11*** 5,143.77*** 158,160.77*** 419.32 -16,289.08*** 
 (16,154.64) (585.46) (20,533.96) (2,729.62) (2,501.01) 
AVERAGE AGE 2,316.81*** 283.24*** 1,567.22*** 813.35*** 336.16** 
 (181.05) (26.66) (121.47) (63.97) (147.27) 
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DEPENDENT 7,861.43*** 1,256.68*** 2,023.99*** 4,587.87*** -9.11 
 (121.31) (39.67) (52.23) (91.23) (17.70) 
PROPORTION_FORMAL 
EDUCATION 
20,858.85*** 5,932.07*** -6,276.88 15,849.03*** 14,016.76*** 
 (5,608.17) (1,063.73) (4,299.89) (3,169.94) (3,120.47) 
ACCESS TO SANITATION 27,358.48*** 3,377.36*** 10,005.34* 5,830.28* 11,131.83*** 
 (6,130.09) (1,144.19) (5,815.42) (3,348.83) (528.54) 
ACCESS TO DRINKING WATER 10,479.83 -2,094.55 4,119.71 10,856.93 1,085.87 
 (14,556.44) (3,061.19) (14,611.56) (7,609.95) (1,013.53) 
ACCESS TO ELECTRICITY 13,363.78** 2,859.13** -3,202.78 4,406.94 10,443.99*** 
 (6,650.47) (1,201.57) (6,431.59) (3,520.37) (505.49) 
HOUSE OWNERSHIP 9,680.57 1,697.73 7,340.82 -2,688.16 3,018.32 
 (8,676.43) (1,963.13) (9,521.82) (5,159.27) (2,422.85) 
LAND OWNERSHIP 66.78* 54.02*** -18.89 13.75 19.14*** 
 (37.80) (8.79) (30.85) (19.13) (3.38) 
YEAR_2005 -906.35 799.36 3,819.09 8,160.95*** -3,587.77*** 
 (2,901.95) (713.60) (2,421.78) (2,557.57) (979.19) 
YEAR2005 * TREATMENT GROUP 
B 
-6,832.13 -2,262.79** -523.09 -972.75 -4,522.29 
 (5,382.82) (884.17) (2,111.24) (3,073.43) (4,774.18) 
CONSTANT -195,001.90*** -17,061.08*** -206,287.26*** -36,064.98*** 5,450.69 
 (24,029.19) (3,884.59) (27,789.04) (9,590.04) (4,229.92) 
      
OBSERVATIONS 26,158 19,866 23,452 21,285 26,145 
R-SQUARED 0.55 0.59 0.10 0.58 0.03 
  Source: Author’s calculations. 
  Note: Robust standard errors in parentheses *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.  
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      TABLE 3: IMPACT ON HOUSEHOLD EXPENDITURE PER CAPITA (TREATMENT GROUP A: RAINFALL-BASED FLOOD AFFECTED GROUP) 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
VARIABLES TOTAL 
EXPENDITURE 
FOOD 
EXPENDITURE 
NON-FOOD 
EXPENDITURE 
CROP 
EXPENDITURE 
NON-CROP 
EXPENDITURE 
AGRICULTURAL 
INPUT 
EXPENDITURE 
EDUCATIONAL 
EXPENDITURE 
HEALTH 
EXPENDITURE 
         
POST (YEAR 2010) 274,945.97*** 13,723.54*** 168,901.32*** 8,831.07*** 10,815.29*** 38,703.29*** 25,347.28*** 2,010.88*** 
 (9,827.20) (389.92) (5,865.01) (1,071.72) (2,079.96) (3,135.96) (1,517.75) (345.59) 
TREATMENT GROUP A 6,165.10*** 94.14** 1,803.31*** 635.98*** 291.67* 3,106.56*** 105.73 -159.04*** 
 (1,207.62) (42.83) (677.01) (211.81) (172.12) (693.20) (157.85) (40.28) 
POST * TREATMENT 
GROUP A 
-22,007.22** -289.68 -8,490.77 -1,752.97 178.26 -10,526.75*** -665.00 310.01 
 (9,094.54) (316.69) (5,635.41) (1,227.00) (1,373.07) (3,398.52) (1,522.67) (411.21) 
RURAL -1,949.62 -198.61* -4,002.73* 361.98 881.22* 1,601.51 -1,914.44*** 276.28* 
 (3,352.70) (120.52) (2,065.28) (611.84) (497.52) (1,620.47) (680.42) (167.74) 
MALE HOUSEHOLD HEAD 26,166.63*** 499.81*** 2,138.11*** 7,083.41*** 3,800.63*** 38,681.53*** -660.34 278.42*** 
 (3,539.30) (94.50) (827.96) (833.64) (452.37) (4,681.05) (540.65) (53.27) 
AVERAGE AGE 1,845.25*** 89.95*** 893.38*** 266.95*** 176.28*** 724.06*** 305.86*** 5.02*** 
 (52.56) (2.08) (29.28) (11.23) (7.53) (33.91) (21.01) (1.87) 
DEPENDENT 12,688.46*** 796.89*** 6,274.01*** 1,016.79*** 871.56*** 2,648.68*** 988.69*** 100.23*** 
 (107.84) (4.05) (64.62) (11.81) (22.19) (34.97) (15.47) (3.05) 
PROPORTION_FORMAL 
EDUCATION 
16,871.00*** 457.77*** 7,190.63*** 2,306.37*** 1,315.42*** 3,955.60*** 3,912.70*** 455.79*** 
 (2,335.68) (80.35) (1,405.65) (367.19) (329.55) (1,234.88) (522.10) (117.78) 
ACCESS TO SANITATION 8,224.81*** -47.67 3,611.59* 547.09 1,006.50** 4,259.28*** 377.89 -212.31 
 (3,122.89) (110.91) (1,930.99) (498.22) (459.51) (1,371.73) (616.26) (155.74) 
ACCESS TO DRINKING 
WATER 
5,722.34 214.29 2,291.20 1,717.08 846.83 1,289.88 251.93 182.42 
 (7,594.16) (254.14) (4,612.08) (1,236.52) (1,325.04) (3,519.14) (1,709.64) (362.02) 
ACCESS TO ELECTRICITY 11,716.31*** 560.80*** 8,965.72*** 834.00 560.64 -68.49 1,186.30* 271.41 
 (3,235.46) (113.91) (1,991.60) (509.83) (472.92) (1,456.61) (640.86) (169.44) 
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HOUSE OWNERSHIP 2,671.88 -177.80 319.42 1,435.57 1,082.48 1,441.48 -1,649.23* 204.32 
 (4,251.99) (152.74) (2,620.99) (890.82) (729.28) (2,231.17) (913.79) (190.37) 
LAND OWNERSHIP 127.82*** 1.71** 27.22** 20.42*** 12.02*** 59.18*** 8.14** -0.41 
 (22.30) (0.70) (12.58) (3.40) (2.86) (9.81) (3.65) (0.70) 
YEAR_2005 -9,626.51*** 104.27** -5,853.02*** -319.65 -1,174.67*** 319.81 -258.10 85.16 
 (1,355.62) (50.62) (774.13) (239.07) (197.42) (694.19) (269.39) (70.70) 
YEAR2005 * 
TREATMENT GROUP A 
-3,380.24** -5.19 -1,037.81 200.92 124.81 -1,844.22** 180.94 121.66** 
 (1,411.98) (50.63) (785.47) (291.83) (198.90) (940.37) (259.55) (57.30) 
CONSTANT -99,469.00*** -4,260.60*** -35,948.64*** -16,407.09*** -11,178.54*** -64,072.25*** -7,028.34*** -1,069.70*** 
 (9,386.58) (311.19) (5,257.11) (1,731.98) (1,532.03) (6,379.58) (2,025.19) (378.96) 
         
OBSERVATIONS 26,162 26,162 26,148 19,866 23,452 20,757 21,226 20,041 
R-SQUARED 0.93 0.97 0.90 0.74 0.71 0.74 0.70 0.26 
 Source: Author’s calculations. 
 Note: Robust standard errors in parentheses *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.  
 
TABLE 4: IMPACT ON HOUSEHOLD EXPENDITURE PER CAPITA (TREATMENT GROUP B: SELF-REPORTED FLOOD AFFECTED GROUP) 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
VARIABLES TOTAL 
EXPENDITURE 
FOOD 
EXPENDITURE 
NON-FOOD 
EXPENDITURE 
CROP 
EXPENDITURE 
NON-CROP 
EXPENDITURE 
AGRICULTURAL 
INPUT 
EXPENDITURE 
EDUCATIONAL 
EXPENDITURE 
HEALTH 
EXPENDITURE 
         
POST (YEAR 2010) 265,149.75*** 12,637.44*** 162,053.02*** 10,003.20*** 10,786.41*** 36,939.44*** 23,847.92*** 2,559.69*** 
 (10,287.16) (417.44) (6,296.24) (1,088.48) (2,351.64) (3,175.90) (1,549.01) (476.22) 
TREATMENT GROUP B 6,162.48*** 95.77** 1,806.87*** 632.16*** 292.28* 3,101.46*** 108.78 -159.86*** 
 (1,207.95) (42.82) (677.07) (212.11) (172.09) (693.26) (157.63) (40.29) 
POST * TREATMENT 
GROUP B 
7,067.58 1,594.94*** 8,071.29** -2,613.12*** -182.37 -1,391.21 2,188.68** -688.81*** 
 (5,639.15) (201.67) (3,465.59) (747.09) (810.32) (2,153.44) (923.48) (250.67) 
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RURAL -1,870.25 -190.64 -3,949.59* 346.87 881.98* 1,612.92 -1,900.75*** 271.18 
 (3,351.87) (120.17) (2,064.57) (611.54) (497.68) (1,620.78) (680.22) (167.43) 
MALE HOUSEHOLD HEAD 25,931.90*** 462.00*** 1,940.77** 7,203.63*** 3,795.67*** 38,651.50*** -740.45 313.26*** 
 (3,498.89) (90.09) (813.89) (846.47) (450.76) (4,660.32) (538.91) (55.56) 
AVERAGE AGE 1,841.81*** 89.44*** 890.61*** 268.15*** 176.22*** 723.23*** 303.71*** 5.52*** 
 (52.47) (2.07) (29.27) (11.31) (7.46) (33.84) (20.84) (1.81) 
DEPENDENT 12,700.11*** 798.38*** 6,282.70*** 1,014.71*** 871.69*** 2,650.21*** 990.70*** 99.49*** 
 (108.19) (4.06) (65.07) (11.69) (22.52) (34.67) (15.47) (3.20) 
PROPORTION_FORMAL 
EDUCATION 
16,597.94*** 456.73*** 7,081.84*** 2,280.32*** 1,324.83*** 3,805.64*** 3,916.31*** 457.03*** 
 (2,334.34) (80.10) (1,404.56) (367.27) (328.89) (1,233.69) (521.59) (117.23) 
ACCESS TO SANITATION 8,598.21*** -33.53 3,796.13** 557.36 997.88** 4,441.13*** 407.43 -222.41 
 (3,120.44) (110.69) (1,929.82) (498.05) (459.72) (1,368.23) (617.60) (156.36) 
ACCESS TO DRINKING 
WATER 
6,400.27 200.67 2,516.40 1,834.14 816.03 1,776.98 249.89 187.42 
 (7,612.35) (254.92) (4,618.95) (1,229.70) (1,318.13) (3,515.07) (1,704.85) (358.61) 
ACCESS TO ELECTRICITY 11,874.90*** 561.13*** 9,028.13*** 853.13* 554.82 28.58 1,190.76* 270.61 
 (3,235.28) (113.54) (1,990.29) (509.07) (473.13) (1,458.04) (639.65) (168.84) 
HOUSE OWNERSHIP 2,713.47 -172.36 350.82 1,418.25 1,084.03 1,427.99 -1,639.97* 200.78 
 (4,249.44) (151.95) (2,618.89) (890.65) (729.03) (2,232.07) (913.25) (190.11) 
LAND OWNERSHIP 126.08*** 1.72** 26.57** 20.25*** 12.08*** 58.31*** 8.11** -0.41 
 (22.25) (0.70) (12.55) (3.38) (2.86) (9.78) (3.63) (0.71) 
YEAR_2005 -9,733.49*** 101.69** -5,901.85*** -325.81 -1,172.06*** 281.37 -265.81 87.59 
 (1,355.64) (50.48) (774.08) (239.50) (197.35) (694.14) (269.26) (70.70) 
YEAR2005 * 
TREATMENT GROUP B 
-3,359.16** -4.54 -1,027.83 203.14 123.96 -1,832.19* 183.14 121.27** 
 (1,412.45) (50.58) (785.56) (292.32) (198.89) (940.46) (259.36) (57.34) 
CONSTANT -99,987.94*** -4,218.69*** -36,032.43*** -16,625.41*** -11,145.19*** -64,508.80*** -6,938.28*** -1,107.85*** 
 (9,382.26) (310.27) (5,257.48) (1,735.95) (1,528.49) (6,360.11) (2,021.18) (380.21) 
OBSERVATIONS 26,162 26,162 26,148 19,866 23,452 20,757 21,226 20,041 
R-SQUARED 0.93 0.97 0.90 0.74 0.71 0.74 0.70 0.26 
 Source: Author’s calculations. 
 Note: Robust standard errors in parentheses *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.  
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                                         TABLE 5: IMPACT ON TOTAL ASSET OUTCOMES (TREATMENT GROUP A: RAINFALL-BASED FLOOD AFFECTED GROUP) 
 (1) (2) (3) 
VARIABLES TOTAL CHANGE IN 
AGRICULTURAL AND 
OTHER BUSINESS ASSET  
TOTAL AGRICULTURAL 
INPUT ASSET VALUE 
TOTAL CONSUMER DURABLE  
ASSET VALUE 
    
POST (YEAR 2010) -24,575.16** -21,782.69*** 699,645.49*** 
 (11,627.68) (5,580.80) (30,193.69) 
TREATMENT GROUP A 2,215.49 2,906.11** 28,004.98*** 
 (1,418.26) (1,305.49) (3,783.79) 
POST * TREATMENT GROUP A -6,144.23 -9,866.73 -29,369.54 
 (14,637.09) (6,665.00) (37,593.50) 
RURAL -15,002.08** -6.50 -41,995.48*** 
 (6,998.56) (3,678.55) (14,171.84) 
MALE HOUSEHOLD HEAD 3,328.83*** 10,817.53*** 33,480.03*** 
 (1,098.97) (1,057.23) (5,701.04) 
AVERAGE AGE 628.46*** 234.00*** 3,330.81*** 
 (128.51) (58.88) (166.11) 
DEPENDENT 2,278.04*** 2,734.02*** 25,258.75*** 
 (136.91) (64.66) (332.34) 
PROPORTION_FORMAL 
EDUCATION 
4,585.75 13,888.43*** 34,540.15*** 
 (4,537.68) (2,927.93) (9,267.88) 
ACCESS TO SANITATION 3,762.83 1,756.99 36,735.69*** 
 (5,968.49) (3,250.93) (12,854.83) 
ACCESS TO DRINKING WATER -23,795.35 2,442.58 -58,753.10 
 (17,890.77) (7,733.67) (36,325.16) 
ACCESS TO ELECTRICITY -4,866.77 2,751.39 23,898.82* 
 (6,187.89) (3,362.34) (13,536.43) 
HOUSE OWNERSHIP 8,119.07 11,029.83** -10,849.16 
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 (9,297.59) (4,703.64) (18,309.79) 
LAND OWNERSHIP 42.35 43.48** 141.18 
 (45.96) (20.11) (106.11) 
YEAR_2005 -898.89 3,254.94* -23,834.66*** 
 (2,155.10) (1,884.39) (5,031.14) 
YEAR2005 * TREATMENT 
GROUP A 
1,842.43 -3,476.79 -20,159.09*** 
 (2,718.88) (2,389.55) (4,336.77) 
CONSTANT 3,360.49 -35,550.45*** -76,309.11* 
 (19,755.20) (9,047.27) (40,505.33) 
OBSERVATIONS 21,285 19,455 26,077 
R-SQUARED 0.06 0.29 0.76 
                                                 Source: Author’s calculations. 
                                               Note: Robust standard errors in parentheses *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. 
 
 
 TABLE 6: IMPACT ON TOTAL ASSET OUTCOMES (TREATMENT GROUP B: SELF-REPORTED FLOOD AFFECTED GROUP) 
 (1) (2) (3) 
VARIABLES TOTAL CHANGE IN 
AGRICULTURAL AND 
OTHER BUSINESS ASSET  
TOTAL 
AGRICULTURAL INPUT 
ASSET VALUE 
TOTAL CONSUMER 
DURABLE  
ASSET VALUE 
    
POST (YEAR 2010) 39,014.03*** -33,118.44*** 787,048.50*** 
 (12,312.88) (6,703.46) (34,962.38) 
TREATMENT GROUP B 2,081.67 2,921.69** 27,852.68*** 
 (1,417.51) (1,305.09) (3,782.49) 
POST * TREATMENT GROUP B -103,610.87*** 14,088.17*** -166,368.01*** 
 (9,714.95) (4,442.57) (24,776.12) 
RURAL -15,610.62** 111.53 -42,629.63*** 
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 (6,967.65) (3,677.45) (14,154.10) 
MALE HOUSEHOLD HEAD 8,650.43*** 9,773.22*** 36,666.23*** 
 (1,219.68) (1,045.37) (6,043.68) 
AVERAGE AGE 686.10*** 222.15*** 3,373.24*** 
 (129.49) (58.88) (168.01) 
DEPENDENT 2,188.95*** 2,748.97*** 25,136.90*** 
 (132.69) (66.11) (331.52) 
PROPORTION_FORMAL 
EDUCATION 
4,307.66 13,763.97*** 34,304.66*** 
 (4,502.87) (2,925.55) (9,251.67) 
ACCESS TO SANITATION 3,078.17 2,066.00 35,895.94*** 
 (5,925.03) (3,248.69) (12,832.96) 
ACCESS TO DRINKING WATER -21,705.88 2,644.13 -56,673.77 
 (17,853.99) (7,720.74) (36,201.54) 
ACCESS TO ELECTRICITY -4,711.43 2,830.98 24,060.10* 
 (6,148.60) (3,359.83) (13,502.97) 
HOUSE OWNERSHIP 7,645.44 11,098.94** -11,298.19 
 (9,234.67) (4,704.59) (18,277.88) 
LAND OWNERSHIP 40.21 42.91** 138.46 
 (45.35) (20.09) (105.46) 
YEAR_2005 -914.85 3,203.97* -23,729.38*** 
 (2,141.20) (1,883.95) (5,025.26) 
YEAR2005 * TREATMENT GROUP B 1,837.03 -3,445.14 -20,191.93*** 
 (2,717.59) (2,389.22) (4,336.69) 
CONSTANT -3,683.68 -34,717.65*** -80,797.96** 
 (19,741.35) (9,031.38) (40,441.53) 
OBSERVATIONS 21,285 19,455 26,077 
R-SQUARED 0.07 0.29 0.76 
                                              Source: Author’s calculations. 
                                                  Note: Robust standard errors in parentheses *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. 
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                  TABLE 7: IMPACT ON LABOUR MARKET OUTCOMES (TREATMENT GROUP A: RAINFALL-BASED FLOOD AFFECTED GROUP) 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
VARIABLES TOTAL 
MONTH PER 
YEAR 
TOTAL DAYS 
PER  MONTH 
TOTAL 
HOURS PER 
DAY 
DAILY WAGE SALARIED WAGE YEARLY BENEFITS 
       
POST (YEAR 2010) 70.51*** 156.70*** 58.07*** 392.73*** 1,290.62 -15,437.51*** 
 (3.01) (6.83) (2.30) (25.95) (1,095.69) (2,004.09) 
TREATMENT GROUP A 3.05*** 4.92*** 0.72* 6.36 -19.79 -243.70 
 (0.53) (1.22) (0.41) (5.22) (216.62) (462.62) 
POST * TREATMENT GROUP A -2.55 0.52 -0.75 10.58 -202.77 -2,360.76 
 (2.99) (7.05) (2.30) (29.80) (1,191.00) (2,416.49) 
RURAL 0.17 1.29 0.52 5.92 -722.84 -1,789.51 
 (1.13) (2.62) (0.85) (13.16) (542.63) (1,107.53) 
MALE HOUSEHOLD HEAD 9.47*** 25.85*** 9.82*** -92.65*** 4,641.64*** 11,768.02*** 
 (1.34) (3.54) (1.27) (17.11) (652.69) (1,569.76) 
AVERAGE AGE 0.96*** 2.14*** 0.68*** 4.23*** 259.70*** 416.91*** 
 (0.02) (0.06) (0.02) (0.27) (10.72) (23.64) 
DEPENDENT 8.04*** 17.91*** 6.16*** 39.57*** 1,100.74*** 1,561.88*** 
 (0.03) (0.08) (0.03) (0.29) (13.03) (22.50) 
PROPORTION_FORMAL 
EDUCATION 
6.47*** 13.54*** 3.16*** -62.23*** 5,274.34*** 8,855.72*** 
 (0.79) (1.85) (0.61) (9.57) (410.27) (1,034.96) 
ACCESS TO SANITATION -3.51*** -6.20*** -2.10*** -35.81*** -45.96 -1,902.14* 
 (1.03) (2.40) (0.78) (12.19) (502.32) (1,021.62) 
ACCESS TO DRINKING WATER -0.33 3.37 -0.01 -19.56 2,298.36* 2,528.27 
 (2.47) (5.76) (1.91) (29.27) (1,181.80) (2,439.49) 
ACCESS TO ELECTRICITY 3.07*** 6.62*** 1.81** 15.04 2,393.12*** 4,787.14*** 
 (1.07) (2.49) (0.81) (12.89) (533.11) (1,080.23) 
HOUSE OWNERSHIP -3.20** -8.67*** -2.96*** 3.29 -2,399.71*** -3,239.89** 
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 (1.39) (3.24) (1.05) (15.27) (642.38) (1,315.69) 
LAND OWNERSHIP 0.01* 0.03 0.01 -0.20*** 2.12 1.69 
 (0.01) (0.02) (0.01) (0.07) (2.66) (5.33) 
YEAR_2005 -1.18** -6.03*** -2.16*** 18.30*** 231.32 308.97 
 (0.55) (1.26) (0.43) (5.87) (234.58) (473.71) 
YEAR2005 * TREATMENT GROUP 
A 
-1.70*** 0.18 1.26*** -9.21 -459.43* 255.78 
 (0.62) (1.42) (0.48) (6.33) (275.44) (625.41) 
CONSTANT -32.24*** -76.49*** -24.10*** 36.96 -13,198.95*** -24,023.06*** 
 (3.15) (7.57) (2.55) (36.80) (1,485.32) (3,146.37) 
       
OBSERVATIONS 25,506 25,506 25,506 20,738 20,738 20,738 
R-SQUARED 0.97 0.97 0.97 0.88 0.76 0.56 
                       Source: Author’s calculations. 
                       Note: Robust standard errors in parentheses *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. 
 
 
 
                  TABLE 8: IMPACT ON LABOUR MARKET OUTCOMES (TREATMENT GROUP B: SELF-REPORTED FLOOD AFFECTED GROUP) 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
VARIABLES TOTAL 
MONTH PER 
YEAR 
TOTAL DAYS 
PER  MONTH 
TOTAL 
HOURS PER 
DAY 
DAILY WAGE SALARIED WAGE YEARLY BENEFITS 
       
POST (YEAR 2010) 53.46*** 120.79*** 46.35*** 326.20*** -1,180.90 -20,950.37*** 
 (3.12) (7.10) (2.34) (27.18) (1,192.58) (2,283.23) 
TREATMENT GROUP B 3.08*** 4.99*** 0.74* 6.57 -13.67 -234.27 
 (0.53) (1.22) (0.41) (5.22) (216.03) (461.40) 
POST * TREATMENT GROUP B 23.98*** 52.64*** 17.81*** 101.13*** 3,894.18*** 8,591.28*** 
 (1.81) (4.22) (1.38) (17.90) (751.68) (1,531.00) 
RURAL 0.30 1.57 0.61 6.56 -698.51 -1,734.03 
  
165 
 
 (1.11) (2.60) (0.85) (13.14) (542.03) (1,105.34) 
MALE HOUSEHOLD HEAD 8.59*** 23.94*** 9.22*** -97.71*** 4,464.26*** 11,398.44*** 
 (1.25) (3.33) (1.20) (17.59) (633.19) (1,526.12) 
AVERAGE AGE 0.95*** 2.12*** 0.67*** 4.15*** 256.92*** 411.11*** 
 (0.02) (0.06) (0.02) (0.27) (10.67) (23.34) 
DEPENDENT 8.06*** 17.96*** 6.17*** 39.66*** 1,104.15*** 1,569.22*** 
 (0.03) (0.08) (0.03) (0.29) (13.10) (22.68) 
PROPORTION_FORMAL EDUCATION 6.54*** 13.77*** 3.20*** -61.36*** 5,285.01*** 8,826.31*** 
 (0.79) (1.84) (0.60) (9.55) (409.22) (1,032.20) 
ACCESS TO SANITATION -3.34*** -5.92** -1.98** -35.36*** -10.41 -1,776.53* 
 (1.03) (2.38) (0.77) (12.17) (501.07) (1,018.73) 
ACCESS TO DRINKING WATER -0.75 2.22 -0.28 -22.73 2,243.35* 2,559.98 
 (2.45) (5.73) (1.90) (29.26) (1,179.10) (2,430.87) 
ACCESS TO ELECTRICITY 3.05*** 6.51*** 1.80** 14.72 2,392.89*** 4,815.43*** 
 (1.06) (2.47) (0.80) (12.87) (532.37) (1,078.38) 
HOUSE OWNERSHIP -3.11** -8.47*** -2.89*** 3.74 -2,383.17*** -3,203.86** 
 (1.37) (3.21) (1.04) (15.25) (640.81) (1,312.54) 
LAND OWNERSHIP 0.01** 0.03* 0.01 -0.19*** 2.15 1.51 
 (0.01) (0.02) (0.01) (0.07) (2.64) (5.28) 
YEAR_2005 -1.19** -6.03*** -2.17*** 18.29*** 224.58 278.09 
 (0.55) (1.25) (0.43) (5.88) (233.82) (471.71) 
YEAR2005 * TREATMENT GROUP B -1.68*** 0.20 1.27*** -9.22 -457.70* 265.41 
 (0.62) (1.41) (0.48) (6.34) (274.69) (623.88) 
CONSTANT -31.06*** -73.70*** -23.31*** 45.22 -12,965.60*** -23,684.80*** 
 (3.08) (7.41) (2.50) (37.04) (1,473.13) (3,116.12) 
       
OBSERVATIONS 25,506 25,506 25,506 20,738 20,738 20,738 
R-SQUARED 0.97 0.97 0.97 0.88 0.76 0.56 
                       Source: Author’s calculations. 
                       Note: Robust standard errors in parentheses *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. 
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    TABLE 9: IMPACT ON VARIOUS INCOME AND EXPENDITURE BRACKETS PER CAPITA (TREATMENT GROUP A: RAINFALL-BASED FLOOD AFFECTED GROUP) 
VARIABLES I 
15TH 
II 
25TH 
III 
50TH 
IV 
75TH 
V 
85TH 
INCOME      
      
TOTAL INCOME 152,021.83*** -572.46 -7,895.24*** -15,835.66* -40,390.71*** 
 (2,043.65) (1,311.80) (2,131.86) (9,262.68) (4,060.23) 
CROP INCOME -3,198.41*** -3,795.53*** -3,308.52*** -6,388.10*** -5,593.55*** 
 (383.72) (360.21) (619.48) (1,167.21) (1,935.75) 
NON-CROP INCOME 445,555.98*** 200.23 -2,709.12*** -7,398.63*** -9,205.69*** 
 (370.68) (227.58) (264.23) (473.76) (821.47) 
BUSINESS INCOME -555.30 4,047.79*** 635.15 -2,855.96 -3.86 
 (805.42) (833.85) (1,134.40) (1,898.68) (3,298.74) 
OTHER INCOME -33.74*** 133.20* 1,542.76*** 2,857.56*** 3,360.76*** 
 (0.66) (78.39) (224.47) (660.63) (1,175.64) 
      
EXPENDITURE      
      
TOTAL EXPENDITURE -19,911.78*** -40,648.91*** -49,033.41*** -25,161.09*** -40,409.66*** 
 (2,297.79) (2,125.93) (1,905.56) (2,127.35) (2,638.77) 
FOOD EXPENDITURE -473.48*** -225.12* -382.37*** -590.81*** -205.07*** 
 (151.18) (117.37) (92.81) (89.38) (74.68) 
NON-FOOD EXPENDITURE -1,220.43 -4,921.23*** -6,813.76*** -3,414.29*** -8,147.88*** 
 (995.42) (940.39) (964.61) (929.63) (1,257.81) 
CROP EXPENDITURE -870.66*** -1,594.03*** -2,603.85*** -2,163.09*** -671.60 
 (331.19) (329.33) (468.92) (556.44) (795.72) 
NON-CROP EXPENDITURE -940.27*** -1,118.04*** -603.65*** -324.51 -2,049.00*** 
 (178.68) (161.28) (195.40) (296.19) (496.29) 
AGRICULTURAL INPUT -6,964.92*** -7,551.65*** -9,123.63*** -6,533.64*** -8,872.74*** 
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EXPENDITURE 
 (578.74) (604.57) (606.67) (1,021.10) (1,345.61) 
EDUCATIONAL EXPENDITURE -185.82 -596.55** 249.69 -1,100.02*** -2,981.39*** 
 (222.97) (264.17) (287.57) (375.79) (438.90) 
HEALTH EXPENDITURE 9.08 -22.91 -14.16 -111.10** 132.58 
 (23.49) (25.78) (25.06) (54.97) (88.96) 
                 Source: Author’s calculations. 
        Notes: a This table only presents the coefficient estimates for the Post*Treatment Group A variable, our main estimated parameter. All other 
controls were included in these regressions, however, and are not presented because of space constraints. Full results are available upon 
request. 
 b Robust standard errors in parentheses *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. 
 
 
    TABLE 10: IMPACT ON VARIOUS INCOME AND EXPENDITURE BRACKETS PER CAPITA (TREATMENT GROUP B: SELF-REPORTED FLOOD AFFECTED GROUP) 
VARIABLES I 
15TH 
II 
25TH 
III 
50TH 
IV 
75TH 
V 
85TH 
INCOME      
      
TOTAL INCOME -10,148.74*** -13,463.04*** 15,987.59*** 47,715.77*** 89,658.70*** 
 (1,180.19) (1,135.27) (1,751.44) (2,402.18) (3,301.30) 
CROP INCOME 3,259.10*** 4,919.58*** -4,849.77*** -14,434.85*** -21,142.78*** 
 (261.13) (288.23) (546.27) (923.53) (1,589.63) 
NON-CROP INCOME 10,858.02*** 3,373.86*** 2,681.22*** -75,458.03*** 62,379.60*** 
 (178.22) (192.40) (219.15) (693.16) (705.25) 
BUSINESS INCOME -319,521.66*** -30,000.50*** -26,655.15*** -50.36 30,561.53*** 
 (77,899.91) (741.29) (957.84) (1,557.96) (2,487.58) 
OTHER INCOME -28.61*** -150.94*** -351.81* -87.66 -1,098.86 
 (0.44) (54.19) (213.86) (521.90) (1,020.38) 
      
EXPENDITURE      
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TOTAL EXPENDITURE 65,126.04*** -301,631.73*** 326,400.32*** -44,274.31*** -47,967.13*** 
 (1,685.49) (1,939.23) (1,657.72) (1,673.07) (2,174.96) 
FOOD EXPENDITURE 2,352.46*** 2,162.76*** 815.03*** 754.29*** 1,974.11*** 
 (105.58) (101.78) (82.08) (70.99) (67.29) 
NON-FOOD EXPENDITURE 28,503.82*** 17,501.96*** -34,523.00*** 5,224.30*** -27,610.97*** 
 (861.22) (803.72) (857.43) (755.39) (962.25) 
CROP EXPENDITURE -3,521.57*** -182.49 478.49 118.26 -3,564.41*** 
 (266.82) (271.01) (411.19) (499.72) (653.23) 
NON-CROP EXPENDITURE -4,133.14*** -3,969.57*** 2,655.39*** 3,909.25*** 9,722.32*** 
 (142.20) (132.51) (165.48) (243.52) (407.32) 
AGRICULTURAL INPUT 
EXPENDITURE 
13,327.75*** 8,584.68*** 2,249.37*** -9,722.74*** -45,470.77*** 
 (447.95) (519.94) (537.37) (871.71) (1,127.26) 
EDUCATIONAL EXPENDITURE 3,521.72*** -214.33 -2,261.07*** 2,731.51*** 7,693.01*** 
 (195.74) (227.59) (234.07) (329.83) (384.41) 
HEALTH EXPENDITURE 372.00*** 358.85*** 126.77*** 318.98*** 1,843.89*** 
 (15.82) (19.33) (22.56) (42.09) (78.80) 
                 Source: Author’s calculations. 
        Notes: a This table only presents the coefficient estimates for the Post*Treatment Group B variable, our main estimated parameter. All other 
controls were   included in these regressions, however, and are not presented because of space constraints. Full results are available upon 
request. 
 b Robust standard errors in parentheses *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. 
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APPENDIX TABLE 1: KEY VARIABLES WITH DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS (TREATMENT AND CONTROL GROUP A: RAINFALL-BASED IDENTIFICATIONS) 
VARIABLES TYPE MEAN STANDARD DEVIATION DESCRIPTION OF VARIABLES 
OUTCOME VARIABLES   TREATMENT CONTROL TREATMENT CONTROL   
PER CAPITA TOTAL INCOME Continuous 122609.3 585579.1 350281.8 670960.9 Sum of per capita crop, non-crop, business and other incomes. 
PER CAPITA CROP INCOME Continuous 42914.52 134535.2 80916.75 109717 Per capita income earned through selling of crops. 
PER CAPITA NON-CROP INCOME Continuous 39591.31 175023.1 217985.1 470222.2 Per capita income earned through selling of livestock and 
poultry, livestock products, fish farming and fish capture and 
farm forestry. 
PER CAPITA BUSINESS INCOME Continuous 95109.46 362796.5 225754.1 329750.4 Per capita net revenues earned from non-agricultural 
enterprises and rental income from agricultural assets. 
PER CAPITA OTHER INCOME Continuous 15599.26 15401.97 84804.43 45366.48 Per capita income earned from other assets (e.g. stocks, bonds, 
jewellery etc.), rent, insurance, charity, gift, remittances, bank 
interest and social safety net. 
PER CAPITA TOTAL EXPENDITURE Continuous 163587.6 902204.4 451583.2 772266.5 Sum of per capita food, non-food, crop, non-crop, agricultural 
input, education and health expenditures. 
PER CAPITA FOOD EXPENDITURE Continuous 9428.717 53264.84 26657.94 44630.27 Per capita daily and weekly food consumption. 
PER CAPITA NON-FOOD 
EXPENDITURE 
Continuous 84195.85 464748.6 235125.7 404613.2 Per capita monthly and annual non-food consumption. 
PER CAPITA CROP EXPENDITURE Continuous 27164.83 82950.47 47425.52 59216.15 Per capita crop consumption by household. 
PER CAPITA NON-CROP 
EXPENDITURE 
Continuous 16060.38 64966.32 38283.58 56794.33 Per capita consumption of livestock and poultry, livestock 
products, fish farming and fish capture and farm forestry 
products by household. 
PER CAPITA AGRICULTURAL INPUT 
EXPENDITURE 
Continuous 59887.13 216886.8 123287.5 165543.5 Per capita expenses on agricultural inputs. 
PER CAPITA EDUCATIONAL 
EXPENDITURE 
Continuous 20565.26 85667.89 47419.52 70960.43 Per capita expenditure for educational services. 
PER CAPITA HEALTH EXPENDITURE Continuous 2226.591 8581.544 7182.878 11793.97 Per capita expenditure for health services. 
TOTAL CHANGE IN AGRICULTURAL 
AND OTHER BUSINESS ASSET (IN 
REAL TERMS) 
Continuous 34085.83 137203.9 223634.9 435505.3 Sum of agricultural assets households bought in the last 12 
months and expenditure in capital goods (in non-agricultural 
enterprises) in the last 12 months. 
  
170 
 
TOTAL AGRICULTURAL INPUT ASSET 
VALUE (IN REAL TERMS) 
Continuous 58562.68 188197.2 147132 241979.5 Value of owned equipment and asset used in agriculture. 
TOTAL CONSUMER DURABLE ASSET 
VALUE (IN REAL TERMS) 
Continuous 351885.9 1888812 1016351 1830325 Total asset value of consumer durable goods. 
TOTAL MONTH PER YEAR WORKED Continuous 103.9289 517.5979 255.4481 417.7093 Total number of months per year worked. 
TOTAL DAYS PER MONTH WORKED Continuous 233.9744 1155.402 571.3488 932.6239 Total number of days per month worked. 
TOTAL HOURS PER DAY WORKED Continuous 80.24236 398.9724 196.6285 321.3238 Total number of hours per day worked. 
DAILY WAGE (IN REAL TERMS) Continuous 696.1671 2873.078 1489.233 2067.039 Daily wage in cash (if paid daily). 
SALARIED WAGE (IN REAL TERMS) Continuous 18725.12 77322.4 41691.76 61527.92 Total net take-home monthly remuneration after all deduction 
at source. 
YEARLY BENEFITS (IN REAL TERMS) Continuous 24275.35 98172.85 59626.65 95530.79 Total value of yearly in-kind or other benefits (tips, bonuses or 
transport) from employment. 
COVARIATES             
RURAL Binary 0.6362126 0.655756 0.4811085 0.475134 Whether living in a rural area = 1, otherwise 0. 
HEAD OF HOUSEHOLD IS MALE Binary 0.9127907 0.965463 0.2833284 0.196886 Whether head of the household is male = 1, otherwise 0. 
AVERAGE AGE Continuous 26.50556 26.54462 10.01851 6.61305 Average age of household members. 
DEPENDENT Continuous 11.15075 57.09819 28.11758 46.92759 Age of the household member is <15 and >=65. 
PROPORTION OF FORMAL 
EDUCATION 
Continuous 0.4785376 0.777077 0.3603159 0.34971 Proportion of household members attended school, college, 
university or madrasa. 
ACCESS TO SANITATION Binary 0.4536468 0.510949 0.4978674 0.499894 Whether the household use sanitary or pacca latrines (water 
seal and pit) = 1, otherwise 0. 
ACCESS TO SAFE DRINKING WATER Binary 0.9683555 0.965628 0.1750591 0.182188 Whether the household has access to supply water or tube well 
water = 1, otherwise 0. 
ACCESS TO ELECTRICITY Binary 0.4669435 0.505446 0.4989268 0.499984 Whether the household has got electricity connection = 1, 
otherwise 0. 
HOUSE OWNERSHIP Binary 0.8113631 0.833399 0.3912362 0.37263 Whether the household own a house = 1, otherwise 0. 
LAND OWNERSHIP (IN REAL TERMS) Continuous 12.07561 40.88366 67.71542 104.1996 Amount of total operating land (in acres). 
Source: Author’s elaborations. 
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APPENDIX TABLE 2: KEY VARIABLES WITH DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS (TREATMENT AND CONTROL GROUP B: SELF-REPORTED IDENTIFICATIONS) 
VARIABLES TYPE MEAN STANDARD DEVIATION DESCRIPTION OF VARIABLES 
OUTCOME VARIABLES   TREATMENT CONTROL TREATMENT CONTROL   
PER CAPITA TOTAL INCOME Continuous 373423.5 434201.8 536564 696302 Sum of per capita crop, non-crop, business and other incomes. 
PER CAPITA CROP INCOME Continuous 106895.8 110779.8 108175.3 113151.7 Per capita income earned through selling of crops. 
PER CAPITA NON-CROP INCOME Continuous 119383.3 142421.5 234059.7 561244.2 Per capita income earned through selling of livestock and 
poultry, livestock products, fish farming and fish capture and 
farm forestry. 
PER CAPITA BUSINESS INCOME Continuous 262397.1 285835.9 343133.1 295508.2 Per capita net revenues earned from non-agricultural 
enterprises and rental income from agricultural assets. 
PER CAPITA OTHER INCOME Continuous 16123.11 14555.04 78380.95 35069.85 Per capita income earned from other assets (e.g. stocks, bonds, 
jewellery etc.), rent, insurance, charity, gift, remittances, bank 
interest and social safety net. 
PER CAPITA TOTAL EXPENDITURE Continuous 565384 658288.1 743532.6 766395.6 Sum of per capita food, non-food, crop, non-crop, agricultural 
input, education and health expenditures. 
PER CAPITA FOOD EXPENDITURE Continuous 33397.13 38612.06 43509.96 44531.1 Per capita daily and weekly food consumption. 
PER CAPITA NON-FOOD 
EXPENDITURE 
Continuous 291933.9 338133.9 388660.5 398508.1 Per capita monthly and annual non-food consumption. 
PER CAPITA CROP EXPENDITURE Continuous 65298.17 69545.04 60440.5 62756.02 Per capita crop consumption by household. 
PER CAPITA NON-CROP 
EXPENDITURE 
Continuous 46754.38 50691.94 54652.11 58273.61 Per capita consumption of livestock and poultry, livestock 
products, fish farming and fish capture and farm forestry 
products by household. 
PER CAPITA AGRICULTURAL INPUT 
EXPENDITURE 
Continuous 164668.1 175283.9 167023.6 173735.7 Per capita expenses on agricultural inputs. 
PER CAPITA EDUCATIONAL 
EXPENDITURE 
Continuous 60773.71 66948.93 71753.8 69686.33 Per capita expenditure for educational services. 
PER CAPITA HEALTH EXPENDITURE Continuous 5945.219 7229.639 7618.373 14244.29 Per capita expenditure for health services. 
TOTAL CHANGE IN AGRICULTURAL 
AND OTHER BUSINESS ASSET (IN 
REAL TERMS) 
Continuous 73565 142607.6 214724 529612.6 Sum of agricultural assets households bought in the last 12 
months and expenditure in capital goods (in non-agricultural 
enterprises) in the last 12 months. 
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TOTAL AGRICULTURAL INPUT ASSET 
VALUE (IN REAL TERMS) 
Continuous 151046.5 151352 246957.3 197233.6 Value of owned equipment and asset used in agriculture. 
TOTAL CONSUMER DURABLE ASSET 
VALUE (IN REAL TERMS) 
Continuous 1163556 1420042 1565000 1927552 Total asset value of consumer durable goods. 
TOTAL MONTH PER YEAR WORKED Continuous 334.5448 379.3605 414.1053 414.2008 Total number of months per year worked. 
TOTAL DAYS PER MONTH WORKED Continuous 747.2892 848.02 923.1851 926.0869 Total number of days per month worked. 
TOTAL HOURS PER DAY WORKED Continuous 257.5589 292.9975 318.1137 319.5673 Total number of hours per day worked. 
DAILY WAGE (IN REAL TERMS) Continuous 2019.562 2256.998 2177.093 2109.863 Daily wage in cash (if paid daily). 
SALARIED WAGE (IN REAL TERMS) Continuous 54633.38 60337.16 61341.99 62946.09 Total net take-home monthly remuneration after all deduction 
at source. 
YEARLY BENEFITS (IN REAL TERMS) Continuous 70386.54 75589.07 91639.38 91995.92 Total value of yearly in-kind or other benefits (tips, bonuses or 
transport) from employment. 
COVARIATES             
RURAL Binary 0.6320787 0.670638 0.4822535 0.470001 Whether living in a rural area = 1, otherwise 0. 
HEAD OF HOUSEHOLD IS MALE Binary 0.9431431 0.945613 0.2440097 0.226789 Whether head of the household is male = 1, otherwise 0. 
AVERAGE AGE Continuous 26.58561 26.44676 8.317239 7.935949 Average age of household members. 
DEPENDENT Continuous 35.85337 42.34686 45.34921 47.27546 Age of the household member is <15 and >=65. 
PROPORTION OF FORMAL 
EDUCATION 
Continuous 0.6430289 0.675469 0.3841798 0.380877 Proportion of household members attended school, college, 
university or madrasa. 
ACCESS TO SANITATION Binary 0.4828272 0.494906 0.4997192 0.499995 Whether the household use sanitary or pacca latrines (water 
seal and pit) = 1, otherwise 0. 
ACCESS TO SAFE DRINKING WATER Binary 0.9708324 0.960805 0.1682809 0.194066 Whether the household has access to supply water or tube well 
water = 1, otherwise 0. 
ACCESS TO ELECTRICITY Binary 0.5085285 0.462904 0.4999415 0.498642 Whether the household has got electricity connection = 1, 
otherwise 0. 
HOUSE OWNERSHIP Binary 0.8086086 0.847424 0.3934076 0.359593 Whether the household own a house = 1, otherwise 0. 
LAND OWNERSHIP (IN REAL TERMS) Continuous 28.40776 32.68995 91.94583 95.34276 Amount of total operating land (in acres). 
Source: Author’s elaborations. 
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             APPENDIX TABLE 3: IMPACT ON LOG OF HOUSEHOLD INCOME PER CAPITA (TREATMENT GROUP A: RAINFALL-BASED FLOOD AFFECTED GROUP) 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
VARIABLES LOG OF TOTAL 
INCOME 
LOG OF CROP 
INCOME 
LOG OF NON-
CROP INCOME 
LOG OF BUSINESS 
INCOME 
LOG OF OTHER INCOME 
      
POST (YEAR 2010) 1.569*** 1.822*** 2.402*** 1.890*** -1.002*** 
 (0.0519) (0.0756) (0.0881) (0.0699) (0.0859) 
TREATMENT GROUP A 0.254*** 0.491*** 0.135* -0.0955 -0.0650 
 (0.0422) (0.0583) (0.0784) (0.0780) (0.0587) 
POST * TREATMENT GROUP A -0.229*** -0.527*** -0.166** 0.137* 0.325*** 
 (0.0455) (0.0619) (0.0825) (0.0796) (0.0787) 
RURAL -0.0706*** -0.0388** -0.0132 -0.0465*** -0.234*** 
 (0.0170) (0.0190) (0.0236) (0.0143) (0.0276) 
MALE HOUSEHOLD HEAD -0.353*** 0.289*** 0.359*** 0.206*** -0.915*** 
 (0.0440) (0.0809) (0.0784) (0.0794) (0.0508) 
AVERAGE AGE 0.0161*** 0.0145*** 0.0248*** 0.00596*** 0.0187*** 
 (0.00109) (0.00207) (0.00199) (0.00200) (0.00126) 
DEPENDENT 0.0147*** 0.0143*** 0.0195*** 0.0139*** -0.000778 
 (0.000367) (0.000510) (0.000525) (0.000291) (0.000755) 
PROPORTION_FORMAL EDUCATION 1.316*** 0.982*** 0.344*** 0.825*** 0.768*** 
 (0.0381) (0.0630) (0.0685) (0.0596) (0.0447) 
ACCESS TO SANITATION 0.185*** -0.00214 -0.00889 0.0928*** 0.697*** 
 (0.0143) (0.0157) (0.0205) (0.0124) (0.0248) 
ACCESS TO DRINKING WATER 0.0140 -0.0249 -0.121** 0.0671* -0.108* 
 (0.0330) (0.0395) (0.0526) (0.0389) (0.0549) 
ACCESS TO ELECTRICITY 0.257*** 0.0702*** -0.0253 0.0932*** 0.785*** 
 (0.0151) (0.0168) (0.0221) (0.0134) (0.0260) 
HOUSE OWNERSHIP 0.0633*** -0.0506** -0.0155 -0.0291* 0.211*** 
 (0.0234) (0.0222) (0.0289) (0.0169) (0.0369) 
LOG OF LAND OWNERSHIP 0.116*** 0.136*** 0.0905*** -0.0321*** 0.152*** 
 (0.00425) (0.00515) (0.00574) (0.00369) (0.00693) 
YEAR_2005 -0.0680* 0.136** -0.258*** 0.108 -0.0230 
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 (0.0398) (0.0603) (0.0690) (0.0679) (0.0505) 
YEAR2005 * TREATMENT GROUP A -0.304*** -0.306*** -0.228** 0.191** -0.121* 
 (0.0508) (0.0785) (0.0929) (0.0910) (0.0659) 
CONSTANT 8.696*** 6.794*** 6.301*** 8.570*** 8.260*** 
 (0.0759) (0.115) (0.128) (0.116) (0.104) 
      
OBSERVATIONS 23,749 16,823 18,601 15,186 19,359 
R-SQUARED 0.816 0.785 0.780 0.807 0.228 
                Source: Author’s calculations. 
               Note: Robust standard errors in parentheses *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.  
 
 
              APPENDIX TABLE 4: IMPACT ON LOG OF HOUSEHOLD INCOME PER CAPITA (TREATMENT GROUP B: SELF-REPORTED FLOOD AFFECTED GROUP) 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
VARIABLES LOG OF TOTAL 
INCOME 
LOG OF CROP 
INCOME 
LOG OF NON-
CROP INCOME 
LOG OF BUSINESS 
INCOME 
LOG OF OTHER INCOME 
      
POST (YEAR 2010) 1.547*** 1.815*** 2.312*** 1.902*** -0.967*** 
 (0.0533) (0.0767) (0.0884) (0.0704) (0.0878) 
TREATMENT GROUP B 0.254*** 0.491*** 0.135* -0.0956 -0.0648 
 (0.0422) (0.0583) (0.0784) (0.0780) (0.0587) 
POST * TREATMENT GROUP B -0.216*** -0.487*** -0.000951 0.0821 0.0573 
 (0.0435) (0.0595) (0.0801) (0.0786) (0.0685) 
RURAL -0.0702*** -0.0391** -0.0123 -0.0464*** -0.234*** 
 (0.0170) (0.0190) (0.0236) (0.0143) (0.0276) 
MALE HOUSEHOLD HEAD -0.354*** 0.288*** 0.353*** 0.207*** -0.917*** 
 (0.0440) (0.0810) (0.0780) (0.0795) (0.0508) 
AVERAGE AGE 0.0161*** 0.0145*** 0.0247*** 0.00597*** 0.0187*** 
 (0.00109) (0.00207) (0.00199) (0.00200) (0.00126) 
DEPENDENT 0.0148*** 0.0143*** 0.0196*** 0.0139*** -0.000791 
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 (0.000369) (0.000511) (0.000523) (0.000292) (0.000755) 
PROPORTION_FORMAL EDUCATION 1.316*** 0.981*** 0.343*** 0.826*** 0.775*** 
 (0.0380) (0.0630) (0.0685) (0.0596) (0.0447) 
ACCESS TO SANITATION 0.185*** -0.00140 -0.00701 0.0917*** 0.691*** 
 (0.0143) (0.0156) (0.0204) (0.0124) (0.0248) 
ACCESS TO DRINKING WATER 0.0115 -0.0212 -0.121** 0.0625 -0.128** 
 (0.0330) (0.0393) (0.0524) (0.0388) (0.0549) 
ACCESS TO ELECTRICITY 0.257*** 0.0709*** -0.0245 0.0924*** 0.779*** 
 (0.0151) (0.0168) (0.0221) (0.0134) (0.0260) 
HOUSE OWNERSHIP 0.0635*** -0.0507** -0.0144 -0.0292* 0.211*** 
 (0.0234) (0.0222) (0.0288) (0.0169) (0.0369) 
LOG OF LAND OWNERSHIP 0.116*** 0.136*** 0.0905*** -0.0320*** 0.152*** 
 (0.00425) (0.00516) (0.00574) (0.00369) (0.00694) 
YEAR_2005 -0.0679* 0.136** -0.259*** 0.109 -0.0194 
 (0.0398) (0.0604) (0.0690) (0.0679) (0.0505) 
YEAR2005 * TREATMENT GROUP B -0.304*** -0.306*** -0.228** 0.191** -0.121* 
 (0.0508) (0.0786) (0.0929) (0.0910) (0.0659) 
CONSTANT 8.699*** 6.791*** 6.306*** 8.573*** 8.282*** 
 (0.0759) (0.115) (0.128) (0.116) (0.104) 
      
OBSERVATIONS 23,749 16,823 18,601 15,186 19,359 
R-SQUARED 0.816 0.785 0.780 0.807 0.227 
              Source: Author’s calculations. 
             Note: Robust standard errors in parentheses *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.  
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APPENDIX TABLE 5: IMPACT ON LOG OF HOUSEHOLD EXPENDITURE PER CAPITA (TREATMENT GROUP A: RAINFALL-BASED FLOOD AFFECTED GROUP) 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
VARIABLES LOG OF TOTAL 
EXPENDITURE 
LOG OF FOOD 
EXPENDITURE 
LOG OF NON-
FOOD 
EXPENDITURE 
LOG OF CROP 
EXPENDITURE 
LOG OF NON-
CROP 
EXPENDITURE 
LOG OF 
AGRICULTURAL 
INPUT 
EXPENDITURE 
LOG OF 
EDUCATIONAL 
EXPENDITURE 
LOG OF 
HEALTH 
EXPENDITURE 
         
POST (YEAR 2010) 1.997*** 3.329*** 2.734*** 1.246*** 1.895*** 1.873*** 2.241*** 2.617*** 
 (0.0347) (0.0245) (0.0358) (0.0548) (0.0678) (0.0684) (0.0563) (0.0712) 
TREATMENT GROUP A 0.137*** 0.0602*** 0.0936*** 0.107*** 0.276*** 0.286*** -0.0935 -0.260*** 
 (0.0218) (0.0128) (0.0241) (0.0393) (0.0612) (0.0420) (0.0570) (0.0658) 
POST * TREATMENT GROUP A -0.144*** -0.0546*** -0.0750*** -0.127*** -0.268*** -0.315*** 0.126** 0.273*** 
 (0.0256) (0.0152) (0.0269) (0.0426) (0.0633) (0.0463) (0.0588) (0.0681) 
RURAL -0.0305*** -0.00729 -0.0510*** -0.0124 0.0326* 0.00573 -0.0804*** 0.0571*** 
 (0.0101) (0.00518) (0.0109) (0.0160) (0.0170) (0.0199) (0.0151) (0.0178) 
MALE HOUSEHOLD HEAD 0.122*** 0.0383*** -0.0696** 0.258*** 0.237*** 0.484*** -0.370*** -0.0190 
 (0.0249) (0.0138) (0.0279) (0.0629) (0.0496) (0.0773) (0.0504) (0.0605) 
AVERAGE AGE 0.00562*** 0.00597*** 0.00632*** 0.0113*** 0.0168*** 0.0199*** 0.0258*** 0.0113*** 
 (0.000736) (0.000393) (0.000763) (0.00146) (0.00141) (0.00173) (0.00214) (0.00171) 
DEPENDENT 0.0138*** 0.0141*** 0.0132*** 0.0163*** 0.0173*** 0.0175*** 0.0143*** 0.0164*** 
 (0.000294) (0.000230) (0.000285) (0.000380) (0.000429) (0.000527) (0.000344) (0.000387) 
PROPORTION_FORMAL 
EDUCATION 
1.055*** 0.407*** 1.084*** 0.501*** 0.650*** 0.656*** 2.776*** 0.558*** 
 (0.0223) (0.0110) (0.0247) (0.0460) (0.0480) (0.0558) (0.0465) (0.0569) 
ACCESS TO SANITATION 0.0530*** 0.0567*** 0.111*** -0.0246* -0.0155 -0.00304 0.155*** 0.0755*** 
 (0.00853) (0.00437) (0.00897) (0.0130) (0.0149) (0.0158) (0.0135) (0.0154) 
ACCESS TO DRINKING WATER 0.146*** -0.00973 0.161*** -0.0231 0.0259 0.162*** 0.0495 -0.0774* 
 (0.0215) (0.0101) (0.0210) (0.0310) (0.0385) (0.0394) (0.0332) (0.0396) 
ACCESS TO ELECTRICITY 0.132*** 0.0914*** 0.171*** 0.0520*** 0.0304* 0.0747*** 0.145*** 0.0829*** 
 (0.00903) (0.00472) (0.00956) (0.0135) (0.0158) (0.0170) (0.0146) (0.0166) 
HOUSE OWNERSHIP -0.0341** -0.0459*** -0.0570*** -0.114*** -0.00544 -0.134*** -0.118*** -0.0352 
 (0.0135) (0.00720) (0.0145) (0.0195) (0.0207) (0.0227) (0.0199) (0.0234) 
LOG OF LAND OWNERSHIP 0.157*** 0.0194*** 0.0323*** 0.177*** 0.111*** 0.201*** 0.0135*** -0.00416 
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 (0.00283) (0.00128) (0.00268) (0.00511) (0.00415) (0.00564) (0.00382) (0.00442) 
YEAR_2005 -0.525*** 0.133*** -0.616*** -0.216*** -0.237*** -0.488*** 0.199*** -0.0827 
 (0.0212) (0.0112) (0.0238) (0.0423) (0.0532) (0.0492) (0.0467) (0.0585) 
YEAR2005 * TREATMENT 
GROUP A 
-0.121*** -0.105*** -0.173*** 0.162*** -0.195*** -0.00682 0.0534 0.228*** 
 (0.0273) (0.0150) (0.0305) (0.0544) (0.0697) (0.0642) (0.0656) (0.0778) 
CONSTANT 8.903*** 6.007*** 8.011*** 7.285*** 6.125*** 6.636*** 4.842*** 4.171*** 
 (0.0435) (0.0222) (0.0471) (0.0859) (0.0897) (0.103) (0.0865) (0.0997) 
         
OBSERVATIONS 24,107 24,107 24,093 18,475 19,951 18,594 19,557 18,425 
R-SQUARED 0.943 0.984 0.942 0.826 0.834 0.841 0.892 0.833 
Source: Author’s calculations. 
        Note: Robust standard errors in parentheses *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.  
 
 
 
APPENDIX TABLE 6: IMPACT ON LOG OF HOUSEHOLD EXPENDITURE PER CAPITA (TREATMENT GROUP B: SELF-REPORTED FLOOD AFFECTED GROUP) 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
VARIABLES LOG OF TOTAL 
EXPENDITURE 
LOG OF FOOD 
EXPENDITURE 
LOG OF NON-
FOOD 
EXPENDITURE 
LOG OF CROP 
EXPENDITURE 
LOG OF NON-
CROP 
EXPENDITURE 
LOG OF 
AGRICULTURAL 
INPUT 
EXPENDITURE 
LOG OF 
EDUCATIONAL 
EXPENDITURE 
LOG OF 
HEALTH 
EXPENDITURE 
         
POST (YEAR 2010) 1.988*** 3.311*** 2.723*** 1.258*** 1.897*** 1.861*** 2.243*** 2.601*** 
 (0.0358) (0.0257) (0.0368) (0.0549) (0.0684) (0.0686) (0.0564) (0.0723) 
TREATMENT GROUP B 0.137*** 0.0602*** 0.0936*** 0.107*** 0.276*** 0.286*** -0.0934 -0.260*** 
 (0.0218) (0.0128) (0.0241) (0.0394) (0.0612) (0.0420) (0.0570) (0.0658) 
POST * TREATMENT GROUP B -0.124*** -0.0300** -0.0740*** -0.129*** -0.278*** -0.271*** 0.0943 0.288*** 
 (0.0231) (0.0136) (0.0250) (0.0406) (0.0620) (0.0436) (0.0576) (0.0668) 
RURAL -0.0304*** -0.00708 -0.0508*** -0.0127 0.0326* 0.00564 -0.0802*** 0.0574*** 
 (0.0101) (0.00518) (0.0109) (0.0160) (0.0171) (0.0200) (0.0152) (0.0178) 
MALE HOUSEHOLD HEAD 0.122*** 0.0376*** -0.0701** 0.260*** 0.237*** 0.483*** -0.370*** -0.0203 
 (0.0249) (0.0138) (0.0279) (0.0630) (0.0496) (0.0773) (0.0504) (0.0605) 
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AVERAGE AGE 0.00561*** 0.00596*** 0.00632*** 0.0113*** 0.0168*** 0.0199*** 0.0258*** 0.0113*** 
 (0.000736) (0.000393) (0.000763) (0.00146) (0.00141) (0.00173) (0.00215) (0.00171) 
DEPENDENT 0.0138*** 0.0141*** 0.0132*** 0.0162*** 0.0173*** 0.0175*** 0.0143*** 0.0164*** 
 (0.000295) (0.000231) (0.000286) (0.000380) (0.000430) (0.000527) (0.000344) (0.000389) 
PROPORTION_FORMAL 
EDUCATION 
1.055*** 0.407*** 1.084*** 0.501*** 0.650*** 0.655*** 2.777*** 0.558*** 
 (0.0223) (0.0110) (0.0247) (0.0460) (0.0480) (0.0558) (0.0465) (0.0569) 
ACCESS TO SANITATION 0.0532*** 0.0569*** 0.111*** -0.0244* -0.0156 -0.00239 0.155*** 0.0756*** 
 (0.00854) (0.00437) (0.00897) (0.0130) (0.0149) (0.0158) (0.0135) (0.0154) 
ACCESS TO DRINKING WATER 0.146*** -0.0107 0.159*** -0.0207 0.0251 0.165*** 0.0465 -0.0794** 
 (0.0215) (0.0100) (0.0210) (0.0309) (0.0384) (0.0393) (0.0331) (0.0394) 
ACCESS TO ELECTRICITY 0.132*** 0.0914*** 0.170*** 0.0523*** 0.0303* 0.0752*** 0.144*** 0.0827*** 
 (0.00903) (0.00471) (0.00955) (0.0135) (0.0158) (0.0170) (0.0146) (0.0166) 
HOUSE OWNERSHIP -0.0340** -0.0457*** -0.0570*** -0.115*** -0.00544 -0.134*** -0.118*** -0.0350 
 (0.0135) (0.00719) (0.0145) (0.0195) (0.0207) (0.0227) (0.0199) (0.0234) 
LOG OF LAND OWNERSHIP 0.157*** 0.0194*** 0.0323*** 0.177*** 0.111*** 0.201*** 0.0135*** -0.00414 
 (0.00283) (0.00128) (0.00268) (0.00511) (0.00415) (0.00564) (0.00382) (0.00442) 
YEAR_2005 -0.525*** 0.133*** -0.616*** -0.216*** -0.237*** -0.488*** 0.200*** -0.0826 
 (0.0212) (0.0112) (0.0238) (0.0423) (0.0532) (0.0492) (0.0467) (0.0585) 
YEAR2005 * TREATMENT 
GROUP B 
-0.121*** -0.105*** -0.173*** 0.162*** -0.195*** -0.00678 0.0534 0.228*** 
 (0.0273) (0.0150) (0.0305) (0.0544) (0.0697) (0.0642) (0.0656) (0.0778) 
CONSTANT 8.903*** 6.009*** 8.013*** 7.282*** 6.126*** 6.635*** 4.845*** 4.174*** 
 (0.0434) (0.0221) (0.0470) (0.0859) (0.0896) (0.103) (0.0865) (0.0997) 
         
OBSERVATIONS 24,107 24,107 24,093 18,475 19,951 18,594 19,557 18,425 
R-SQUARED 0.943 0.984 0.942 0.826 0.834 0.841 0.892 0.833 
Source: Author’s calculations. 
        Note: Robust standard errors in parentheses *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.  
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                    APPENDIX TABLE 7: IMPACT ON LOG OF TOTAL ASSET OUTCOMES (TREATMENT GROUP A: RAINFALL-BASED FLOOD AFFECTED GROUP) 
 (1) (2) (3) 
VARIABLES LOG OF TOTAL CHANGE IN 
AGRICULTURAL AND 
OTHER BUSINESS ASSET 
LOG OF TOTAL 
AGRICULTURAL INPUT 
ASSET VALUE 
LOG OF TOTAL CONSUMER DURABLE ASSET 
VALUE 
    
POST (YEAR 2010) 0.384*** 1.162*** 2.639*** 
 (0.133) (0.0862) (0.0471) 
TREATMENT GROUP A -0.202 0.295*** 0.521*** 
 (0.129) (0.0732) (0.0390) 
POST * TREATMENT GROUP A 0.212 -0.275*** -0.455*** 
 (0.137) (0.0786) (0.0423) 
RURAL -0.0724** 0.000385 -0.137*** 
 (0.0349) (0.0234) (0.0149) 
MALE HOUSEHOLD HEAD 0.706*** 0.750*** 0.116*** 
 (0.123) (0.0946) (0.0394) 
AVERAGE AGE 0.0155*** 0.00282 -0.00328*** 
 (0.00506) (0.00253) (0.00101) 
DEPENDENT 0.0233*** 0.0203*** 0.0141*** 
 (0.000596) (0.000502) (0.000327) 
PROPORTION_FORMAL EDUCATION 1.292*** 1.117*** 1.795*** 
 (0.139) (0.0795) (0.0338) 
ACCESS TO SANITATION 0.0620** 0.0625*** 0.197*** 
 (0.0296) (0.0204) (0.0124) 
ACCESS TO DRINKING WATER -0.0698 -0.0142 0.138*** 
 (0.0795) (0.0517) (0.0355) 
ACCESS TO ELECTRICITY 0.0828*** 0.0691*** 0.447*** 
 (0.0314) (0.0214) (0.0133) 
HOUSE OWNERSHIP -0.00918 -0.0542** 0.0699*** 
 (0.0437) (0.0274) (0.0199) 
LOG OF LAND OWNERSHIP 0.00984 0.0973*** 0.0691*** 
 (0.00848) (0.00591) (0.00377) 
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YEAR_2005 -0.460*** -0.582*** -0.442*** 
 (0.121) (0.0728) (0.0357) 
YEAR2005 * TREATMENT GROUP A 0.346** -0.341*** -0.452*** 
 (0.167) (0.0968) (0.0463) 
CONSTANT 6.030*** 6.714*** 8.404*** 
 (0.212) (0.139) (0.0696) 
    
OBSERVATIONS 13,217 15,941 23,807 
R-SQUARED 0.436 0.751 0.910 
                   Source: Author’s calculations. 
                  Note: Robust standard errors in parentheses *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.  
 
 
                       APPENDIX TABLE 8: IMPACT ON LOG OF TOTAL ASSET OUTCOMES (TREATMENT GROUP B: SELF-REPORTED FLOOD AFFECTED GROUP) 
 (1) (2) (3) 
VARIABLES LOG OF TOTAL CHANGE IN 
AGRICULTURAL AND 
OTHER BUSINESS ASSET 
LOG OF TOTAL 
AGRICULTURAL INPUT 
ASSET VALUE 
LOG OF TOTAL CONSUMER DURABLE 
ASSET VALUE 
    
POST (YEAR 2010) 0.599*** 1.177*** 2.636*** 
 (0.134) (0.0868) (0.0482) 
TREATMENT GROUP B -0.202 0.295*** 0.521*** 
 (0.129) (0.0732) (0.0390) 
POST * TREATMENT GROUP B -0.139 -0.316*** -0.507*** 
 (0.132) (0.0753) (0.0402) 
RURAL -0.0767** 0.000315 -0.136*** 
 (0.0347) (0.0234) (0.0149) 
MALE HOUSEHOLD HEAD 0.776*** 0.752*** 0.116*** 
 (0.126) (0.0946) (0.0394) 
AVERAGE AGE 0.0164*** 0.00284 -0.00328*** 
  
181 
 
 (0.00507) (0.00253) (0.00101) 
DEPENDENT 0.0230*** 0.0203*** 0.0142*** 
 (0.000594) (0.000503) (0.000328) 
PROPORTION_FORMAL EDUCATION 1.290*** 1.117*** 1.797*** 
 (0.139) (0.0795) (0.0338) 
ACCESS TO SANITATION 0.0571* 0.0619*** 0.197*** 
 (0.0294) (0.0204) (0.0124) 
ACCESS TO DRINKING WATER -0.0605 -0.0160 0.133*** 
 (0.0788) (0.0515) (0.0355) 
ACCESS TO ELECTRICITY 0.0811*** 0.0687*** 0.446*** 
 (0.0313) (0.0214) (0.0133) 
HOUSE OWNERSHIP -0.0135 -0.0543** 0.0698*** 
 (0.0433) (0.0274) (0.0199) 
LOG OF LAND OWNERSHIP 0.00983 0.0974*** 0.0692*** 
 (0.00844) (0.00591) (0.00377) 
YEAR_2005 -0.459*** -0.581*** -0.442*** 
 (0.121) (0.0728) (0.0357) 
YEAR2005 * TREATMENT GROUP B 0.345** -0.341*** -0.452*** 
 (0.167) (0.0968) (0.0463) 
CONSTANT 5.944*** 6.714*** 8.410*** 
 (0.214) (0.139) (0.0696) 
    
OBSERVATIONS 13,217 15,941 23,807 
R-SQUARED 0.442 0.751 0.910 
                  Source: Author’s calculations. 
                   Note: Robust standard errors in parentheses *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.  
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APPENDIX TABLE 9: IMPACT ON VARIOUS INCOME AND EXPENDITURE BRACKETS PER CAPITA (TREAT GROUP A: RAINFALL-BASED FLOOD AFFECTED GROUP) 
VARIABLES I 
15TH 
II 
25TH 
III 
50TH 
IV 
75TH 
V 
85TH 
INCOME      
      
TOTAL INCOME -8,684.68*** 8,446.09*** 436.31 -22,268.13*** -13,699.11*** 
 (456.81) (780.54) (1,704.79) (3,094.70) (5,224.42) 
CROP INCOME -3,849.69*** -4,090.00*** 1,418.15*** -3,181.12* -6,615.66*** 
 (430.00) (4.41) (449.69) (1,643.33) (1,197.43) 
NON-CROP INCOME -146.66 1,946.66 -3,359.52*** -635.47* -51,378.16*** 
 (131.02) (2,223.99) (116.93) (353.80) (1,043.89) 
BUSINESS INCOME 0.00 7,433.31*** 8,643.20*** -14,115.48*** -9,749.66** 
 (677.82) (493.02) (68.78) (2,174.70) (4,201.40) 
OTHER INCOME 0.00 43.78*** 2,070.04*** 510.03 -1,762.24 
 (2.01) (6.56) (361.38) (1,290.58) (2,626.63) 
      
EXPENDITURE      
      
TOTAL EXPENDITURE -808.53*** -24,087.06*** -5,357.88*** -8,871.79*** -31,949.62*** 
 (273.02) (355.66) (802.60) (1,639.79) (2,694.14) 
FOOD EXPENDITURE 770.49*** -125.71*** -98.26*** 1,022.91*** 110.73*** 
 (14.31) (13.12) (16.39) (28.35) (37.05) 
NON-FOOD EXPENDITURE -2,222.90*** -10,549.13*** -2,176.59*** -21,474.10*** -13,547.52*** 
 (88.14) (110.43) (236.76) (624.43) (964.09) 
CROP EXPENDITURE 1,208.29*** -71.07 -2,361.67*** -601.92 -435.27 
 (230.31) (281.77) (445.68) (707.91) (731.81) 
NON-CROP EXPENDITURE 708.00*** -1,222.90*** -136.89 -3,964.10*** -1,195.00*** 
 (65.13) (62.82) (141.31) (342.22) (448.64) 
AGRICULTURAL INPUT 582.67*** -2,991.49*** -9,122.85*** -7,339.18*** -17,790.28*** 
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EXPENDITURE 
 (2.26) (105.19) (422.66) (999.41) (1,730.57) 
EDUCATIONAL EXPENDITURE 9.34 -233.82*** -397.61** -1,738.33*** -1,230.27** 
 (20.71) (43.86) (158.94) (358.27) (568.46) 
HEALTH EXPENDITURE -101.97*** -2.90 -113.02*** -54.37 127.51** 
 (2.85) (5.15) (13.33) (38.36) (62.78) 
                 Source: Author’s calculations. 
        Notes: a This table only presents the coefficient estimates for the Post*Treat Group A variable, our main estimated parameter. All other controls 
were not included in these regressions. 
 b Robust standard errors in parentheses *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. 
 
 
 
APPENDIX TABLE 10: IMPACT ON VARIOUS INCOME AND EXPENDITURE BRACKETS PER CAPITA (TREAT GROUP B: SELF-REPORTED FLOOD AFFECTED GROUP) 
VARIABLES I 
15TH 
II 
25TH 
III 
50TH 
IV 
75TH 
V 
85TH 
INCOME      
      
TOTAL INCOME -38,371.00*** -77,008.91*** 16,693.69*** 43,108.87*** 148,187.89*** 
 (368.88) (581.29) (1,421.33) (2,476.48) (3,862.80) 
CROP INCOME -9,327.00*** -9,201.70*** -4,635.45*** -112.83 -6,862.55*** 
 (555.90) (3.16) (353.17) (1,046.94) (670.10) 
NON-CROP INCOME 12,419.98*** 20,550.00*** 6,377.88*** 32,379.83*** 73,085.09*** 
 (1,094.04) (613.00) (81.40) (322.69) (725.28) 
BUSINESS INCOME -32,866.70*** -23,281.31*** -47,990.18*** -29,561.85*** 79,527.03*** 
 (1,243.73) (854.74) (53.53) (1,224.90) (2,706.31) 
OTHER INCOME 0.00 -289.55*** -513.30 -1,491.63 -2,095.57 
 (1.54) (4.49) (330.61) (968.46) (2,149.39) 
      
EXPENDITURE      
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TOTAL EXPENDITURE -56,713.22*** 18,016.19*** -13,414.00*** -39,815.17*** -113,040.00*** 
 (180.36) (250.64) (503.54) (1,002.04) (1,653.98) 
FOOD EXPENDITURE -6,099.71*** -1,940.31*** 4,235.44*** -1,780.30*** 1,348.30*** 
 (9.17) (8.76) (10.07) (19.47) (21.62) 
NON-FOOD EXPENDITURE -10,082.90*** 32,942.18*** -15,039.21*** -29,247.10*** -35,751.58*** 
 (56.34) (73.07) (158.56) (398.29) (820.01) 
CROP EXPENDITURE -6,414.05*** -2,305.74*** -1,614.01*** -6,052.92*** 4,804.73*** 
 (149.49) (240.00) (214.63) (472.92) (533.45) 
NON-CROP EXPENDITURE -8,169.34*** -2,509.57*** 1,306.45*** -4,544.11*** 1,679.67*** 
 (55.10) (47.52) (79.69) (218.83) (293.02) 
AGRICULTURAL INPUT 
EXPENDITURE 
8,044.00*** 21,020.51*** 7,650.48*** 9,418.78*** -44,504.28*** 
 (1.51) (62.09) (295.02) (463.42) (922.90) 
EDUCATIONAL EXPENDITURE -6,125.34*** -5,854.16*** 3,361.73*** -6,333.33*** -3,001.75*** 
 (13.17) (29.73) (107.00) (247.74) (341.57) 
HEALTH EXPENDITURE -101.97*** -312.23*** 276.65*** 284.30*** 52.51 
 (1.81) (3.75) (8.94) (26.09) (42.43) 
            Source: Author’s calculations. 
   Notes: a This table only presents the coefficient estimates for the Post*Treat Group B variable, our main estimated parameter. All other controls  
                   were not included in these regressions. 
                          b Robust standard errors in parentheses *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. 
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CONCLUSION OF THE THESIS: 
 In Chapter One, we survey the literature that examines the direct and indirect impact 
of natural disaster events specifically on the poor and their impact on various income groups. 
We argue that it is perhaps even more important to determine the long-term effects of 
catastrophic disasters on various income groups, rather than only their direct and indirect 
short-term impacts. One issue that may turn out to be the most important in determining 
post-disaster outcomes is not the degree and level of destruction, or the degree of 
preparedness, but the adjustment in expectations with regard to future events that 
catastrophes often prompt. Kobe, for example, was not perceived to be a high-risk area for 
earthquakes before 1995, an assessment which unsurprisingly changed in the disaster’s 
aftermath. This may be especially important as these changes in the subjective probabilities 
assigned to plausible hazards may well matter differently for people from different socio-
economic backgrounds, given the additional exposure of the poor to risk and given the 
possibility of decreased investment leading into poverty traps. However, this is still an open 
empirical question.  
Natural disasters affect households adversely, and they do so especially for people 
with lower incomes and wealth that are less able to smooth their consumption. In Chapter 
Two, we conducted a meta-regression analysis of the existing literature on the impacts of 
disasters on households, focusing especially on the poor and on poverty measures. We find 
much heterogeneity in these impacts which is most likely the most important insight gleaned 
from our analysis. Nevertheless, several general patterns that are observed in individual case 
studies also emerge. Incomes are clearly impacted adversely, with the impact observed 
specifically in per-capita measures. Consumption is also reduced, but to a lesser extent than 
incomes. Importantly, poor households appear to smooth their food consumption by reducing 
the consumption of non-food items; the most significant items in this category are spending 
on health and education. This suggests potentially long-term adverse consequences as 
consumption of health and education services is often better viewed as long-term investment. 
However, there are limits to what we can conclude using our methodology covering a fairly 
large and diverse literature and they are quite obvious as we note that we observe no robust 
insight on the impact of disasters in the longer term. 
  
186 
 
It is well understood that any government’s public spending decision-making 
processes are affected by other considerations rather than need, but the balance between 
these competing pressures is not obviously clear. Our objective in Chapter Three is to identify 
the determinants’ of publicly allocated and realized DRR spending at the local government 
(sub-district) level in Bangladesh. We employ the Heckman two-stage selection model to 
empirically estimate the covariates where we assume public spending is a function of the 
probability of flood risks, population size, poverty rate, socio-economic development, political 
connections, ethnic composition, and details about the geo-location of the sub-district. We 
find little evidence (and some counter-evidence) of any rationale in the regional funding 
allocation decisions of the Bangladesh government. The DRR regional allocations do not seem 
to be determined by risk and exposure, and only weakly by vulnerability. Even obvious and 
transparent political economy motivations do not seem to explain much of the variation in 
inter-regional funding. We do not rule out the possibility that our results are biased because 
of the absence of long-term data, a possible omitted variable bias and reverse causality. All 
these justify future research in this area. Whether our conclusions apply to other types of 
central government funding in Bangladesh, or whether this is indeed typical of regional 
allocations in lower-income countries, are also all still open questions that require more 
evidence-based answers. 
The last few years have seen a new wave of empirical research on the consequences 
of changes in precipitation patterns, temperature and other climatic variables on economic 
development and household welfare. Our objective in Chapter Four is to estimate the impacts 
of recurrent-flooding on income, expenditure, asset and labour market outcomes. We start 
with identification of the treatment (affected) groups with setting two benchmarks i.e. using 
self- and non-self-reported information. We employ a difference-in-difference estimation 
model to understand the impacts of disaster on households surveyed in 2000, 2005 and 2010. 
Our results suggest a sharp decline in agricultural income (crop and non-crop) for both 
treatment group – A (rainfall-based) and B (self-reported). This significant decline in 
agricultural income, being consistent with previous literatures reveals a clear message on 
timely adoption of insurance in the context of increased climatic threat to achieve sustainable 
poverty goals for the extreme poor especially in agriculture-based economy like Bangladesh. 
As per expenditure in concerned, we also observe a negative response to crop and agricultural 
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input expenditure consistent with our theoretical prior in both treatment cases. We extend 
our analysis for income and expenditure categories for households of various socio-economic 
backgrounds. We find a contrast in terms of impact for the ultra (bottom 15 percent) poor in 
total income and expenditure between treatment groups – A and B. The ‘disaster-
development’ literature has made considerably less progress on the use of shock modules in 
survey data to empirically estimate the impacts of natural disasters on development 
outcomes. The recent addition of shock questionnaires in nationally representative 
household income and expenditure surveys provides an ample scope to identify the self-
reported affected groups in repeated natural disasters. This self-identification in the 
questionnaire could be advantageous to capture the disaster impacts on households’ more 
precisely when compared to index-based identifications based on geographical exposure. 
However, questions’ based on ‘yes/no’ responses (i.e. close-ended) might not be sufficient to 
identify the true development impacts. One possible solution is of course, more respondents 
in addition to incorporating degrees of actual hazard awareness, experience and 
preparedness questions’ to identify the real affected group in repeated natural shocks. 
However, the evidences and the novel approach that we adopt in this paper could justify 
future research in estimating welfare adaptation costs of climate-induced persistent natural 
events in developing countries.  
 
 
